This volume is dedicated to Professor Ole Elgström, recognizing his important and lasting contributions to the scholarly fields of international negotiations and EU studies. Inspired by his extensive academic work as well as his cooperative and constructive engagement, the volume consists of a collection of essays from friends and colleagues, organized around the theme of “The EU and the emerging global order”.

The book is divided into four substantive parts, reflecting key aspects of Ole Elgström’s research and publications: diplomacy and negotiation dynamics, actorness and roles, dynamics of global order, and external perceptions, respectively. In addition, the volume opens with a practitioner’s view from Brussels on the major challenges for the EU in the years to come, and concludes with a historical essay on the European integration process.
THE EU AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER
The EU and the emerging global order
Essays in honour of Ole Elgström

Rikard Bengtsson and
Malena Rosén Sundström (eds.)
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Preface

Rikard Bengtsson and
Malena Rosén Sundström

This volume has been arranged to honour our great friend and colleague Ole Elgström. After a long and successful academic career, Ole has now been granted the emeritus suffix to his Professor’s title, a step worthy of recognition and praise! As many readers will know, Ole has made important and lasting contributions to the scholarly fields of international negotiations and EU studies. With the ambition to acknowledge Ole’s work, we therefore find it logical to focus this collection of essays from friends and colleagues around the theme of “The EU and the emerging global order”.

We also deem this a timely and important topic in the academic and public debates on global affairs more generally. The EU, it seems, is in a period of fundamental transformation. Parallel and contradictory forces of integration and fragmentation characterize the Union (and its Member States), clearly evident in/since the multiple crises of the last decade but originating well before that, perhaps even being the default of the polity. When the Brexit fog clears, important developments and decisions about the future direction, indeed identity, of the EU await, with important implications for EU-internal affairs as well as for external relations and the EU’s position and role in global affairs.

To add to that, EU developments do not take place in a static global environment. The multilateral system as we have known it is increasingly questioned, challenged and spoiled, primarily from emerging global actors with a different agenda and outlook, such as China, and challengers, such
as Russia, but also from changing postures of (some of) those that actually constructed the system. In short, the liberal order is under strain, also from within. What that will imply in more detail for the EU is unclear (but is partly, perhaps only marginally, an outcome of EU policy and strategy). What we do know, however, is that economically as well as politically, the global centre of gravity is moving eastward and competition about standards, norms and values is intensifying. This will render the EU a more challenging position in the future, with new, difficult, preconditions for external action. In short: We live in complex times! Against this background, Ole’s efforts at advancing the state of research and debate on these important topics are welcome and important. We are inspired to try to take those efforts further. Olé!

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Ole received his doctoral degree in Lund in 1982, with the dissertation “Active foreign policy”, in which he compared the Swedish and Danish foreign policy debates between 1962 and 1978. Having remained loyal to Lund except for a short decade at Linköping and a sabbatical at Madison-Wisconsin, Ole has since then published on a wide array of topics, ranging from stable peace and Swedish security strategies to the rotating EU Council Presidency, development issues, aid negotiations and the EU’s roles in international relations. Ole has, indeed, been a very active and prolific researcher – and he still is! So even though the reason behind this book is to honour Ole’s academic achievements due to his retirement, he is by no means leaving the scholarly scene.

One of the theoretical approaches Ole has used in his research is role theory. Just as actors on a stage, actors in political relations perform different roles, such as leaders, mediators, managers or spoilers. We find this a relevant point of departure also for looking closer at different aspects of Ole’s own professional achievements, indeed of Ole as a person. While research is in focus in this book, there are definitely more roles than that of researcher in academic life, such as teacher, supervisor and colleague.

Let us start with Ole’s role as a teacher. Ole has without doubt carried out this role with much appreciation from his students. Among the things
that have repeatedly been said about Ole in course evaluations, we find “friendly”, “professional”, “respectful”, “very competent”, and “always motivated and in a good mood”. We have ourselves had Ole as teacher and can readily agree with these descriptions. Ole’s excellent organizational skills contribute to the positive impression, also in this context.

A second important role of Ole’s – one that we editors as well as some of the authors in this book have experience of – has been that of supervisor. Over the years Ole has supervised hundreds of Bachelor’s and Master’s theses and has carefully and successfully guided students to both deeper understanding and thesis completion. Equally importantly, Ole has supervised at the doctoral level. Always encouraging, meticulous, responsive – and patient!, our dissertations improved considerably through Ole’s suggestions and efforts, and his engagement made the sometimes stressful, lonely and difficult PhD life not only bearable, but fun.

Third, we want to underline Ole’s role as colleague. Keywords when asking around in the lunch room amount to “encouraging”, “respectful”, “helpful”. It is especially important to point to Ole’s conscious ambition to facilitate younger colleagues’ progress and development (here a clear example of role complementarity and overlap, a good topic for exploration in some future article). Many of us, colleagues at the department as well as contributors to this volume, can testify to the delight of co-authoring with Ole – he is easy to cooperate with and co-authors need not lose sleep over a job not being done. To add to that, Ole is the master of keeping deadlines – not seldom delivering well before the set deadline. As editors of this book, we have had a hard time to keep (and inculcate) the different deadlines we set during the process. We are convinced that had Ole been the editor, the book would have been published a long time ago!

A fourth role that Ole has held is that of academic leader. Much appreciated due to his meticulousness and organizational skills, Ole has throughout his career been willing to take on administrative responsibilities and engage in management functions. To mention just a few tasks and positions, Ole was the Vice Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Lund from 2009 to 2017, member and later chair of the research delegation of Östersjöstiftelsen (2002-2015), and board member of the Swedish Political Science Association, the Nordic International Studies Association and the
ECPR Standing Group on European Union. He has also repeatedly accepted assignments as evaluator and assessor of research funding applications, ethical vetting, and quality assurance of academic institutions/departments in Sweden and abroad, contributing to the greater academic environment.

As we have seen, Ole has been mastering a palette of roles. Yet, in addition to our experiences of Ole in his different academic roles, we are also very happy to have come across yet another role – Ole as friend! Empathetic, prestigeless and thoughtful, Ole is always interested in how things are going and takes that extra minute to ask how the family is doing. Combined with as sound dose of self-distance, it has been both very joyful and very fun to work closely with Ole over the years.

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The book is organized around four themes which also correspond to major areas of Ole’s research – negotiations, roles, global order, and perceptions. As a prologue to these different analyses, providing a practitioner’s perspective from Brussels, Lars Danielsson starts off the volume by outlining the major challenges for the EU in the years to come, including primarily the issue of the future development of the euro zone but also questions about the adherence to the EU’s core values and principles and about forging a common migration and asylum policy.

The first part of the book concerns Diplomacy and negotiation dynamics. In his chapter, “Diplomacy in the 21st century”, Christer Jönsson focuses on the current trends and future evolution of diplomacy. Among the changes discussed is a transition from “club” to “network” diplomacy, meaning that diplomats will increasingly have to interact with others than government officials. Digitization is one aspect that will bring in new potential actors in diplomacy. As stated by Jönsson, new world orders usually emerge as a result of either war or diplomacy. The evolvement of diplomacy is hence central to a discussion of the emerging global order.

In the next chapter, Anders Ahnlid investigates a truly diplomatic challenge within the EU: migration. In “The European Council and the refugee crisis: towards the limits of negotiation?”, Ahnlid demonstrates how
external negotiations on migration (such as those with Turkey) have been relatively successful, but negotiations on internal measures considerably less so. Usually, the shadow of the future makes EU members conducive to find compromises and to strike deals, but in this case some Member States were willing to break the norm of *juste retour* by opposing the proposed relocation scheme.

Markus Johansson’s chapter, “Sweden’s best friends in the Council of the EU”, states that Sweden’s cooperation partners in the Council have remained relatively stable over time. In the top, the Nordic neighbours and the United Kingdom are found, which means that Sweden will lose an important cooperation – and negotiation – partner with Brexit. Johansson argues that new alliances will have to be formed, but that Sweden’s cooperation partners will likely continue to be from its vicinity.

Björn Fägersten further develops what Brexit will mean to Sweden, in his chapter “Swexit, voice and loyalty: Sweden’s EU strategy after Brexit”. As a consequence of Brexit, Fägersten argues that Sweden could become a more loyal Member State, rather than to try to filling the void as “the sceptic”, since the political costs of taking on this role would be too high for Sweden.

The second part of the book trains focus on *Actorness and roles*. In his conceptually and theoretically oriented chapter entitled “Identity and power in European foreign policy”, Knud Erik Jørgensen advances an argument for combining perspectives of power and identity in analyses of EU foreign policy, in contrast to separating these, as has been the dominant mode in existing search. Further, the chapter underscores the contribution of a horizontal, transnational, non-state-centric perspective on the study of European foreign policy.

Lisbeth Aggestam directs her contribution to the issue of leadership in EU foreign policy. Her chapter, entitled “Leadership roles and institutional change in EU foreign policy”, draws on role theory to analyse what is referred to as a “leadership paradox” in the EU. Understanding leadership from a relational perspective, the chapter argues that there is simultaneously a perceived need for stronger and more coherent leadership at the EU level and an unease with which this is granted by the Member States, reflecting the overlapping governance structures at hand.
Transatlantic relations are in focus in Michael Smith’s contribution to the volume. His chapter “The European Union in transatlantic relations: four roles in search of an actor” departs from a general conceptualization of roles in international relations and specifically the nature of the EU’s roles in global affairs in order to critically assess the EU’s roles in transatlantic relations. Smith advances four roles that are in a state of dynamic tension – the role of proxy, partner, protagonist, and power, respectively.

Under the heading of *Dynamics of global order*, the third part of the book deals with the changing nature of the global order and the EU’s preconditions and roles in that setting. In her chapter “The EU and the crisis of liberal order: at home and abroad”, Sonia Lucarelli argues that whereas the EU for a long time has been a key supporter and contributor of the liberal world order, recent developments seem to point in the direction of weakening liberalism, both abroad and at home. Internally, parameters such as equality and solidarity, liberal democracy and pluralism are increasingly under strain. These developments in turn relate to less principled and more pragmatic external policies, in which the EU if needed is willing to compromise on its liberal values in order to achieve other goals.

Anders Persson directs his attention to the EU’s role in the Middle East. His chapter entitled “Developing and legitimizing the just peace: the EU’s contribution to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” critically analyses the EU’s role in the peace process. Persson identifies five different advances in EU policy about the conflict over the last half century and shows that the Member States have upheld a remarkable degree of consistency in the declaratory policy on the conflict.

In “Donor coordination on health assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, Jan Orbie, Lies Steurs, Sarah Delputte and Joren Verschaeve investigate European and international donor coordination on health assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The authors show that both constraining factors and enabling factors are present. Overall, the EU has played a facilitating role without being in the driver’s seat, demonstrating flexible coordination in working with other international actors, and displaying role diversification on the part of the EU as an external actor in the emerging global order.
External perceptions are the focus of the fourth and final substantive part of the book. Natalia Chaban, Serena Kelly and Antoine Rayroux investigate external perceptions of the EU in their chapter “Communicating the EU externally: media framing of the EU’s irregular migration crisis (case-studies of New Zealand and Canada)”. The authors analyse the role of news in mediating information about the EU in third countries (New Zealand and Canada), with US and British media as intermediaries, in a study on external recognition and reception of the EU’s leadership with regard to irregular migration.

Maximilian Conrad’s chapter, “‘Free trade needs a champion’: the EU as seen in US media discourse during the TTIP negotiations”, also analyses external perceptions of the EU based on media. Sceptical public opinion against TTIP constituted a puzzle to US media; in the US the negotiations did not give rise to any public contestation. In addition, the EU was perceived as a difficult negotiation partner due to its reservations about environmental and consumer protection standards. Finally, the EU’s capacity for leadership in free trade negotiations was, in this discourse, seen as undermined by its protectionism within agricultural trade.

The book is concluded by a reflective outlook entitled “The historical role of the EU: an essay about the changing conditions of European integration”. In the text, Hans Albin Larsson returns to the questions posed initially about the future of and challenges to European integration. Departing from conflicting perspectives and visions about the EU, the chapter discusses the key role of France in the integration process and outlines alternative routes for future development.
Prologue

Key future challenges for the EU: a view from Brussels

*Lars Danielsson*

For someone that has had the privilege of being intimately involved in Sweden’s work in the European Union ever since we became members on 1 January 1995, it is both interesting and tempting to try to assess how the Union has changed over almost a quarter of a century. Also, Sweden’s work in and with the EU has evolved quite substantially over this period.

The most obvious difference is of course that the Union is almost double the size it was in 1995. Moving from 15 to 28 members has not been without complications. Things take longer time to agree on in the Council, but all in all the legislative process has been remarkably smooth given the differences in economic development and administrative capacity between Member States.

When looking at, for example, the number of infringement procedures or the speed of implementation of directives governing the internal market, the worst “culprits” are rather some of the older Member States, including some of the founding ones.

One can argue that some of the newer Member States – the Baltic countries, Slovenia and the newest member Croatia – have achieved remarkable progress in a very short time and now belong to the mainstream on many European issues.

What has attracted attention over the past years is the failure of some of
the newer Member States to live up to the fundamental values and principles that should guide every member of the Union. In my mind, this has more to do with the spreading of right wing populism in the most developed countries in Europe and elsewhere in the Western hemisphere.

It is a fact that Hungary and Poland, now also followed to some extent by the Czech Republic, are the most problematic in this respect. But this depends not so much on the fact that they are new Member States but rather that right wing populism has gained majorities first in these countries.

The fact that one country, the United Kingdom, after 45 years has decided to leave the Union is in many ways a fundamental blow to the European project. Some argue that virtually every British government has had substantial problems in defining its role in the European Union and that this in a way was an accident waiting to happen. But not least for a country like Sweden it will certainly mean the loss of an ally in many areas. And the European Union loses in one go fifteen percent on the income side of its budget.

What are then the challenges for the European Union in the next couple of years? These are some of the major ones that I see:

1. How will the euro zone develop?

The discussion about the future of the European Union tends often to be a bit theoretical. In my mind, the decisive factor for which avenue the Union will take – more or less integration or no change from today – will be what happens to the euro zone.

Almost two decades after the establishment of the common currency, one can draw the conclusion that the participating economies in the euro zone are, if anything, less convergent today than they were at the start of this historically ambitious project.

