Electoral Cycles in Government Policy Making : Strategic Timing of Austerity Reform Measures in Western Europe

Summary, in English

This article investigates whether governing parties strategically time austerity policies to help them win re-election. It contributes to existing research by focusing directly on government policy output, analyzing over 1,200 welfare and taxation austerity measures in thirteen Western European countries over twenty years. In line with previous research, the authors find that governments become less likely to introduce austerity measures as elections approach. The study introduces original hypotheses about which governments have the ability and opportunity to strategically time policy decisions. The authors suggest that minimal winning cabinets with leadership change (new prime ministers) face less complex bargaining environments and can credibly shift responsibility for austerity measures to the preceding government. The empirical analyses show that these governments are most likely to strategically time austerity policies.

• Author: Daniel Strobl; Hanna Bäck; Wolfgang C. Müller; Mariyana Angelova
• Department/s: Department of Political Science
• Publishing year: 2021
• Language: English
• Pages: 331-352
• Publication/Series: British Journal of Political Science
• Volume: 51
• Issue: 1
• Links: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000073
• Document type: Journal article
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Topic: Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)
• Keywords: austerity reforms; electoral cycles; social policy; taxation policy; Western Europe
• Status: Published
• ISBN/ISSN/Other: ISSN: 0007-1234