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Holdo2

Markus Holdo

Docent | Universitetslektor

Holdo2

Power Games : Elites, Movements, and Strategic Cooperation

Författare

  • Markus Holdo

Summary, in English

Cooperation between movements and political elites are frequently associated with the risk of cooptation. Because it undercuts contentious actors, cooptation may seem rational for elites that seek to protect their interests. However, recent scholarship questions whether this view is empirically valid. Adding to these debates, this article demonstrates that even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that elites always act to maintain power, cooptation may often not be the rational choice of strategy. This article presents a typology of elite responses that focuses on three phases of elite–movement interaction: preparatory, term-setting, and confrontation phases. In each phase, elites’ choice between cooptation and conditional cooperation depends on whether legitimacy appears instrumental to achieve their goals. Cooperation, as opposed to cooptation, generates legitimacy and can, therefore, be used strategically by movements.

Publiceringsår

2020

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

189-203

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Political Studies Review

Volym

18

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Wiley-Blackwell

Ämne

  • Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)

Nyckelord

  • movements
  • cooptation
  • power

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1478-9302