A common perception in Brussels is that Germany so far is the winner whereas countries in the south of Europe have been forced into a straightjacket which has hampered their growth. From Germany and the countries forming a group that today is called “The New Hanseatic League” the argument is that the main problems in the economies of southern Europe is their inability to reform their national economies and take the necessary difficult decisions to make themselves more flexible and market oriented.
The result of these conflicting views is – so far – an almost endless discussion on risk reduction vs. risk sharing. The fiscally prudent countries in the north argue that risk reduction must come first whereas countries in the south see a more simultaneous process. Notably France insists that a “fiscal capacity” should be formed inside the euro zone to pave the way for more convergence. A separate budget line for the euro zone in the EU budget and a joint Minister of Finance are elements in such a package.

So far, Germany has been very reluctant to go down that road. In virtually every European Council and Ecofin Council the German message has been the same – risk reduction before risk sharing. In June 2018 France and Germany agreed on the so called Meseberg Declaration, which in my mind shows that Germany only is willing to move very slowly down the path of further integration.

It is the development of this complex issue that will decide which road the European Union is heading in a more overall sense. Most experts and politicians will agree that if the converging power of the present set of rules for the euro zone does not work in five to ten years, there will be increasing frictions among the participating Member States. It may in the long run be difficult for a country like Germany to oppose the move towards more of a joint economic policy, including fiscal policy, and the institutionalization that would follow such a process.

Should this happen, which I deem quite likely in a medium-term perspective, it will of course have serious consequences for a country like Sweden which has chosen to stay outside the euro. So far, we have been able to handle the fact that we are not part of the monetary cooperation quite well but the willingness of those who are “in” to listen to the “outs” will probably decrease if the internal developments of the euro zone move in a more integrationist direction.

2. What will happen after Brexit?

When I write this, the process for the UK to leave the European Union by 29 March 2019 is still moving on, albeit with tremendous domestic uncertainties in British politics. Despite the absence, so far, of a full agreement on the conditions for the withdrawal and even greater uncertainty about
the future relation, we must nevertheless continue to have the assumption that our British friends will leave.

In the daily work in the Council, it is a sad fact that the UK in practice already has left. All their efforts are focused on Brexit and the rest of us are already living in a reality where we can no longer count very much on the able and efficient British colleagues as supporters on a range of issues.

The British imminent departure has forced Sweden to be even more diverse in its search for workable alliances with other Member States. This is good in many ways. What also has happened – which also is positive – is that we more and more realize that the European institutions on many issues are our best friends.

Will there be other countries following the British example and wanting to leave? I do not see any country in the foreseeable future wanting to do that. A common perception in Brussels used to be that there was a risk for a “Swexit”, not least following the rising popularity of the Eurosceptic Sweden Democrats. But every opinion poll in the last two years show that support for the EU is high and growing in our country.

What about Hungary, Poland or Italy? It is obvious that the present governments in Hungary and Poland have a view on the extent of European cooperation which is characterized by a rather strict definition of the principle of subsidiarity. But that is something which is more and more prevalent among conservative parties in Europe. The economic advantages of membership also for Hungary and Poland are tremendous. This does apply both to their participation in the internal market and in the fact that they are among the greatest net recipients of funds from the EU budget.

It can also be noted that Poland often directs its criticism toward the European Commission, not the EU as a whole. In the same vein, Hungary often targets the European Parliament. This subtleness is not by coincidence.

Italy is in a way a bit more complicated. The support for the European Union is the lowest in Italy among all Member States, below 50 percent. The euro is perceived as the culprit for most of Italy’s economic difficulties.

But, Italy is a founding member and sees itself as part of the heart and soul of Europe. Right wing populism must grow considerably stronger if an exit (probably in that case starting with the euro) should become a realistic option.
3. What will happen with the adherence to EU’s core values and principles?

When countries aspire for membership in the European Union, there are a whole range of very powerful tools that can be used to transform countries in such a way that they can live up to all the principles and realities of being a member. But once they are in the club, the arsenal of tools becomes much weaker.

The prevailing idea up until now has been that adherence to principles and values should not be a problem once you are a Member State. It would come more or less automatically. The trend of right wing populism with a strong dose of Euroscepticism has shown that it is no longer possible to take for granted that the independence of the judiciary or the important role of non-governmental organizations are values which every member state signs up to.

The possibility in Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty to deal with countries that are perceived to deviate from the core principles of the EU have proven to be a difficult “weapon” to use. The pressures being applied to Poland during 2018 have been very strong but have not, so far, resulted in any significant improvements as far as the independence of the judiciary is concerned. In Hungary, Viktor Orban seems to thrive on the criticism levied by various European leaders and institutions.

I believe there are two avenues which we should pursue to come to grips with this unfortunate development. The first one is to use economic disincentives. In the next Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, there should be mechanisms which put a price on not following the most fundamental principles and values that are enshrined in the Treaty. The second one is to introduce some sort of peer review for all Member States when it comes to fundamental values and principles. The Belgian government has presented some interesting ideas to this effect and they should in my mind be pursued as soon as possible.
4. Can the European Union agree on a common asylum and migration policy?

The effects of the migration crisis in 2015-2016 can still be felt. With the dwindling number of asylum seekers and migrants coming to Europe it is now argued that we do not have a migration crisis any longer but rather a political crisis around migration.

This is of course true, numbers are now down to more “normal” figures. But most politicians in Europe believe that the pressure of economic migrants wanting to come to our continent to seek a better life will soon be on the rise again.

To me it is obvious that the political explosiveness in all European countries of the migration issue cannot be underestimated. The credibility of the European Union is at risk if we continue to fail to agree on common policies.

The issue becomes more complex because we are talking about asylum and migration at the same time. The humanitarian inclination to help those fleeing from war and persecution is still very strong in most countries.

But the acceptance of economic migrants is much lower, even though many countries are highly dependent on the labour force that these migrants provide.

There are solutions to these challenges, but it is very likely that they can only be found within the context of a “coalition of the willing” or a form of reinforced cooperation. What effects will such a direction have on the overall EU cooperation? Can the Schengen system survive if a small number of states choose to be outside a common asylum and migration system?

There are no clear answers to all these questions but a solution must be found, urgently.

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What do all these challenges mean for Sweden after almost a quarter of a century inside the most ambitious regional integration project that the world has ever seen? My conclusion is that we can give an important con-
tribution to moving all these difficult questions a bit closer to a meaning-
ful answer. From the point of view of influence, we have one handicap
because of our decision to stay outside the euro. But that is – if not a
constant – at least a parameter that will not change in the foreseeable fu-
ture.

What we try to do is just to work harder and show that we want to find
solutions that can combine national and European interests as much as
possible. The growing support in Sweden for our membership is a great
asset. The fact that our knowledge of the European Union has increased is
also important. Here, academia in Sweden should feel very proud. We are
slowly but surely getting on par with similar Member States when it comes
to knowledge and depth of debate around European issues. I always tell
my collaborators at the Swedish Permanent Representation in Brussels that
we are paid to be optimistic, to negotiate hard but always try to find re-
sults. That kind of pragmatism is good for Sweden and good for the Eu-
ropean Union.
Diplomacy and negotiation dynamics
Diplomacy in the 21st century

Christer Jönsson

New world orders typically emerge as a result of either war or diplomacy. The danger of major wars has not been eradicated in the new millennium. On the contrary, the probability of devastating armed conflicts is generally perceived to have increased in recent years. Yet the hope that diplomacy may contribute to a new peaceful order persists. It is therefore relevant to raise questions concerning current trends and future evolution of diplomacy.

In 2016-2017 I had the privilege of participating in a series of seminars on the topic of “Diplomacy in the 21st Century”, arranged by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin and with participants from both the academic and the diplomatic community. In this essay I will try to summarize our multifaceted and enriching discussion, subsumed under the three essential or constitutive dimensions of diplomacy that I and my co-author Martin Hall proposed more than a decade ago (Jönsson and Hall 2005): communication, representation and reproduction of international society. Even if predictions are notoriously unreliable, one may at least identify noteworthy trends and changes within these dimensions that would seem to affect contemporary and future diplomatic practice.

Communication

Much of the discussions in Berlin revolved around the digitization of communication that permeates not only diplomacy but virtually all aspects of public and private life. To be sure, innovations in communication technology have been seen as challenges to ingrained diplomatic procedures in
the past as well. For instance, when the first telegram arrived on the desk of British foreign minister Lord Palmerston in the 1840s, he reputedly exclaimed: “My God, this is the end of diplomacy!” Harold Nicolson considered the telephone “a dangerous instrument, unfit for diplomacy” (quoted in Fletcher 2016: 60). The new speed of communication was seen to endanger the reflection and careful analysis that were the hallmarks of traditional diplomacy. In the 21st century, the speed with which information is communicated is close to real-time. Moreover, the amount of available information is virtually unlimited. Diplomats can have a conversation on various platforms with theoretically any other human being using the same platform (cf. Stanzel 2017: 1).

However, the entry into the digital era entails more than the provision of additional and refined communicative tools. The depth and extent of digital technology has, in effect, created a new environment or landscape, in which diplomatic actors communicate and conduct relations. Digitization has generated a new relationship dynamic that is colliding with old diplomatic routines. Furthermore, the rapid acceleration of innovations within digital technology has to be taken into account. For instance, the 3G mobile technology made possible the development and spread of social media networks. The 5G technology, due to arrive in just a few years, will likely usher in the adoption of a range of new tools of relevance for diplomacy, such as virtual and augmented reality in interactive public diplomacy campaigns or artificial intelligence in consular services (Bjola 2017b: 3-4).

Adapting to this new environment, diplomacy is undergoing operational as well as institutional shifts (cf. Wagner 2017: 3). Operationally, the digital transformation forces diplomats to go beyond the traditional preference for closed spaces and physical encounters (Melissen and de Keulenaar 2017: 4), “requiring diplomats to regularly look outside their once closed doors, and perhaps more importantly, for the first time, allowing citizens to look in” (Bjola 2017b: 6). Diplomatic communication in the 21st century will increasingly mean connecting with a wider public: “as power continues to move towards the individual those ‘in power’ will have to insure that their message is connecting with the public,” and the role of a diplomat will be “not just representing a government to a government but representing a people to a people” (Fletcher 2016: 156, 195). If earlier history has seen a change from the
“orator” diplomat of the Greek city-states to the “trained observer” of the 19th and 20th centuries, as proposed by Sir Harold Nicolson, diplomats in the 21st century are evolving from trained observers to proactive initiators and modern orators (Heine 2013: 66).

Institutionally, a dense digital environment favors networks over hierarchies and bureaucratic structures (cf. Bjola 2017b: 5). Some have even predicted the end of physical embassies, and a few virtual embassies have been established with limited success (see Gilboa 2016: 544). Thus far there has been no decline in the amount of traditional embassies and diplomatic networks (Lowy Institute 2017). It has been suggested that what is needed is “institutional agility”. This may be easier to accomplish in smaller states than in large ones, “because they have simpler bureaucratic structures which are easier to adapt to new technological environments and due to resource constraints they are more easily accustomed to giving their staff greater levels of personal agency” (Wagner 2017: 5). Digital presence, in any case, amplifies the accountability of individual diplomats, who have to react both in real-time and in depth and assume direct responsibility for all published statements.

Presence in social media has quickly become a necessary element of diplomacy. By 2016 there were 793 Twitter accounts belonging to heads of state and governments in 173 countries, representing 90 per cent of all UN Member States (Bjola 2017a: 3). With Carl Bildt and Hillary Clinton as pioneers, ministries of foreign affairs have become replete with “tweeting Talleyrands” (Fletcher 2016: 8). Once diplomats enter the realm of social media and practice “Facebook diplomacy” or “Twiplomacy” (Gilboa 2016: 541), they expose themselves to new conditions of work. Social media offer transparency and emotional impact. To take advantage of these media, “diplomats have to appear as individuals, have to offer insight in at least some private aspects of what they are doing, and allow an exchange over policies that may become emotionally charged” (Stanzel 2017: 3). A dry bureaucrat cannot expect followers. Diplomats need to “entertain and engage, create genuine emotional connections, and take risks” (Fletcher 2016: 166). This means “removing the once held dear structures of formality and secrecy, with diplomats instead today being expected to engage in highly public conversations, with their messages informal and short in tone” (Bjola-
Areas where digitization has made a notable impact on diplomacy include public diplomacy, crisis communication and consular services. In public diplomacy, it has entailed a movement away from monologues to dialogues. Diplomats may use social media to reinforce a favorable viral trend or build an agenda (Gilboa 2016: 546). As reaching people is of critical importance in crises, diplomatic establishments are exploring the potential of digital technologies that enable them to target and message people within a given geographical area. This may include geospatial mapping, to trace people and their movements during emergencies, which has been made possible by merging users’ digital footprints with geographical data. The “digital shift” in consular assistance arguably makes consular diplomacy more political, as perceptions of inadequate or slow government assistance tend to go viral within minutes. At the same time, digitization creates a new relationship dynamic, offering opportunities for engaging with digitally literate citizens in more active roles, providing government assistance to nationals abroad and assuming more responsibility for their own security (see Melissen and Caesar-Gordon 2017).

Digitization entails dangers as well as advantages for diplomacy. The share of conversational exchanges in social media that are done by web robots or bots rather than people is increasing, and when artificial intelligence overtakes humans in the population of digital users, the possibility of diplomats to develop meaningful relationships with online public will decrease drastically. The “dark side” of digital technologies, such as disinformation and infowar tactics, has proved to be the most fertile soil for the proliferation of bots (Bjola 2017b: 6-7). Whereas the success of future diplomacy may depend on the successful use of digitization, the future development of digitization may produce effects that undermine successful diplomacy (Stanzel 2017: 5).

Whereas many foreign ministries initially “silied off” digital diplomacy, with a few departments such as press office, public policy or technology policy departments designated as responsible actors, mainstreaming will no doubt develop in the course of the 21st century. Every desk officer and every ambassador will need to have at least a basic understanding of how digital technology applies to their specific context (Wagner 2017: 5). Today
senior diplomats are digital “tourists”, looking at awe and trying to take in the new landscape; younger staff are digital “immigrants”, learning but not yet fully integrated into the new culture; the next generation of diplomats will be digital “natives”, fully versed in the new technology and taking it for granted. Only then will the full impact of digitization be discernible.

Representation

Representation, in terms of standing and acting for others, is a core function of diplomacy. Historically, diplomats represented individual rulers; today they represent states. Their representative role hinges on the predominance of states in international relations.

