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Markus Holdo

Associate Professor | Senior Lecturer

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Power Games : Elites, Movements, and Strategic Cooperation

Author

  • Markus Holdo

Summary, in English

Cooperation between movements and political elites are frequently associated with the risk of cooptation. Because it undercuts contentious actors, cooptation may seem rational for elites that seek to protect their interests. However, recent scholarship questions whether this view is empirically valid. Adding to these debates, this article demonstrates that even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that elites always act to maintain power, cooptation may often not be the rational choice of strategy. This article presents a typology of elite responses that focuses on three phases of elite–movement interaction: preparatory, term-setting, and confrontation phases. In each phase, elites’ choice between cooptation and conditional cooperation depends on whether legitimacy appears instrumental to achieve their goals. Cooperation, as opposed to cooptation, generates legitimacy and can, therefore, be used strategically by movements.

Publishing year

2020

Language

English

Pages

189-203

Publication/Series

Political Studies Review

Volume

18

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Topic

  • Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)

Keywords

  • movements
  • cooptation
  • power

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1478-9302