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A political economy theory of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in OECD countries

A political economy theory of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in OECD countries, article in Nature Communications by Nils Droste, Benjamin Chatterton & Jakob Skovgaard.

Subsidies to fossil fuels – oil, coal and gas – are notoriously difficult to reform with global subsidy levels reaching a record $1.5 trillion in 2022. In a new article, Nils Droste, Benjamin Chatterton and Jakob Skovgaard study the political economy of fossil fuel subsidies and their reform.

Studying industrialised countries they find that renewable energy and well-functioning political institutions increase the likelihood of reform. Renewable energy can break the the lock-in of fossil fuel subsidies, especially when the level of democracy is high and the political processes is insulated from fossil fuel interests.

Authors: Nils Droste, Benjamin Chatterton & Jakob Skovgaard

Title: A political economy theory of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in OECD countries

Link to the article in Nature Communications: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-49835-4