When states become weaker, so do those who represent and derive authority from them. As the trend continues towards global decision-making for the big global issues on the one hand, and greater localisation and individualisation on the other, where does a state’s representative fit in? (Fletcher 2016: 14)

Yet diplomats are committed not only to their primary roles as representatives of states, but also have an obligation to uphold the diplomatic system. Diplomat-cum-scholar Adam Watson (1982), for example, argues that diplomats throughout history have been guided not only by *raison d’état*, but also by *raison de système*. Commonly described as representing peace or international order, diplomats are said to be “conscious of world interests superior to immediate national interests” (Nicolson 1959: xi). Today, with a plethora of unsolved global issues, diplomacy “needs to reconnect to this more idealistic sense of collective diplomatic purpose: the promotion of global co-existence” (Fletcher 2016: 21). If the new dividing line is between “coexisters” and “wall builders”, as suggested by Tom Fletcher (2016: xiv), a key role for diplomacy is to promote the “coexisters”.

From Antiquity to the Middle Ages, diplomats represented sovereign rulers in the sense that they were perceived to embody their sovereigns when they presented themselves at foreign courts. While such a view is alien to modern thought, today’s principle of diplomatic immunity has
deep roots in notions of personal representation. The reason that early envoys were inviolable was that they were to be treated “as though the sovereign himself were there” (McClanahan 1989: 28). Today, the status of diplomatic representatives, standing for other, is understood as symbolic representation. The diplomat is then a representative in the same way that a flag represents a nation.

 Representation implies not only status (standing for others) but also behavior (acting for others). Economists and political scientists analyze such relationships between representatives and those represented in terms of principals and agents. Principal-agent relations arise whenever one party (principal) delegates certain tasks to another party (agent). Diplomats and elected politicians are obvious examples of agents, who have been entrusted with certain tasks from their principals (governments/voters). Because of conflicting preferences and information asymmetry, agents may pursue other interests than those of the principal. Delegation is therefore usually combined with control mechanisms.

The proper behavior of a representative is a matter of intense debate, especially in the literature on representative democracy. At issue is whether agents have an “imperative mandate”, being strictly accountable to their principals, or a “free mandate”, being authorized to act on behalf of their principals (Sobolewski 1968: 96). It implies an appraisal whether accountability or authorization is the key term to characterize the relationship between representatives and principals.

In short, standing and acting for others entail perennial dilemmas and issues concerning diplomats’ symbolic role and the balancing act between the imperative and free mandate extremes. Are there, then, specific issues of diplomatic representation in the 21st century? Let me make an attempt to identify some changes and trends, and raise questions concerning their implications. As for symbolic representation, I will discuss the change from immunity to vulnerability and the question whether diplomats ought to mirror the society they represent. In addition, I will identify three interrelated issues concerning principal-agent relations and diplomatic behavior: What are the significant differences in representing a democratic or an authoritarian state? How can diplomats represent divided societies? And what problems are associated with representing a populist regime?
From immunity to vulnerability. For centuries, the fact that diplomats represented venerable principals – from powerful monarchs to established states – guaranteed their protected and privileged status. Whereas long-standing rules of diplomatic immunity and privileges by and large continue to be upheld in interstate relations, popular perceptions of diplomats have changed in recent decades. To the extent that diplomats are perceived as symbols of disliked countries, religions or “-isms”, the quality of standing for others has been transformed from a rationale for diplomatic immunity to a rationale for political violence. No longer inviolable symbols, diplomatic representatives have increasingly become highly vulnerable symbols.

In a polarized world diplomats and diplomatic facilities have become soft targets for terrorist attacks. For instance, out of all terrorist attacks targeting the United States between 1969 and 2009, 28 per cent were directly against US diplomatic officers. In 2012 alone various diplomatic institutions were attacked 95 times, of which more than one-third targeted UN personnel (Ismail 2016: 139). As a consequence, embassy security has become an overriding concern. Some embassies today have the appearance of fortresses or penitentiaries, with barbed wire atop and alongside high walls without windows. CCTV surveillance, turnstiles, metal detectors and crash proof barriers are but a few examples of security devices at embassies and consulates. One veteran US diplomat speaks of “creeping militarization”, as embassy security has become influenced by military priorities and requirements (Bullock 2015). The military connection is also reflected in the fact that embassies and diplomats representing governments with ongoing military operations are particularly vulnerable.

This raises the question whether there are non-militarized ways of restoring the protection and security of diplomats that have been a hallmark of diplomacy throughout centuries. The tendency toward increasing insecurity and vulnerability not only impedes diplomatic tasks but also threatens to render the recruitment of qualified personnel more difficult.

Mirroring society. Standing for others can be understood in another, more literal sense. To what extent do diplomats need to mirror the social and ethnic composition of the societies they represent? For most of recorded history, diplomatic envoys have represented individual rulers rather
than whole communities and have not necessarily come from the same country as their rulers. Well into the 19th century diplomats were aristocrats, who could easily change from one monarchical employer to another. The idea that diplomats should be an accurate reflection or typical of the society they represent is quite recent. With increasing migration, many – if not most – states will have a multiethnic and multicultural character in the 21st century. In countries with substantial immigration, such as Sweden, governments have recently made efforts to influence recruitment policies in order that the diplomatic corps better mirror the multiethnic character of these societies.

The standard objection to taking measures to safeguard representativeness in this sense is that diplomats are supposed to represent national policies and values rather than the social and ethnic composition of the society they come from. However, the question needs to be raised how important the symbolic value of accurately reflecting their society might be in the perceptions of relevant audiences. Another consideration concerns the potential value of individuals with multiple cultural background and understanding in diplomatic negotiations with relevant counterparts. For instance, could diplomats recruited from the Muslim population in Germany or Sweden play a constructive role in negotiations with Arab countries?

Gender is another debated dimension of representativeness. In many diplomatic establishments around the world there is an ongoing quest to end formal and informal barriers and bring about gender parity, which will no doubt pervade the 21st century. Despite positive developments in recent years, diplomatic infrastructures still tend toward masculinized norms, homo-social environments and gendered divisions of labor (see Aggestam and Towns 2018).

Democratic vs. authoritarian states as principals. The nature of the principal is one important factor determining the nature of diplomatic representation. Specifically, it matters whether the diplomatic agent has a single principal or receives instructions from a collective body. Principal-agent theory pays attention to the problems of collective or multiple principals, especially the increased autonomy agents may enjoy as a result of competing preferences among principals. The unequivocal instructions from a single sovereign in earlier times left less leeway for diplomats than the
frequently vague instructions resulting from negotiations among different actors and agencies in modern democracies. In the same vein, whereas democratic states place diplomats at the end of multiple chains of principals and agents, diplomats representing contemporary authoritarian states, with one clearly identifiable principal, have more restrictive mandates.

The changing balance between democratic and authoritarian states in the 21st century constitutes quite a change from the optimistic predictions of the final victory of liberal democracies after the end of the Cold War. This ought to make us think harder about differing parameters of diplomatic representation between democracies and autocracies, and what consequences these might have. For instance, the use of digital platforms by autocracies, such as Russia, to influence elections in democratic states represents a new facet of 21st-century diplomacy. On the other hand, digital diplomacy offers an effective tool for democratic states to bypass the controlled media in authoritarian states (Gilboa 2016: 542).

Representing divided societies. A specific case of representation dilemmas in the 21st century occur in divided societies. Two prominent examples are Britain after the Brexit referendum and the United States after the election of Donald Trump as president. These countries are virtually split into two halves of similar strength, with opposing views on issues diplomats have to deal with. On the one hand, this would seem to grant diplomats more leeway. But, on the other hand, the lack of firm and consistent policies, standpoints and instructions complicates life for diplomats significantly. The lack of a firm consensus can be a serious liability in international negotiations, as the other side may try to exploit internal divisions and opposing standpoints. One common dynamic, well-known from repeated Cold War occurrences, is that hard-liners of both sides tend to reinforce each other’s position. The Brexit negotiations will be a significant test case to see whether old patterns hold in the new 21st-century environment. Their unique character of an encounter between a deeply divided society and a coalition of a large number of dissimilar states makes for interesting observations concerning representation in the contemporary world.

Representing populist regimes. Another specific problematique concerns the rise of populist regimes. Populism represents a democratic representation problem. Populists claim to represent “the real people” or “the silent major-
ity”. By implication, those who do not share the populists’ views and notion of “the people” are no legitimate members of society. Populism is essentially anti-pluralist, which is in contradiction to the norm of coexistence – of “live and let live” – on which both democracy and diplomacy rest.

The controversial conception of democratic representation domestically translates into a diplomatic representation problem externally. Exploiting growing mistrust and suspicion among voters, populist leaders target diffuse and undefined forces, such as “the establishment” or “experts” who have ostensibly undermined the democratic system. Along with journalists, diplomats are typically included in these categories. The fact that xenophobia often is a component of populism does not make the situation easier for diplomats. This raises the question of how to represent a principal who distrusts you. The United States under Trump is a case in point. The president has openly declared his lack of confidence in the State Department and proposes to cut its budget. A number of important ambassadorial appointments have been postponed. Among US diplomats there is widespread distress, and some have chosen to leave the service.

As this current example illustrates, the problem of representing populist regimes is interrelated to the issue of differing principal-agent interests as well as the difficulty of representing divided societies.

To summarize, representation is no simple and static concept, but a complex and dynamic one. Changes in the parameters of diplomatic representation in the 21st century warrant reflection among practitioners and students alike. As symbolic representatives, standing for others, diplomatic agents face challenges in terms of increased vulnerability and demands for reflecting multiethnic societies and gender equality. The problems of acting for others, discussed here, pertain to the changing nature of principals: reduced attention to raison de système as a result of rising nationalism; the difference between democratic and authoritarian states; and the specific complications associated with divided states and populist regimes.

Reproduction of international society

Diplomatic recognition is a “ticket of general admission to the international arena” (Krasner 1999: 16), and the granting of tickets is ultimately a
political act. Although the criteria may vary and their application may be inconsistent, diplomatic recognition is still given to states or state-like entities, and not to other influential international entities, such as multinational corporations or financial actors. Thus, diplomatic recognition has contributed to the reproduction of a global society of states and a state-centered diplomatic society monopolized by foreign ministries.

Moreover, as a result of imperialism and colonialism, a Western diplomatic society has spread around the world, reflecting the European origin of the prevalent diplomatic culture. The dissonance between a diplomatic system with an overwhelming number of Western traits and a global order in which power is diffused will be increasingly felt in the 21st century. The frustration of some non-Western states has already been evidenced by decreasing support for Western initiatives and attempts at counter-institutionalization, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (cf. Eisentraut and Stanzel 2017).

However, challenges to the prevalent diplomatic society concern not only its Western bias, but its foundation on states *per se*. Will the state-centric pattern persist in the 21st century, or are there signs of potential change?

One recent noteworthy exception to the state-centered pattern is the recognition of the European Union as a diplomatic *persona*. This raises the question whether this “supranational challenge” heralds the introduction of other regional organizations on the diplomatic arena. Another trend that challenges traditional diplomatic society is the eroding monopoly on contacts across state borders by foreign ministries. The fact that a growing number of departments in national bureaucracies possess external policy interests constitutes a “transgovernmental challenge”. Moreover, other actors than state entities have entered today’s diplomatic arena. One may speak of a “transnational challenge” to state-centered diplomacy (cf. Jönsson 2016).

*The supranational challenge.* The recognition of the European Union as a diplomatic actor is an anomaly in the sense that the EU is not a state. It is even debatable whether the EU itself lives up to the rather strict criteria it has adopted for recognizing a new state. Yet already in 1972, the Commission’s delegation in Washington obtained full diplomatic status. The Commission’s external service expanded from 50 delegations in 1980 to
representation in 130 states by 2004. It was then the fourth largest diplomatic service in the world, and over the years an expanding number of states established diplomatic missions in Brussels (see European Commission 2004). With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 the European Union as such, not just the Commission, has acquired a diplomatic persona.

The activity of the external delegations of the Commission before the Lisbon Treaty was sometimes characterized as diplomacy without a state, without a clearly defined foreign policy, without a representative head of state, without a foreign minister, and without a professional diplomatic corps (Bruter, 1999: 185). This has now changed. The European Union has a “president” of sorts in the President of the European Council, and the EU “foreign minister”, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The recruitment process has not been unproblematic. Some 1,600 officials were transferred to the EEAS from the Commission and the Council Secretariat on 1 January, 2011. In addition, staff is recruited among Member State diplomats. The representational function of EU delegations is well established, and EU diplomats take an active part in the local corps diplomatique. Yet several organizational questions are still to be solved (see Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2012; Koops and Macaj 2015).

One set of challenges concerns the “double-hatted” character that the service shares with its foreign minister. It is supposed to combine somehow the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the EU. Skeptics wonder how the two sets of career streams in the Commission and the Council Secretariat can be fused. The recruitment of Member State diplomats adds to the heterogeneity and potential tensions. By comparison, national diplomatic services recruit the best and the brightest among young students and professionals, then conduct a training program for them and socialize them into a shared diplomatic culture. The External Action Service is still far from that ideal and will be for the foreseeable future.

If the EU has acquired a foreign minister and a foreign service, however problematic, the crucial question remains whether it has been and will be able to develop a foreign policy of its own. Another problematic aspect of supranational European diplomacy concerns the persistence of tradi-
tional, national diplomacy among the Member States. The emergence of the EU as a diplomatic *persona* has not replaced, but merely added a new layer to, traditional diplomacy.

Does the anomaly of the EU as a recognized diplomatic actor represent the beginning of new development in the history of diplomatic relations? Will it trigger the emergence of additional regional diplomatic actors? So far, we have not seen any development in that direction. Other regional organizations are still far from being granted similar diplomatic status. Nor is regionalized diplomacy discussed as a likely future scenario in the way regionalized trade is.

*The transgovernmental challenge.* Relations across state borders are not handled exclusively by foreign ministries. This is particularly evident in the European Union. Member State permanent representations in Brussels are inhabited by bureaucrats from a diverse range of government departments. Today officials from domestic ministries constitute the majority in the permanent representations. Thus, “other government officials increasingly are called upon to function as diplomats” (Pigman 2010: 43).

Not only have European foreign ministries lost their former monopoly of government contacts across national borders and “found that the policy milieu in which they work is inhabited by bureaucrats from an ever more diverse range of government departments” (Hocking 2002: 3), they have also become more permeable. The trend is toward specialization and secondment to foreign ministries from other ministries. This is not unique to the European Union. For instance, more than 60 per cent of those under the authority of US ambassadors and other chiefs of mission are not State Department employees (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 142). Foreign ministries, in short, have lost their traditional role as sole manager of government contacts across national borders.

