
Annika Fredén
Associate Senior Lecturer

Insurance strategic considerations in coalition-oriented systems : A consideration set model approach
Author
Summary, in English
During a vote-decision process, citizens elect between some of the parties – not all of them. In this paper, we explore a potential strategic reason to include an additional alternative in the consideration set. Drawing on research from the field of strategic voting, we study incentives to defect to a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold in order to elect a winning coalition (”insurance”). Our argument is that these types of strategic considerations occur already in the campaign, but do not always translate into choice. Using the so-called consideration set model approach (CSM), which focuses on how voters select fewer alternatives among a larger number of parties, we model vote choice over an election campaign using panel data from the Swedish National Election Studies of 2014. In line with our argument, we demonstrate that the insurance strategy was prevalent earlier in the decision-making process, when forming the consideration set.
Publishing year
2019-02
Language
English
Pages
302-308
Publication/Series
Electoral Studies
Volume
57
Links
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Elsevier
Topic
- Political Science
Keywords
- Coalitions
- Consideration set
- Insurance
- Small parties
- Strategic
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 0261-3794