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Bolkvadze Ketevan

Ketevan Bolkvadze

Universitetslektor

Bolkvadze Ketevan

Corrupt or Repressive? How Political Competition Incentivizes Hybrid Regimes to Subvert Police in Distinct Ways

Författare

  • Ketevan Bolkvadze

Summary, in English

This article develops an argument that in hybrid regimes, different levels of party competition incentivize incumbents to subvert the police in distinct ways, resulting in more corrupt or more repressive policing practices. In competing-pyramid hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine (2013–2019), elites have stronger incentives to preserve police corruption as a tool for immediate resource extraction amid pervasive uncertainty about political survival. Conversely, in dominant-pyramid systems, like Georgia (2003–2012), ruling elites have stronger incentives to curtail police corruption in pursuit of a more disciplined and repressive police force. This theory is illustrated through a structured focused comparison and more than 60 interviews collected during several rounds of fieldwork in Kyiv and Tbilisi.

Avdelning/ar

  • Statsvetenskapliga institutionen

Publiceringsår

2025-07

Språk

Engelska

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Governance

Volym

38

Avvikelse

3

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Wiley-Blackwell

Ämne

  • Political Science

Nyckelord

  • corruption
  • hybrid regimes
  • policing
  • repression

Aktiv

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0952-1895