Examples of transgovernmental diplomacy abound. Suffice it to point out that the establishment and entrenchment of specialized international agencies within and outside the UN system contribute to strengthening the cross-border links between individual government ministries and agencies beyond the control of foreign ministries. By eroding the exclusive authority of foreign ministries and diplomats to act on behalf of the state, the transgovernmental challenge has transformative potential in the
21st century. It represents a movement away from territorial toward functional differentiation of political authority. Authority over portions of space is overshadowed by authority over distinct functional domains or issue-areas.

*The transnational challenge.* Transnational actors are individuals and groups who act beyond national borders yet are not controlled by governments. These include NGOs or civil society organizations, advocacy networks, party associations, philanthropic foundations, multinational corporations, and the like. International relations today involve a broad set of transnational actors and processes, which have come to play an increasingly important role, especially in multilateral diplomacy.

Given their enhanced role, transnational actors of various kinds have begun to claim, and are increasingly granted, access to various diplomatic forums. For instance, some 3,000 NGOs now have consultative status with ECOSOC, as compared to 41 in 1948. The openness toward NGOs has subsequently spread to other parts of the UN system, generating a pattern where few or no UN bodies remain entirely closed to transnational actors (cf. Tallberg and Jönsson 2010). In the mid-1980s international negotiations on ozone depletion attracted only a handful NGOs, and not a single environmental NGO was present at the signing of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985. In the 1990s and early 2000s, by contrast, NGOs typically outnumbered states at key negotiations dealing with climate change.

States and international institutions are engaging transnational actors (TNAs) as policy experts, service providers, compliance watchdogs, and stakeholder representatives. A new dataset, containing information on formal TNA access to 298 organizational bodies of 50 international organizations during the time period 1950-2010, shows that, while hardly any of these organizations were open in 1950, more than 75 per cent provided access in 2010 (see Tallberg et al. 2013).

In addition to gaining access to diplomatic forums, TNAs can enact diplomatic roles by means of informal networking. Prominent examples of networking between states, NGOs and international organizations include the processes leading to the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines and the creation of the International Criminal Court.
In global health governance the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has emerged as a major player. Actors behind popular digital platforms, such as Google and Facebook, have a considerable political impact in how they organize our access to information. While they have not become actively involved in diplomatic processes thus far, their central position in today’s world will inevitably draw them into the diplomatic realm before the end of the century.

In sum, one may speak of a transnational turn in diplomacy. Senior diplomats admit that traditional bilateral and multilateral diplomacy has been “progressively supplemented by transnational issues which may or may not involve government-to-government activity” (Hamilton and Langhorne, 2011: 267). Whereas the transgovernmental challenge fragments state authority in relating to the global environment, the transnational one amplifies the transformative potential by eroding the exclusive cross-border authority of states.

In sum, for centuries the practice of diplomatic recognition has been essential to statehood, at the same time as it has delegitimized other types of actors. Yet more inclusionary practices appear to become conceivable in the 21st century.

Conclusion

The trends and changes identified in this chapter point in the direction of a “hybrid diplomatic arena”, where the individual diplomat needs to be an “orchestrator” of a broad range of voices and interests. Digitization entails limitless connectivity; a multitude of potential diplomatic actors claim participation in international affairs; and the traditional Western model of diplomacy is challenged.

Diplomatic interactions require an abandonment of the “club” model in favor of a “network” model of diplomacy. In the club model diplomats meet primarily with government officials, fellow members of the club, with whom they feel most comfortable. In the network model diplomats interact with a vastly larger number of players, many of whom are far from “the rarefied atmosphere of the salons and private clubs the diplomats of yesteryear used to frequent”. Thus, “diplomacy is becoming ‘complexity man-
agement’ to a degree earlier master practitioners like Cardinal Richelieu would not have imagined” (Heine, 2008: 273; cf. Heine 2013).

The transition from club to network diplomacy in the 21st century is not likely to be free from hitches or risks. Digitization entails not only opportunities but also threats. Social media can be used to facilitate as well as destroy diplomatic solutions, to mobilize “coexisters” as well as “wall builders”. The vulnerability of diplomats representing disliked states is increasing in the digital era. If nationalism and populism continue to spread and authoritarian regimes continue to expand at the expense of democratic ones, diplomacy’s vital raison de système will be in peril. As functional differentiation tends to overshadow territorial differentiation, the position of foreign ministries will weaken in relation to other ministries and agencies. The transnational challenge to diplomacy can be met only by giving voice to civil society while countering “uncivil” society. The 21st century, in short, promises to be an era of unprecedented complexity and uncertainty for diplomacy.

References


2 The European Council and the refugee crisis: towards the limits of negotiation?

*Anders Ahnlid*

In 2015 the number of asylum seekers that crossed the external border of the European Union (EU) grew unprecedentedly month by month. By the end of the year approximately 1.3 million migrants, many of whom had fled war and persecution, had field requests for asylum in the EU; the majority in countries like Germany or Sweden. The refugee crisis rapidly became *Chefsache* in EU Member States and came to dominate negotiations in the European Council, in which EU heads of state or government were put under severe pressure facing a unique situation, which forced them to navigate uncharted waters.

The handling of the crisis – at, beyond and within EU borders – became the dominant item on the European Council agenda. A number of extraordinary meetings were held. Leaders explored new measures to come to grips with the situation. Unconventional means of conducting business at the EU external border and with neighboring countries achieved intended results. In parallel, the European Council pushed legislative work to handle the emergency situation within EU borders less successfully.

This chapter discusses how the European Council responded to the refugee crisis 2013-2016 during its initial, acute and managing phase. It concentrates on how the European Council handled three aspects of its “comprehensive approach” to manage the crisis: protection at the EU external border, cooperation with countries of migrant origin or transit be-
yond EU borders and attempts to distribute asylum seekers within EU borders. Finally, the chapter relates these developments to the “negotiating perspective” on EU policy-making put forward by Elgström and Smith (2000), according to which the study of EU negotiations could usefully be pursued by analysis of negotiation, first, as process, second, as system and, third, as order.

Negotiations between heads of state and government in the European Council proceed behind closed doors, either in formal sessions or informally over meals. During the proceedings heads of state and government normally finalize prepared written conclusions, which represent the negotiated and agreed outcome of the leaders’ meeting. Such formal or informal conclusions or statements constitute the basic sources of this chapter.

Initial phase – the Lampedusa disaster and beyond

The EU has previously received large numbers of refugees, with variations over time. After a peak in 2001 with 425,000 requests for asylum, less than 200,000 applications were filed in 2006 (European Commission 2017). As the most recent refugee crisis approached, a new and untested Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was in place. The crisis rapidly exposed weaknesses in the system (Malmström 2014).

From the autumn of 2013 migration rose – step by step – as a pressing issue for EU institutions. The disaster on 3 October 2013, when more than 350 migrants, mainly from Eritrea, Somalia and Ghana, drowned as their ship sank off the Italian island of Lampedusa, elevated migration to the agenda of the European Council. While the European Council had dealt with migration in general terms before, it had never handled a tragedy as the one at hand. At their meeting on 25 October, EU heads of state or government addressed migration in the end of their 50 paragraphs long agreed conclusions, after a meeting dominated by the economic crisis. Leaders expressed their “…deep sadness at the recent tragic and dramatic death of hundreds of people… which shocked all Europeans” (European Council 2013a). They stated that “…determined action should be taken in order to prevent the loss of lives at sea” based on “…the imperative of
prevention and protection and guided by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility” (ibid.).

Thus, leaders focused on measures at the EU external border, albeit at sea, which involved challenges under international law. They “called for” action by relevant EU institutions and “invited” them to cooperate to improve the situation. The newly established Task Force of the Mediterranean, in which the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU agencies and Member States cooperated, was asked to identify short term priority actions. Finally, the European Council decided to revert to migration at its meeting in June 2014. With reference to the outcome of the European Council meeting, the Task Force of the Mediterranean stepped up its work under Commission leadership and proposed 38 operational actions (European Commission 2013).

The European Council reverted to “migration flows” at its 19-20 December meeting, once more at the very end of lengthy agreed conclusions, and without in-depth discussion as the meeting was dominated by security and defense. Again, leaders focused on saving lives at sea and activities at the EU border. They received a report from the Task Force of the Mediterranean and stressed the importance of cooperation with countries of origin beyond EU borders in order to “…avoid that migrants embark on hazardous journeys towards the European Union” (European Council 2013b). Within EU borders, leaders stated the importance of ensuring “…that appropriate solidarity is shown to all Member States under high migration pressure” (ibid.). The Council was tasked to monitor implementation of actions needed.

An increased number of asylum seekers throughout 2014 led to severe challenges for recipient EU Member States, particularly Italy, but still not to acute problems for the EU as a whole. At the “Central Mediterranean route” the naval and air Operation Mare Nostrum, undertaken by Italy with EU support, helped some 150,000 migrants to arrive safely to the EU over the sea from October 2013 until the EU run Operation Triton took over a year later.

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and warfare in eastern Ukraine dominated European Council work during the first half of 2014. In June, heads of state and government reverted to migration as agreed and set
orientations for EU work on “freedom, security and justice”. In general terms, the conclusions noted that “…the Union needs an efficient and well-managed migration, asylum and borders policy, guided by the Treaty principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, in accordance with Article 80 TFEU1 and its effective implementation” (European Council 2014a).

The European Council stated that the EU’s commitment to international protection would require “a strong European asylum policy based on solidarity and responsibility” (ibid.). References to solidarity between Member States and abidance by international refugee law were quite common during the initial phase of the crisis. In addition, migration polices “…must become a much stronger integral part of the Union’s external and development policies” (ibid.). It was also noted that the freedoms provided in the Schengen area required “…efficient management” of EU’s external borders and that the EU must “…mobilise all the tools at its disposal” to support Member States in this regard. External border management had to be improved, including by strengthening Frontex (European Council 2014a).

A period without high-level attention to migration followed. Two extraordinary European Council meetings in July and August 2014 dealt with Ukraine, the transition to a new Commission and the election of Donald Tusk as new president of the European Council. The October European Council agreed the EU position on climate before the upcoming Paris UN meeting, and stated that the “…economic and employment situation remains our highest priority” (European Council 2014b). The December 2014 European Council meeting concentrated on investments and Ukraine without addressing migration (European Council 2014c). Ukraine also dominated the informal European Council meeting in February 2015.

Energy Union was the main item for the formal European Council meeting in March. But now leaders reverted to migration, albeit under the head-

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1 Article 80: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the acts of the Union adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.”
ing of Libya and at the end of their conclusions. Leaders expressed impa-
tience; implementation of previously agreed measures had to be stepped up
in order to avoid loss of migrants’ lives at sea, including by strengthening
Triton, the Frontex Operation in the Central Mediterranean. Leaders wel-
comed the Commission’s initiative to submit a “European Agenda for Mi-
gration” in May (European Council 2015a). However, new alarming devel-
opments would be needed before more decisive action would be taken.

Acute phase

Dramatic situation along migrant routes

In 2015 the preferred route of asylum seekers on their way to the EU
changed. The number of migrants taking the hitherto dominating Central
Mediterranean route fell somewhat to 154,000, from 170,000 in 2014. This
was mainly due to a shortage of boats for smugglers following EU actions
and a shift of Syrian refugees to the alternative Eastern Mediterranean
route. Here the number of migrants increased dramatically to some
885,000 compared to about 50,000 in 2014; the majority coming from
Syria, passing Turkey to reach Greek islands, such as Lesbos (Frontex
2017a). The increase started early in the year, intensified in April and
peaked at 216,000 in October. Most of the migrants continued north along
the so called Western Balkan route, via the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Serbia into Hungary and Croatia, and from there further
north to countries like Germany or Sweden (Frontex 2017b).

An effective response to such large-scale refugee movements required both
robust coordination and additional resources. In an institutionally fragment-
ed European Union only the European Council could play such a role, in-
cluding by mandating actions by subordinate councils, in particular the
Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA), that had been in the lead hitherto,
and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), but also, as the crisis evolved, the
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin). Thus, the European
Council quickly became the key body for managing the now acute situation.

The worst refugee disaster so far in the Mediterranean on 19 April, with
a death toll of at least 700 off the Libyan coast, sparked action by the
European Council that rapidly held an extraordinary meeting 23 April. Leaders formulated the basic components of their “comprehensive approach”, more clearly than before: protection of the external border, including through stronger EU presence at sea and intensified fight against traffickers, prevention of illegal migration flows and reinforced internal solidarity and responsibility (European Council 2015b).

Concrete measures at and beyond the EU border

Thus, heads of state or government “committed”, first, to strengthen EU border security operations Triton, in support of Italy, and Poseidon, in support of Greece, by at least tripling the financial resources in 2015 and 2016, and by increasing the number of participating marine vessels and airplanes. Leaders also committed to disrupt trafficking networks and bring the perpetrators to justice and to systematically identify and destroy vessels used by traffickers.

Second, leaders committed to act beyond EU borders to limit illegal migration flows and to discourage people from putting their lives at risk. Cooperation with countries of transit and origin, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Mali and Niger, should be stepped up, including through support for monitoring of their borders. Dialogue with the African Union should also be improved; a summit on Malta in the coming months was proposed.

Third, heads of state or government agreed to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility within EU borders. They committed to increase emergency aid to front-line Member States under pressure, i.e. Italy and Greece, and “…options should be considered for organizing emergency relocation between Member States on a voluntary basis”. Likewise on a voluntary basis, leaders committed to set up a pilot project “…on resettlement across the EU, offering places to persons qualifying for protection”. The notion of voluntariness was inserted upon the insistence of the Visegrad and Baltic Member States. Finally, leaders agreed to revert to migration at their regular meeting in June (European Council 2015b).

At the June European Council meeting “migration” topped the agenda. Leaders referred to the their “decisions taken” in April and noted that they had been translated into actions to “…prevent further loss of life at sea, to
find new ways of confronting smugglers and to intensify cooperation with countries of origin and transit, while respecting the right to seek asylum” (European Council 2015c). Leaders welcomed the launch of EUNAVFOR MED naval operation Sophia, decided by FAC on 22 June, aimed at preventing the activities of migrant smugglers and human traffickers in the central Mediterranean.

The European Council no longer issued orientations; now leaders took initiatives and agreed concrete measure to tackle the crisis. To address the acute emergency facing Italy and, increasingly, Greece, and in order to foster solidarity and responsibility, the European Council “agreed” measures to help 60,000 people. 40,000 refugees “in clear need of international protection” should be “relocated” from Italy and Greece to other EU Member States. Leaders stated that all Member States “will participate” (ibid.). They agreed “…on the rapid adoption by the Council of a Decision to this effect; to that end, all Member States will agree by consensus by the end of July on the distribution of such persons, reflecting the specific situations of Member States” (European Council 2015c), while it was noted that Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom were not legally obliged to participate. In addition, leaders agreed that all Member States should take part in the “resettlement” of an additional 20,000 refugees from camps in the Middle East to EU Member States. Finally, Italy and Greece should be given EU support to set up specific receptions facilities for refugees, labeled “hotspots”, and be granted enhanced financial assistance (European Council 2015c). The discussions among leaders that proceeded adoption of the carefully drafted conclusions were heated and centered on whether relocation should be mandatory, a view that Sweden and Germany held, or voluntary, which the Visegrad and Baltic countries demanded.

Measures beyond EU borders in the form of cooperation with countries of origin and transit were more easily agreed. Cooperation with these countries should be scaled up. Partnerships should be forged between European and African countries at the now decided Valletta Summit in November. Leaders also advocated increased cooperation with Turkey and relevant countries in the Middle East (particularly Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon). It is notable that Turkey did not yet figure prominently as a priority country for cooperation.
After the European Council meeting, migration ministers in the JHA Council set out to implement the leaders’ commitment to relocate asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU Member States. While the Council failed to fully translate the agreement in the European Council, i.e. to decide on the distribution of 40,000 refugees by consensus by the end of July, it partly managed, by a decision covering 32,256 persons from Italy and Greece.

Difficult decision on relocation

Meanwhile the number of asylum seekers in the EU continued to grow rapidly. On 31 August, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated: “Wir schaffen das!”. On 2 September, the picture of the dead body of three-year old Alan Kurdi on a Turkish beach was distributed globally. The situation at the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes was difficult. After Hungary constructed a fence on its border with Serbia in September, the flow of migrants to the EU shifted to Croatia. In 2015, the region recorded 764,000 detections of illegal border crossings by migrants, a 16-fold rise from 2014 (Frontex 2017b).

The crisis situation required extraordinary action. Thus, on 9 September the Commission put forward an emergency relocation proposal covering 120,000 refugees (50,400 from Greece, 54,000 from Hungary and 15,600 from Italy), on top of the 40,000 relocations from Italy and Greece already proposed. The relocation would be done according to a mandatory distribution key using objective criteria.

However, again the JHA Council failed to agree on the proposal by consensus at extraordinary meetings, 14 and 22 September. Instead, a modified proposal, in which Hungary declined participation, was adopted by qualified majority voting (QMV), with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voting against, and Finland abstaining (Euractiv 2015).

With the QMV-decision on relocation taken by the JHA Council, leaders were not forced to come back to the controversial issue of distribution of asylum seekers when they met for yet another extraordinary European Council 23 September to “…deal with the unprecedented migration and refugee crisis we are facing” (European Council 2015d). Nevertheless,
the statement from the meeting made an indirect reference to the difficult QMV-decision taken the day before: “We all recognised that there are no easy solutions and that we can only manage this challenge by working together, in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility. In the mean time we have all to uphold, apply and implement our existing rules, including the Dublin regulation and the Schengen acquis” (European Council 2015d).

At this meeting, the leaders concentrated on operational decisions on the most pressing issues beyond EU borders on which they could agree more easily. Focus was on the consequences of the inhuman civil war in Syria. Leaders wanted to add “at least” an additional 1 billion euro in response to the urgent needs of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and other countries, in particular through assistance via the UNHCR and the World Food Programme. The EU’s Regional Trust Fund for the Syrian Crisis should also be increased, as should the Emergency Trust Fund for addressing the root causes of migration in Africa in preparation for the Valletta summit.

Focus on Turkey

EU heads of state or government now pointed at the need to cooperate with Turkey in clearer terms than before. Dialogue with Turkey should be reinforced at all levels, including at an upcoming visit of the Turkish President to “stem and manage” migratory flows. Assistance should also be given to Western Balkan countries, following the “Western Balkan route conference” on 8 October.

Within the EU, front-line Member States should be supported, including by assistance for the establishment of “hotspots”, and by ensuring relocation and return. Leaders also stated that it was “important to create the conditions for all Member States to participate fully in the Dublin system” (European Council 2015d). As a result of the non-functioning Dublin system and the “waiving through policy” at hand, several Member States felt compelled to impose internal border controls under Schengen safeguard provisions. Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden imposed temporary controls during the autumn.

In order to “stem the flow”, cooperation with Turkey stood out as the key priority. EU institution leaders met Turkey’s President Erdogan in Brussels
on 5 October. After consultations with the Presidents of the European Council and the European Parliament, Commission President Juncker handed over a Draft Action plan on support of refugees and migration management to Erdogan. The plan contained a number of proposed actions in order to assist Turkey to manage the large number of refugees from Syria and to avoid irregular crossings from Turkey to the EU. As part of the plan, the EU should provide financial support, and accelerate visa liberalization and EU accession for Turkey. The details of the plan were to be worked out in meetings between Commission and Turkish officials.

On 8 October the situation along the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkan route was assessed at a high level ministerial conference in Luxembourg. A number of action points were declared, including support for Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, as well as transit states, and in order to fight organized crime responsible for migrant smuggling and trafficking (Council of European Union 2015a).

As leaders reconvened for their regular autumn European Council meeting on 16 October the acute migration crisis dominated the meeting. “Tackling the migration and refugee crisis is a common obligation which requires a comprehensive strategy and a determined effort over time in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility” (European Council 2015e). Leaders stressed the importance of prompt implementation of orientations already agreed. Again, focus was on actions at and beyond EU borders. Leaders welcomed the joint Action Plan with Turkey now agreed by officials. The European Council stood ready to increase cooperation with Turkey further and to “...step up their political and financial engagement substantially”. Leaders also stressed the importance of the Valletta summit.

Rapid negotiation on a European Border and Coast Guard

The European Council pointed at the need to further improve security at the EU external border, including through the establishment of a European Border and Coast Guard System, which was now mentioned for the first time by the European Council. Hitherto several Member States had seen border protection solely as a national competence; the refugee crisis
rapidly changed that position.\footnote{The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) was proposed on 15 December 2015, by the European Commission. The proposal extended Frontex’s existing mandate and transformed it into a fully-fledged European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The European Council roundly supported the proposal. The negotiations took place in rapid pace and the agency could be officially launched 6 October 2016. The budget of the agency will increase from 238 million euro 2016 to 322 million in 2020, and staff from 400 in 2016 to 1,000 in 2020.} Within EU borders, leaders noted the first successful relocations and committed to “…proceed rapidly with the full implementation of the decisions taken so far on relocation” (European Council 2015e).

The Valletta Summit took place 11-12 November between EU and invited African leaders, announcing a large number of priority actions to handle the situation. In doing so European and African leaders inter alia confirmed their commitment to “…address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement resulting from state fragility and insecurity, as well as from demographic, economic and environmental trends… Re-kindling hope, notably for the African youth, must be our paramount objective” (Valletta Summit 2015).

EU heads of state or government met Turkey’s Prime Minister Davutoğlu on 29 November. Additional steps towards developing EU’s relation with Turkey were taken due to the need to jointly manage the migration crisis. The Joint Action Plan, first taken up in October, was adopted. The EU committed to step up its political and financial engagement substantially; EU pledged 3 billion euro to help Turkey cope with the more than two million Syrian refugees, within its borders, through a special Refugee Facility for Turkey. Both sides agreed that they would cooperate in order to return refugees, who were not in need of international protection, to their countries of origin. In addition, the parties committed to re-energize Turkey’s accession process to the EU and to hold regular summits (Council 2015b).

When the European Council met in December, leaders were not satisfied: “Over the past months, the European Council has developed a strategy aimed at stemming the unprecedented migratory flows Europe is facing. However, implementation is insufficient and has to be speeded up.
For the integrity of Schengen to be safeguarded it is indispensable to regain control over the external borders. Deficiencies, notably as regards hotspots, relocation and returns, must be rapidly addressed” (European Council 2015f).

Thus, severe challenges still loomed. Schengen cooperation – one of EU’s paramount achievements – was at risk. “Shortcomings” and “deficiencies” at the external border had to be fixed. Systematic security checks against relevant databases had to be ensured, as had identification, registrations and fingerprinting of migrants. “Hotspots” had to be made operational. Leaders were prepared, not only to implement relocation decisions, but also to “… consider including among the beneficiaries of existing decisions other Member States under high pressure who have requested this” (such as Sweden) (European Council 2015f).

Leaders tasked the Council to continue work on the crisis relocation mechanism “…taking into account experiences gained” (ibid.). The Council should also adopt its position on the European Border and Coast Guard by June, which meant very rapid negotiations on a Commission proposal made just days before the European Council meeting, covering a complex matter that many Member States hitherto rejected EU competence on (European Council 2015f).

Managing phase – control of external borders and reduced numbers

At the European Council meeting in February 2016, which was dominated by a new settlement for the United Kingdom before its referendum on EU membership, the tone of the conclusions on migration changed somewhat compared to earlier meetings. Leaders reverted to their comprehensive approach, which they now formulated as follows: “the objective must be to rapidly stem the flows, protect our external borders, reduce illegal migration and safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area” (European Council 2016a). Refugee rights, solidarity or responsibility were no longer mentioned when the main approach was addressed.

Leaders prioritized stemming migration flows and tackling traffickers and smugglers. NATO’s decision to assist in preventing illegal crossings in
the Aegean Sea was welcomed. The importance of full and speedy implementation of the EU-Turkey Action Plan was stressed. Progress was noted as regards access by Syrian refugees to Turkey’s labour market and data sharing with the EU. But the number of migrants arriving in Greece from Turkey remained “…much too high” (ibid.). A “substantial and sustainable reduction of the number of illegal entries from Turkey” was needed. This called for “…further, decisive efforts also on the Turkish side to ensure effective implementation of the Action Plan” (European Council 2016a). Leaders also welcomed internal decisions on the funding of an operation of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey.

**Ending the “wave-through approach” and “return to Schengen”**

The heads of state or government were still concerned about the irregular migration flows along the Western Balkan Route where further concerted action was needed, including putting “…an end to the wave-through approach” (European Council 2016a). It was decided that relevant regulations should be amended to make humanitarian assistance possible inside the EU, to stranded refugees in Greece. Leaders repeated that the decisions on relocation should be implemented without delay.

At this occasion EU heads of state or government were compelled to urge rapid return to the normal functioning of the Schengen area, which had been fragmented due to internal temporary border controls: “We need to get back to a situation where all Members of the Schengen area apply fully the Schengen Borders Code and refuse entry at external borders to third-country nationals who do not satisfy the entry conditions or who have not made an asylum application despite having had the opportunity to do so” (ibid.).

It was, finally, noted that the comprehensive strategy agreed in December would require joint and coordinated action by EU institutions and Member States, and that EU’s existing framework needed reform in order to ensure a “humane and efficient” asylum policy (European Council 2016a).

The main focus was now on cooperation with Turkey to halt migrants from reaching Greece from Turkey. On 7 March, EU heads of state or
government again met with Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu. Progress had been made in implementing the Joint Action Plan. However, according to President Tusk’s statement after the meeting, “…the flow of migrants passing from Turkey to Greece remains much too high and needs to be brought down significantly” (ibid.). Cooperation should therefore be strengthened further “…so as to achieve concrete results on the ground within days” (Council of European Union 2016a).

Tusk referred to the fact that migrants had started to be sent back from Greece to Turkey, albeit in small numbers. Davutoglu reassured that Turkey was ready to take back irregular migrants who would be apprehended by NATO vessels on Turkish waters. According to Tusk, these steps “…send a very clear message that the days of irregular migration to the European Union are over” (Council 2016a). It was decided that the EU-Turkey cooperation should proceed on the basis of a balanced agenda. Turkey committed to accept the return of all new irregular migrants from the Greek islands, in return the EU committed inter alia to resettle Syrian refugees from Turkey on a “one-for-one basis” (one for every migrant returned to Turkey from Greece), to speed up disbursement of the 3 billion euros in support of Syrian refugees in Turkey, to accept accelerated work on visa liberalization for Turkish citizens and to advance the Turkish process of accession to the EU.

In addition, EU leaders used the meeting to decide to “…end the ‘wave through approach’ which means that the irregular flow of migrants along the Western Balkan route have now come to an end.” This would require deployment of “massive” humanitarian assistance to Greece, which the leaders committed to deliver urgently, and support to manage the EU external border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. This was “…a collective EU responsibility and so Greece will not be left alone” (ibid.).

As requested by the European Council the Council rapidly – on 15 March – adopted a regulation allowing emergency support within the Union, which permitted humanitarian assistance to around 35,000 refugees who were stranded in Greece. The EU budget was amended so that up to 300 million euros could be used for this purpose.

Meanwhile contacts with Turkey had continued. On 18 March, EU leaders met with Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu for the third time
since November. They now deepened the cooperation even further and presented the result in a joint statement. Two components were added to the Joint Action Plan, which led leaders to declare that they had “…decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU” (Council of European Union 2016b).

First, Turkey accepted that all irregular immigrants to Greece should be returned to Turkey as from 20 March, after due legal procedures, securing the individual’s rights under international law. Second, the EU committed that for every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian should be “resettled” from Turkey to the EU. The first component posed significant legal challenges; both measures involved technically difficult operations, which the EU committed to pay for. The EU also promised to work with Turkey to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria near the Turkish border.

The EU pledged to speed up disbursement from the Facility for Refugees in Turkey by deciding on additional projects before the end of March. If conditions were met, the EU also committed an additional 3 billion euro in support of refugees in Turkey up to the end of 2018 (Council 2016b).

In their regular European Council meeting, back-to-back with the Davutoglu encounter, EU leaders reiterated that the EU-Turkey Statement did not establish any new commitments on Member States regarding relocation or resettlement. In addition, they expected Turkey “…to respect the highest standards when it comes to democracy, rule of law, respect of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression” (European Council 2016b). The European Council was “…pleased with progress on the European Border and Coast Guard proposal, which should be adopted as soon as possible” (ibid.). Further work was also needed on the future architecture of the EU’s migration policy, including the Dublin Regulation.

On 12 May the Council agreed to the continuation of temporary internal border controls, due to exceptional circumstances, in Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway for a maximum period of six months.
Progress finally reported

At the European Council meeting on 28 June, leaders could report progress for the first time since the beginning of the crisis. The agreed conclusions noted that crossings from Turkey to the Greek islands had sharply decreased, and “…now almost come to a halt” (European Council 2016c), following the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement. Leaders were also satisfied that “considerable progress” had been made on other action points in the statement and looked forward to more to come. However, further action was called for to accelerate the implementation of the existing relocation and resettlement schemes (ibid.).

In addition, attention was again drawn to the Central Mediterranean route, where flows of mainly economic migrants remained at the same level as last year. This flow “…must be reduced, thus saving lives and breaking the business model of smugglers” (ibid.). Heads of state or government stressed the need for a partnership framework of cooperation with individual countries of origin or transit, on the basis of the Valletta Action Plan, “…applying necessary leverage by using all relevant EU policies…”. Such a framework should be “…put into place…swiftly…based on effective incentives and adequate conditionality” (ibid.). The EU High Representative was tasked to lead the work. All available sources of funding should be mobilized and an External Investment Plan should be adopted in order to improve the economic situation in countries of origin. Finally, leaders welcomed agreement on the European Border and Coast Guard proposal and asked for its swift adoption and rapid implementation (European Council 2016c).

The adoption of the regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard on 14 September 2016 paved the way for its operations to begin in mid-October. Compared to other complex and sensitive rule making projects, this one was finalized very rapidly.

The regular October European Council meeting saw further progress and concluded that the situation at the EU border had improved. Leaders stated that the “…entry into force of the European Border and Coast Guard…and national efforts are important steps in strengthening control of our external borders and getting ‘back to Schengen’ by adjusting the
temporary internal border controls to reflect the current needs” (European Council 2016d).

Much attention was given to measures beyond EU borders, the external dimension of migration. Cooperation with African countries of origin and transit was highlighted, using all relevant EU policies in order to apply necessary leverage. The first results of cooperation with five selected African countries – Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Niger and Senegal – should be presented to the European Council in December. Leaders welcomed the UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and called on all global actors to shoulder their responsibilities. Concerning the Eastern Mediterranean route agreed measures should be continued. However, efforts to accelerate returns from the Greek islands to Turkey, in line with the EU-Turkey statement, had to be speeded up. Finally, leaders asked EU countries to boost the relocation of migrants, especially for unaccompanied minors. This, was, however, stated “…without prejudice to the position of Hungary and Slovakia, as contained in the Court proceedings launched relating to Council Decision n° 2015/1601, and to the position of Poland, which has intervened in support” (European Council 2016d).

And, again, leaders called for further work on the reform of EU asylum rules, including the application of the principles of responsibility and solidarity, without being able to note progress.

At its meeting in December, the European Council mainly referred to ongoing activities without advancing new ones. Leaders found the new Migration Partnership Framework with African countries to be an important tool for addressing the root causes of illegal migration. Leaders welcomed progress made with the five selected African countries and stated that cooperation with additional countries could be envisaged.

Concerning the internal EU rules on asylum “…effective application of the principles of responsibility and solidarity remains a shared objective” (European Council 2016e). Some progress had been made in the review of the Common European Asylum System, while other areas required further work. The Council was tasked to continue the process with the aim of achieving consensus on the EU’s asylum policy during the first half of 2017. Without prejudice to Hungary, Slovakia and Poland it was also reiterated that Member States “should further intensify their efforts to accel-
erate relocation, in particular for unaccompanied minors, and existing resettlement schemes” (European Council 2016e).

The refugee crisis in a negotiating perspective

Elgström and Smith (2000) argue that each aspect of a threefold “negotiating perspective” – comprising EU negotiating processes as well as interpreting the EU as both a negotiating system and a form of negotiated order – “contributes significantly to our understanding of... policy-making in the EU” (2000: 673). The European Council’s handling of the refugee crisis would seem to support the usefulness of this approach; the crisis management described above contains salient points relevant to negotiations as process, system as well as order.

As pointed out by Elgström and Smith, decision-making processes in the EU are by and large negotiating processes (even if decisions can also be made via voting and application of rules), and it makes sense to describe the EU as a “negotiating machinery”. Multiple – upcoming, ongoing or finished – internal and diverse negotiating processes formed the basis for the outcomes of the European Council meetings, as recorded in the written conclusions or statements reviewed above. The crisis conditions no doubt shaped and sharpened positions and contributions by participating EU institutions and Member States so that concrete results could be obtained rapidly and successfully concerning measures at and beyond EU’s external border. Negotiated results were, however, more difficult to achieve with regard to actions within EU borders.

The former conclusion is illustrated, first, by the rapidness with which approval of EU naval operations were negotiated despite legal complications under international law and by the very rapid, yet successful negotiation establishing the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, despite technical challenges and earlier firm resistance of many Member States to give up national competence on the matter.

Second, negotiating processes focused on actions beyond EU borders were also largely successful, again no doubt helped by the crisis conditions at hand. The negotiations leading to the EU-Turkey statement were exception-
al in several ways: they were to a large extent held outside the regular framework, without the same kind of formalized mandate that underpinned most equivalent negotiations; the European Council stepped in as an actor; the process was partly led by the President of the European Union and the result was recorded in a “statement”, not in an agreement that would have required formal adoption by the Council and the European Parliament. In addition, the Council gave the Commission mandate to formulate a Migration Partnership Framework of cooperation covering, initially, five African countries, involving conditionality of a sort that was normally not seen as appropriate in international development cooperation, and regarding which some Member States expressed concern, but not objection.

However, negotiation processes on internal measures, in the form of relocation and distribution of asylum seekers between EU Member States, were not equally successful. These negotiations involved matters that affected citizens and perceived national identities more directly, and hence sparked resistance in Central European Member States. Despite attempts to find solutions the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia were, initially, not willing to accept such measures and voted against them in the next step. Poland soon joined the same camp, meaning that the Visegrad-group united and rejected relocation of asylum seekers between EU Member States, which in turn confirm the prediction by Elgström et al (2001) that coalitions are becoming an increasingly important theme in EU politics and that the latest enlargement of the union would “…distinguish and polarize policy stand-points within the EU” (2001: 111).

Beyond the negotiating processes, Elgström and Smith indicate that the EU constitutes a unique negotiating system, in which negotiations have some essential characteristics that may shed additional light on the European Council’s handling of the refugee crisis. The high degree of institutionalization of EU negotiations provided structure and guidance as the refugee crisis shocked the negotiating system. Formal and informal norms and rules were exploited to produce negotiated outcomes or, when negotiations failed, to make decisions by qualified majority voting, as with regard to relocation of refugees. However, in this negotiation, which involved value based components, the principle of juste retour, according to which all participants are supposed to gain something from a negotiation,
which normally form part of the EU negotiating system, did not apply. The institutional framework was used by the opponents to relocation as the Visegrad-group challenged the legality of the decision in the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

The permanent, linked and continuous nature of EU negotiations no doubt influenced the way the European Council managed the refugee crisis. EU members “…almost by definition expect long-term favours from membership” (Elgström and Smith 2000: 676). Normally, the long shadow of the future that EU membership entails makes members conducive to find compromises and to strike deals. Again, this is illustrated by the outcomes at and beyond the EU external border during the refugee crisis, while Visegrad-countries were willing to pay the price of breaking the norm concerning internal relocation measures. In this context they were helped by the rigid institutional structure of EU negotiations that made it impossible to link the negotiation on relocation to the negotiations on EU’s next multiannual financial framework, not beginning until 2021.

The presence of institutional actors such as the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in the EU negotiating system influenced the negotiating processes and their outcomes. The Commission, with its sole right of initiative and as guardian of the treaties, rapidly put forward emergency proposals on a wide range of issues during the crisis and stood up for the values upon which the EU is founded: including by proposing relocation and defending it before the ECJ. The EEAS performed important functions in several negotiating processes.

Beyond negotiation processes and the unique negotiating system that the EU forms, Elgström and Smith argue that the EU also can be seen as a negotiated order that rests, “…not only on the material foundations of institutions and procedures but also on a powerful set of normative and quasi-ideological understandings” (2000: 678). This means that “reigning ideas” play an important role in EU negotiations; as “…a powerful non-material shaping force” (ibid.). Furthermore, Elgström (2007) points out that the EU’s self-representations picture is one of a normative, value-driven “force for the good” (2007: 468).

The European Union rests on fundamental values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights, which also underpin its migration and ref-
ugee policy, in which the right of asylum and the principle of non-refoulement are fundamental components. The Visegrad-countries’ nationalistic stance and rejection of this basis, their refusal to receive refugees and to accept the QMV-decision, can be interpreted as a negation of the normative aspect of EU as a negotiated order based on the common fundamental values. This stance now accentuates the problem of “authority, legitimacy and compliance” (Elgström and Smith 2000: 679) that the EU faces. The difficulty to agree on relocation illustrates the dilemma that the EU, as a value based negotiating machinery with partly weak resources to coerce members to act, faces. As Elgström and Smith argue, tendencies in this direction lead to “…evolution of ideas about the ‘negotiable’ and the acceptable outcomes to negotiations” (2000: 679). This, in turn, leads to the existential question whether the Visegrad-group’s refusal to negotiate on the value-based issue of internal solidarity, and the following inability of the EU to negotiate and agree rules for relocation of refugees in emergency situations, has led the EU to the limits of negotiations?

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3 Sweden’s best friends in the Council of the EU

Markus Johansson

Who are Sweden’s best friends in the Council of the European Union? Which cooperation partners does Sweden have, and has this pattern changed over time? These are the questions in focus in this chapter. The substance, patterns and processes of cooperation among various kinds of political actors are central topics in the field of political science, and have also been at the forefront in EU studies. In the EU, the patterns of cooperation, that is, which Member States that cooperate with each other, have been a central focus in studies of the practices of the Council of the EU. This essentially concerns the issue of coalition-building, which is crucial to simplify negotiations when the number of decision-makers increases and decisions are taken by majority rule. It is also a way to enhance one’s own position in negotiations, and seek to influence the direction of policy-making. A coalition can be said to exist when actors “coordinate their behavior in order to reach goals they have agreed upon” (Elgström et al. 2001: 113). In this meaning, coalition-building is a deliberate and active choice from its parties. Considering the development of the EU during the past two decades, with increased use of qualified majority voting and south-eastern enlargement, coalition-building should be expected to have increased in importance in the EU over time. It is to quite some extent also in relation to enlargement that scholars previously have directed attention to the issue of coalition-building (e.g. Naurin and Lindahl 2008; Mattila 2009; Thomson 2009), which lately also have included the effect of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union (Huhe et al. 2017).
Some pioneering work on coalitions was however done already during the 1990s, amongst other by Elgström et al. (2001), who in 1998 did a survey with 275 Swedish representatives to the Council of the EU. This chapter will aim to explore how their findings about Swedish cooperation partners have evolved since then. Using updated survey data from 2003 to 2015, collected at the University of Gothenburg, the study of cooperation patterns by Elgström et al will be extended in time, analysing the development of Swedish cooperation with other Member States during this period.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, a brief review of existing research on coalition formation and cooperation patterns in the Council of the EU is provided to derive at the expectation that it should be possible to observe quite some stability in cooperation partners over time, following a north-south-east pattern. The section there after introduces the empirical data and how it relates to data used in previous studies. Some empirical analyses of Sweden’s cooperation partners follow, and the chapter finishes with a brief concluding and forward-looking section.

Research on coalitions and cooperation patterns in the Council of the EU

A spurring scholarly interest for the functioning of the EU Council of Ministers was seen during the late 1990s to early 2000s. It has been explained as an effect of both new methods of gathering data as well as increased transparency, allowing for enhanced document analyses (Sullivan and Veen 2009). Among these “new” methods of data gathering, which became paramount to gaining knowledge about the functioning of the Council, were surveys done with Member State decision-makers in the various preparatory bodies of the Council. Some pioneering work with such methods was conducted in the late 1990s and turn of the millennium (e.g. Beyers and Dierickx 1997, 1998; Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Elgström et al. 2001), which significantly has contributed to our understanding of the practices of cooperation among the EU Member States. Others have followed the model of these early surveys for repeated data gathering about cooperation and negotiation dynamics in the Council (Naurin et al. 2016), and it has jointly proved the versatility of this type of data.
Studies of patterns of cooperation and coalition formation in the Council of the EU have been based on three main data sources: voting data, positional data and survey data. The general pattern that has been found regardless of data type is some north-south-east fractions of Member States. The first, and perhaps most widely used, type of data is voting data, which is used to discern coalition patterns based on which Member States that vote together when votes are formally cast. The most striking result is perhaps the geographical pattern, consisting of a vocal minority in the north, and further divisions between old and new Member States, effectively resulting in a north-south-east pattern (Mattila 2009; Van Aken 2012). The second type of data is positional data, where actor alignment has been explored using Member States’ initial positions on numerous legislative proposals to discern patterns of positional proximity. The method builds on interviews with key informants on different legislative dossiers to identify actors’ initial positions, which are used for a variety of analyses. Also with this type of data, an overall north-south-east clustering of Member States is found (Thomson 2009).

Both these types of data have their limitations. While voting data has the benefit of accessibility, it is limited to the fraction of decisions that are actually made with a final registered vote. There are at least two problems with using voting data to study coalitions. First, the voting patterns might actually not indicate coalitions if identical voting decisions are taken for different reasons, in a form of passive coalition. Second, voting data is unable to capture cooperation patterns in the actual process of negotiations. Positional data on the other hand is difficult to gather, but has the strength of not being limited to the fraction of very contested decisions where votes are formally cast, and do thereby not risk providing biased data. However, neither positional data is able to capture coalition-building in the process of decision-making. It is for instance not evident whether any coordinated behavior, and hence an active coalition between the Member States, is an automatic result of positional proximity. This presupposes that coalitions are interest-based, and excludes other reasons for coalition-building.

In light of these limitations, a third group of studies has been based on surveys conducted with Member State representatives to the Council to
study communication and cooperation processes and patterns of coalitions (Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Elgström et al. 2001; Naurin and Lindahl 2008). These studies have better potential to capture also what happens during the process of decision-making, and get overall estimates on which Member States that actually do cooperate with each other in coalitions. It should be noted however that such data is based on experts’ perceptions about cooperation, which obviously induces some uncertainty as regards the accuracy of those perceptions. Elgström et al. rely in their 2001 article on a survey with Swedish representatives to the Council of the EU, while both Beyers and Dierickx (1997) and Naurin and Lindahl (2008) rely on surveys with representatives of all EU Member States. The early studies identified a north-south pattern of cooperation (Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Elgström et al. 2001), which has later been complemented by an eastern bloc (Naurin and Lindahl 2008). This essentially concurs with the findings of coalitions studies using voting data and positional data. Elgström et al. (2001) also explore some explanatory factors for these patterns, using explicit questions about observed coalitions as well as motivations for seeking cooperation. It is concluded that the findings largely support a culture-based explanation for coalitions, but also that this can be a foundation for long-term common interests. They reject power-seeking and ideological explanations for coalitions, and instead the results would suggest that the observed coalitions are quite stable. While their study did only measure coalitions and cooperation in a single instance, the stability of cooperation could not really be examined. The aim here will therefore be to extend the analysis of Swedish cooperation partners over time. To the extent possible, some remarks will also be made regarding indications of different explanations for observed coalition patterns, primarily regarding cultural (geographical) proximity and power-seeking.

Data and measurement of cooperation partners

The dataset (Naurin et al. 2016) used in this chapter is based on a telephone survey with EU Member State representatives, which has been conducted every three years between 2003 and 2015, amounting to five measurement
In each round, all Member States’ representatives to eleven different preparatory bodies of the Council were approached for interviews, and with an overall response rate of 81% the number of interviews conducted are in total 1093. The question that is used to identify cooperation partners is the following (on which we have in total 936 valid responses): “Which Member States do you most often cooperate with within your working group/committee in order to develop a common position?” The respondents have been asked to mention three other Member States, but we have frequently registered more cooperation partners than three, even up to ten other Member States in some cases. For the purpose of this chapter, I look both at which Member States the Swedish respondents say they cooperate with (Table 1), and also how many of the other Member States’ representatives that say they cooperate with Sweden (Table 2). In order to do this, no differentiation is made based on how many cooperation partners that are mentioned by each respondent, i.e. there is no extra weight attached to the counting if a Member State is mentioned along with two other Member States as compared to if it is mentioned along with for instance nine other Member States.

The data used in this chapter differs from the data used in Elgström et al. (2001) in some important ways. While Elgström et al. (2001) rely on survey data collected with a one-shot large sample of Swedish respondents in 1998, the data used here measures cooperation on five occasions from 2003 to 2015, with respondents from all Member States at each point in time, but with a more limited sample from each Member State. This obviously implies better possibilities for studying the stability of cooperation partners, as well as the extent to which this reported cooperation is reciprocated. The data is however more limited when it comes to the number of respondents from each Member State and year, which makes the figures reported more volatile to individual responses. If anything, this should induce more variation between the years, and therefore potentially overestimate the instability of coalitions. The phrasing of the question regarding cooperation partners is also slightly different, where Elgström et al. (2001, 122) asks their respondents “which countries’ representatives they usually cooperate with”. In both cases, the question asks for common cooperation partners, but the data used here is based on a question with the added
information that it should lead to a common position, and thereby also that there is some jointly agreed goal. This clarification is well in line with the definition of a coalition given by Elgström et al. (2001), which was reiterated in the introduction to this chapter, but it does not change the substantial meaning of the question. In sum, this means that the data used here should be highly comparable to the one used by Elgström et al. (2001), but provide opportunities to study the development of time.

Who are Sweden’s best friends?

The results regarding Sweden’s cooperation partners in the Council of the EU are reported below in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 1 includes the Swedish respondents from the five survey rounds, and their answers to the question of which Member States they cooperate with. It also includes the aggregated figures for all years in the left column, as well as a comparison to the figures reported in Elgström et al. (2001) based on data from 1998, in the right column. Table 2 in turn includes figures for the respondents from the other EU Member States in each survey round, and the frequency of them that have reported regular cooperation with Sweden. Table 2 also includes the aggregated figures for all years in the left column.

Looking specifically at Sweden’s cooperation partners, it is impossible to make any definitive inferences regarding general cooperation patterns in the EU, or the explanations for the patterns observed. Yet, in light of the results from previous studies presented above, the figures here do not contradict the earlier found north-south-east structure of cooperation in the Council of the EU. As noted by Elgström et al. (2001), Sweden cooperates closely with its Nordic neighbors in Denmark and Finland, but also with the United Kingdom. In Table 1, it is apparent that the aggregated figure in the left column support that these three Member States are most often mentioned by Swedish representatives to the Council, even if the UK comes out much ahead in the data presented here compared to the data from 1998. Added to that list of top cooperation partners over time is the Netherlands, which came out quite far behind the top three cooperation partners in 1998. Based on the aggregated survey data presented here, 73 per cent of Swedish respondents mention the Netherlands as a frequent cooperation partner,
### SWEDEN’S BEST FRIENDS IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EU

Table 1: Frequency of Swedish respondents reporting cooperation with other Member States

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<td>10</td>
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*Note:* Member States are sorted based on the total scores in the left column.

Compared to just 36 per cent in 1998. Also, Germany and France is more often mentioned in this data compared to the data from 1998, whereas Austria comes out with lower reported cooperation frequency. These differences in results compared to the study by Elgström et al. (2001) can have many causes. There might of course be genuine differences over time, but it can also be an effect of differences in measurement.
Such sources of divergence between the surveys might be how many Member States that the respondents have been allowed to mention, the policy areas covered, as well as any potential bias in the data towards different policy areas (more respondents from one policy area than another). As also mentioned previously, the number of respondents are lower in the presented data, which consequently increases individual responses’ weight. This could hence also affect the comparative accuracy.

Given the presentation of the data above, the overall pattern of cooperation with the 14 EU Member States that was observed in 1998 is nevertheless strikingly similar when comparing the development over time. The order of Swedish respondents’ most frequently mentioned Member States (Table 1) is following the same north-south division that was observed in 1998, and the Member States that have entered in 2004, 2007 and 2013 are placed in a mid and lower segment of Member States. Among those twelve Member States that are not mentioned by any Swedish respondent in our surveys, or just mentioned in a single instance, we almost exclusively find Mediterranean and south-eastern Member States. The cultural explanation for these coalitions, put forward by Elgström et al. (2001), where common language and history are strong components and to some extent geographically determined, therefore continues to look plausible.

That both Italy and Spain – two of the EU’s largest Member States – are consistently not mentioned by Swedish respondents could be interpreted as an indication that power-based explanations for coalitions are insignificant. Especially when considered along the fact that Sweden cooperates most closely with some other relatively small states, such as Denmark and Finland, power-seeking for building winning coalitions does not seem to be a primary motivation for cooperation. At the same time, if extending the power-based explanation away from formal voting power to build minimum-winning majorities or blocking minorities, to include also substantial power over policy outcomes, it is clear that large Member States are not necessarily more influential than smaller ones (Golub 2012). There is hence a potential for small Member States to punch above their weight in a systematic way in the Council of the EU, and accordingly, that also large states can punch below their weight (Panke 2011). Consequently, a power-seeking explanation for coalitions could be based on an ambition
to team up with substantially influential states. Moreover, a common wisdom in analyses of European integration is that the UK, France and Germany make up a dominating troika of influential Member States (Moravcsik 1998). Even if Italy and Spain are of similar size, they are generally not considered to belong to this group. Neither Germany nor France are however top cooperation partners mentioned by Swedish respondents, but they do come out well above the mid and lower segment of southern and eastern Member States that was previously mentioned. It might hence be too hasty to discard power-seeking altogether. Instead, there might be layers of motivation for forming coalitions, where cultural and power-seeking can function as complements.

Looking at Table 2, it is clear that the top three cooperation partners mentioned by Swedish respondents to very similar extents also mention Sweden as a cooperation partner in the Council of the EU. There hence seems to be some mutuality in the relation to these Member States. Both the Danish and Finnish respondents to a somewhat greater extent report cooperation with their Swedish counterparts than the other way around, even if the figures in both cases are very high. While the Swedish respondents did not report very frequent cooperation with eastern and Baltic Member States, respondents from the Baltic states and the Czech Republic have reported frequent cooperation with Sweden. As mentioned in the introduction, the enlargement rounds have been particularly interesting for coalition-building, and spurred quite some research attention. But while the Swedish respondents have steadily mentioned the same cooperation partners over the years, some of these comparatively new Member States seem to, more or less unilaterally, have aligned themselves with Sweden. An argument in some enlargement research has been that as newcomers to the Council it could take some time to learn the environment (e.g. Hosli et al. 2011), and in that light, it might be conceivable that it is more important for newcomers to try to form alliances with old member states than it is for the old Member States to seek alliances with the newcomers. That this pattern persists over time might in turn be an effect of habit and path dependencies.

One of the questions that was raised initially regarding the patterns of cooperation in the Council of the EU was whether they are stable or vary
Table 2: Frequency of Member States’ respondents reporting cooperation with Sweden

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<th>Member State</th>
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<th>2012</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2003</th>
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</table>

*Note: Member States are sorted based on the total scores in the left column.*

over time. The general, and striking, observation to make is that coalition partners change very little from year to year. Swedish respondents consistently mention the same quintet of Member States – UK, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Germany – as their primary cooperation partners through the five survey rounds, even if the order of them varies somewhat. This pattern is the same in the data from 1998 presented in Elgström et al. (2001). It is thus possible to say with some confidence that for the
past 20 years – almost the entire length of Swedish EU membership – Sweden has formed a coalition with their northern European neighbors. The stability of coalitions, which was predicted by Elgström et al. (2001) could from a Swedish perspective thus largely be confirmed.

Conclusions

Going back to the questions raised initially about who Sweden’s cooperation partners in the Council of the EU are, and whether these have varied over time, it is obvious that Swedish representatives consistently recognize cooperation with other northern European Member States. These findings concurs with the patterns found in Elgström et al. (2001), and also largely confirms the predicted coalition stability. It is worth noting that the data used in this chapter measures cooperation on five occasions, with a limited sample of respondents from each Member State and year. This implies that the data and figures presented can vary quite substantially depending on individual responses, which in part can also be seen when comparing responses for the different years (compare for instance the number of times Finland is mentioned by Swedish respondents in 2003 and 2006). At the same time, it is remarkable how stable the top, mid and lower groups of cooperation partners are, both based on the Swedish representatives’ perceptions and the perceptions of other Member States’ representatives. Given that such stability is found, despite the limited samples, these stable patterns must be expected to persist also in a larger sample.

Even if Swedish cooperation patterns are persistent over time, the enlargement rounds during the past 15 years have had an impact on coalition-building, both in terms of introducing another geographical dimension to the cooperation patterns, and by the new Member States seeking cooperation with old Member States. Sweden’s closest cooperation partners in this group of states are the Baltic states and the Czech Republic. Future enlargement rounds are likely to encompass states in the south-eastern corner of Europe, a region where Sweden thus far has not had very close cooperation. For Sweden, the most important development during the coming years in terms of membership changes will instead be Brexit, and the effect of losing its closest, and largest, cooperation partner. In fact,
the effect of Brexit is likely to be significant for the cooperation within the whole bloc of northern European states, and new alliances will need to be formed (Huhe et al. 2017). Even if there have been speculations about Italy seeking a new role in Europe post-Brexit, and fill the space left by the UK, it is unlikely that Swedish cooperation partners in the future will be found in the southern and south-eastern parts of Europe. Instead, Sweden’s important cooperation partners will likely continue to be found in its closest vicinity.

References


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1 See for instance Colonnelli (2016).


4 Swexit, voice and loyalty: Sweden’s EU strategy after Brexit

Björn Fägersten

The British exit from the European Union puts Sweden in a difficult position. The UK has often been a close partner and offered protection in areas where Sweden’s interests have been challenged. This chapter examines Sweden’s relationship with the EU, Swedish-British cooperation and what Sweden can expect following Brexit. The Swedish Brexit debate is scrutinized, along with the choices now facing the country in a shifting strategic environment. It is suggested that the political cost of taking on the UK’s role as a sceptic in the area of EU security and defence policy, or as a watchdog in relation to the eurozone, will be difficult for Sweden to bear. Consequently, Sweden could become a more loyal EU Member State and, with time, find its own role within the European integration project.

Sweden: a careful but fastidious European

If one assumes, as Alan S. Milward (1992) once argued, that European cooperation was primarily intended to “rescue” the nation states of Europe after two catastrophic world wars, it is easy to understand why Sweden chose to remain outside of it. While major parts of Europe were left in ruins by World War II, Sweden was benefiting from its unprecedented level of industrial capacity and legitimate system of government. Furthermore, military and political neutrality was seen as a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy. The country did not need to be saved, and the price of membership of the new European cooperation – in the form of diminished
national autonomy – was not seen as worth paying. For about the first 40 years of EU integration, Sweden therefore chose to maintain, and was able to maximize the benefits of the continent’s political convergence, from the position of an outsider.

The Swedish economy and its exports strongly benefited from the Nordic-British free trade agreement, the European Free Trade Association and a free trade agreement with the predecessor of the EU – the European Economic Community (EEC). However, full membership of the EEC was considered impossible to combine with Sweden’s neutral foreign policy. In addition, it was opposed domestically as it was perceived as a potential threat to the advanced Swedish welfare state (Erlander 1961). This perception would last until the economic and political map was dramatically redrawn in 1990, when a domestic banking crisis contributed to a recalculation. Sweden’s political isolation and relative vulnerability were now seen as obstacles to a safe and stable economic policy. A recalculation was also made in the foreign policy arena when the break-up of the Warsaw Pact ended the potential for any major conflict in which Sweden might in theory remain neutral (Gustavsson 1998). An application for EU membership submitted in 1991 was backed by a referendum in 1994, resulting in Sweden joining the EU in 1995.

The main driving force behind Sweden’s decision to join the EU was the economic benefits and stability that a more solid relationship between Europe’s nation states might produce. European symbolism and visionary ideas of deepened integration, however, were rarely part of the Swedish calculation. When Swedes voted in 2003 on the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union, these domestic doubts were once again demonstrated. This time the “No” side won, and Swedes have stuck with their krona ever since – even though Sweden does not have a formal exemption from monetary union. These two referendums have made their mark on Sweden’s relationship with the EU in two ways. First, there is still a tendency to discuss Sweden’s relationship with the EU in binary terms – whether membership is good or bad, if we win or lose – rather than focusing on the political context and the development of the EU. Second, the two referendums led to deep cleavages within many of the Sweden’s largest political parties, the Social Democrats being perhaps the clearest example. While
Prime Minister Göran Persson was the clear leader of the “Yes” camp during the 2003 euro campaign, his charismatic Minister for Enterprise, Leif Pagrotisky, led the “No” camp. Even 15 years later, many Swedish parties still find it difficult to formulate a coherent and common vision of what the EU should be and what it should do. In this context, the UK’s decision to leave the EU has led Swedes to both relive the phantom pain of our own referendums and cautiously increase their engagement with the EU.

Ironically, the most animated articles about the benefits of the EU and European integration have been written not as a reaction to Sweden’s relationship with the EU, but as a response to another country deciding to end its membership. Brexit may thus enable Sweden to carry on a debate over the EU “by proxy”, using the fate of UK post-Brexit as a pretext. As to the central question – whether Sweden should remain a member – the Brexit process seems to have strengthened Swedish support for EU membership.¹ In the context of the country’s ties with the EU and the reasons for finally joining, this support seems completely rational. Even if the UK is a close partner of Sweden’s, its journey out of the EU is viewed as risky and turbulent, especially at a time when even the global rules of the game are being questioned. For Sweden, which initially saw its membership of the EU mainly as a way to strengthen its economy and maintain political stability, the EU still fulfils its purpose. And even if the country – unlike many others – does not view the EU as a way to protect itself or its neighbours, the increasing tension between the EU and Russia has certainly supported the perception that a political union with other European countries can increase the country’s political stability and security.

Sweden and the United Kingdom as political partners

That it is the United Kingdom rather than any other country that is in the process of leaving the European Union is to Sweden probably more dramatic than the departure itself. The United Kingdom and Sweden share a

¹ In a recent survey 65 per cent of Swedes viewed their EU membership favourably, see <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6686061>.
long history of cooperation that, to a large extent, has been channelled with greater vigour through the EU. The foundation of that cooperation is a strong bilateral trade relationship, manifest as early as 1654 in a trade and friendship agreement between the two. The trade relationship consists for the most part of a trade in services but the trade in goods is also well developed, and cultural and geographic proximity drive the relationship. Around 100,000 Swedes live in the United Kingdom and the British constitute one of the biggest groups travelling to Sweden as tourists. These interpersonal relations have their counterparts at the political leadership level. Göran Persson frequently discussed his good relationship with Tony Blair just as Fredrik Reinfeldt later developed ties with David Cameron.

Within the EU, the Swedish-British relationship can be discussed in terms of policy, politics and polity. Starting with policy, the UK and Sweden have similar political preferences in areas such as competition policy, the size and focus of the budget, trade policy, foreign and security policy, the development of the single market and agriculture. Both countries share a fundamentally liberal view of the function of the market and what EU-level policy ought to try to accomplish. The UK also has a similar view on the geopolitics of Northern Europe and what the Russian threat to the European security order looks like, and has made efforts to counter such threats, for example through sanctions.

Turning our attention towards politics, the exercise of power and the road to gaining real influence in the EU, the UK is once again a close ally of Sweden. Several studies have shown how close decision makers are to one another. For example, Sweden often votes the same way as the UK. It is also clear from studies of civil servant interaction that Sweden has strong ties with the UK in the political process (see e.g. Naurin and Lindahl 2014; Hix, Hagemann and Frantescu 2016; and Sieps 2017). Both Sweden and the UK can be said to share a view of how politics should ideally be done, using evidence from science and consequence analyses to underpin the decision-making process. Finally, both Sweden and the UK have been united in their resistance to the dominance of the eurozone. Even if Sweden and the UK have had different associations with the eurozone – the UK has driven its clear division while Sweden has been more interested in closer cooperation and participation – they have shared an interest in not
allowing non-eurozone Member States to be discriminated against and not letting the eurozone have too much influence over non-eurozone countries, for instance in the development of the common market.

Lastly, if we look at polity, or what kind of political organism the EU ought to be and what it should comprise, Sweden and the UK once again have shared a similar view. Both Sweden and the UK have nurtured the intergovernmental character of the union, both have – partly for different reasons – pushed back against the EU developing into a significant military actor, and both have actively worked to expand the EU and open it up to new Member States. Taken together, this shared vision and cooperation with the UK with regard to policy, politics and polity have been important to Sweden as a smaller country within the EU with often strong and sometimes obvious preferences. Ultimately, this means that Sweden has a lot to lose when Brexit happens, albeit that there are also some opportunities to be grasped.

What can Sweden expect post-Brexit?

Because of the close relationship discussed above, the effects of Brexit could be very substantial for Sweden. At the same time, however, the effects will be largely dependent on how the United Kingdom leaves the European Union and how the new relationship is designed, which given its close relationship with the UK is an area that Sweden ought to be able to have an impact on.

A new dynamic could develop in the relationship between Sweden and the UK as the Brexit negotiations proceed. However, with regard to the essential substance of the relationship – trade – the effects are very likely to be undesirable. A report by the Swedish National Board of Trade has found that all the possible alternatives imaginable for future trade deals between the EU and the UK are worse than the trade now taking place under current conditions (Kommerskollegium 2017).

Another side-effect is that the EU as a whole is at risk of changing direction in a way that is not in Sweden’s interests. As a result of Brexit, the policies that have united Sweden and the UK will be driven with considerably less force in future. Economically, the EU might become more
prone to regulation and less to free trade, which would be a disadvantage for a smaller country as dependent on trade as Sweden. Another possible scenario is deeper integration, either within the eurozone, which would accentuate Sweden’s position as an outsider, or among the EU 27 as a whole, which Sweden is likely to be uncomfortable with.

On a geopolitical note, a Europe in which the larger Member States are divided in their outlook on security policy would constitute a risk to Sweden. If the opportunities for France, Germany and the UK to collectively analyse and position themselves in relation to their surroundings are diminished, the risk of geopolitical divisiveness in Europe will increase. On the other hand, if the larger Member States were to compensate for this Brexit effect with an intensification of bilateral (e.g. the British-French Lancaster House cooperation) or minilateral (e.g. G3 cooperation) forums, this would also constitute a risk for a smaller Member State such as Sweden, which has benefited from the fact that deliberations have been held in open, multilateral formats.

At the same time, there are also opportunities for Sweden in a post-Brexit setting. The UK will have an interest in compensating for its loss of influence by maintaining and creating other European arrangements. The deep bilateral relationship will become more important in this scenario, as will regional agreements with the Nordic countries and the Baltic states which will be prioritized by the United Kingdom. These are forums that could potentially give the UK a platform for influencing the EU while at the same time allowing it to fulfil its role vis-à-vis the USA as a bridge to Europe. If the British place an additional focus on these groups, this will be advantageous for Sweden, which already has a strong position in these forums. Finally, the British might compensate by increasing its engagement with NATO. With regard to the division of geopolitical views between the UK and Sweden, this could be seen as a positive development leading to a greater training and operational presence in the Baltic Sea, and coherent with the Swedish Government’s ambitions with regard to the Sweden-NATO partnership.
Sweden debates and prepares for Brexit

The political discussion on Brexit in Sweden has been tainted by the country’s own relations with and approach to the EU, the lack of vision for the European Union among Swedish political parties and the obvious risks mentioned above. There have been three main phases in the political debate: the discussions around David Cameron’s proposals for reform up until February 2016, the British referendum campaign in the spring of 2016, and the period following the victory of the leave voters.

During the first phase, when Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU, Sweden kept a low profile, waiting on the results of the negotiations and the reactions of others. This might seem odd when the questions raised were also key issues for Sweden: relations between “the core” and “the periphery”, the shape and limits of free movement, future development of the internal market and the role of national parliaments. Perhaps the reason why Sweden kept a low profile was its shared interests with the UK, and that the UK’s continued membership was more important to Sweden than the reforms under discussion. Parts of Sweden’s private sector did engage, however, as they saw opportunities for a reformed European cooperation. This indicates their close ties to the UK, perhaps most clearly shown in an op-ed written by the British think tank Open Europe and signed by several Swedish corporate leaders, albeit that in the debate that followed they had difficulties clarifying the logic of their arguments (Dagens Industri 2013).

In the short phase following Cameron’s negotiations, during the campaign before the referendum, the intensity of engagement by Swedish politicians increased and a number of articles were written on the importance of EU cooperation and British membership of the EU. For a country where politicians rarely write about the EU, and even more rarely on the importance of European cooperation, this was a fairly unique chapter in the Swedish political debate. Since the referendum, the media has shifted its focus to expert commentary about the future process, how Sweden should position itself in the negotiations and how the effects should be dealt with.

Throughout the three phases, a common thread in the Swedish debate has been agreement that Sweden stands to lose if the UK leaves the Union.
“Reduced influence for Sweden if the UK leaves”, “Brexit would be very bad for Sweden”, “Brexit is the Swedish nightmare”, and “Sweden has most to lose from Brexit”, are telling examples of headlines of various op-eds in the Swedish press. The unanimous concern is about possible short- and long-term economic setbacks. In the short term, the economic situation in Europe is expected to be affected by an apprehensive market and possible capital flight. The biggest emphasis however has been on the long-term consequences of Brexit. The main challenges for Sweden are seen as lower growth rates, greater exposure for the export and service sectors and decreased influence in Brussels.\(^2\)

A few perspectives stand out in the debate, one example being the Eurosceptic Left Party’s leader who saw an opportunity early in the debate to use the UK’s lead to change Sweden’s relations with the EU (Sjöstedt 2016). Overall, however, the debate has been highly unified around the negative effects likely to hit Sweden, especially for a country with such divergent positions on the EU.

Alongside the public debate, the Swedish public sector is also preparing for the coming negotiations. A number of reports and studies have been commissioned to clarify the situation and develop possible future scenarios. The Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps) has investigated the possible effects on Sweden and the EU, the National Board of Trade has examined the possible effects on Swedish trade and Business Sweden has “mapped possible opportunities to draw investments to Sweden following an eventual Brexit” (Government communication 2016). The Swedish Institute of International Affairs was commissioned by the Swedish Armed Forces to analyse possible political consequences in the security realm, and several internal surveys have been carried out within the Government offices, among other things, on the effect on the EU budget.

From an organizational perspective, the Brexit process is being handled within the existing structures of the Government offices. Even though the

\(^2\) The analysis of Sweden’s attitude to Brexit is based on 79 media articles from Sweden’s largest daily news outlets published between April 2016 and March 2017, analysed by the author.
Prime Minister is formally responsible for the process, the Government put its EU and Trade Minister in charge of the negotiations in the spring of 2016, which facilitates communications on EU-related issues. A civil servant has been appointed “Brexit-coordinator” and leads the day-to-day collaboration between ministries. At the political level, the state secretaries from the ministries involved meet regularly.

In general, it is possible to argue that the Swedish organizational response to Brexit came quite late, and did not pick up pace until the autumn of 2016 when preparations were initiated. This situation was not unique to Sweden, however, as the European Commission was unwilling to even discuss the matter before the referendum.

Future crossroads: the euro and an EU defence policy without the UK

One of the clearest trends in both the studies discussed above and the public debate on Brexit is the consensus that historically with the UK as a partner and ally, Sweden has been able to enjoy far-reaching protection. The two countries share preferences in many areas, and Sweden has long been able to take advantage of the UK’s significant political weight and its willingness to stand up for its (and by extension Sweden’s) principles and positions. This leads to perhaps the biggest question for Sweden in regard to Brexit: without the UK’s backing within the EU, how should Sweden act in the future to secure its interests?

The economist Albert O. Hirschman proposed in *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (1970) that actors in a relationship or organization who no longer feel that they are benefiting from that relationship have two basic options: to leave (exit) or to stay and try to change the relationship/organization (voice). Which option an actor chooses depends largely on how loyal they are to the organization (loyalty). Applied to the EU, loyalty can be understood from the perspective of a Member State as a choice in itself. An actor who chooses loyalty would stay in the EU – or the relevant policy field – and adapt to the majority position of the Member States. Exit, on the other hand, implies that an individual member either leaves the union or opts out of one of its designated areas of policy cooperation, while voice
would mean that the member would continue to be involved, with a focus on protesting or adapting the policies of the organization in ways that it perceives as advantageous. The latter action fits well the logic of the Swedish position on Brexit. The action logic becomes even clearer when looking at Sweden’s positions on the policy areas where Sweden and the UK have positioned themselves at the outer periphery of EU Member States. Two such policy areas stand out: the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the relationship between the eurozone and the EU Member States that have remained outside it.

Sweden has traditionally adopted a rather ambivalent approach to the CSDP. On the one hand, Sweden has historically been one of the biggest opponents of a “militarization” of the EU – as a threat to Sweden’s military non-alignment, which as discussed above was a major reason why Sweden joined the EU relatively late. On the other hand, Sweden has been one of the driving forces behind the development of the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities, and has contributed a significant number of personnel to CSDP operations. In addition, Sweden has been the framework nation for the Nordic Battlegroup on three separate occasions, in 2008, 2011 and 2015. However, the current coalition between the Social Democrats and the Green Party has adopted a more cautious approach to the development of the CSDP. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström, has opted to prioritize working within the UN, such as in the campaign for a non-permanent member seat on the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, the Swedish Minister for Defence, Peter Hultqvist, has prioritized strengthening the bilateral relationship with the United States and has rarely expressed any enthusiasm about the security and defence policy dimension of the EU.

In addition, the Social Democrats’ coalition partner, the Green Party, has traditionally been critical of the EU and is characterized by strong pacifist roots, which may have contributed to Sweden’s cautious approach to the CSDP. More specifically, Sweden has been sceptical about deeper cooperation on the joint development and procurement of defence equipment, a military headquarters for the planning and operational control of CSDP missions, and the strong focus on defence issues in the implementation of the EU Global Strategy. This recurring scepticism, often expressed
together with the UK, has led to concerns in other Member States that Sweden, following Brexit, will assume the UK’s current role as the main nay-sayer in the development of the CSDP – or, in other words, adopt the *voice* strategy to obstruct further integration. However, there is much to suggest that this will not be the case, and that Sweden will instead act in line with the *loyalty* strategy. One reason for this is the major political price that would have to be paid for halting the development of the CSDP, which is seen by many Member States as vital following years of terrorist attacks and Russian aggression, and the election of a US president who has given unclear signals about the worth of NATO’s collective defence clause. In other words, the political cost has gone up and Sweden will no longer be able to share this cost with the UK.

Another reason why Sweden may well not adopt the *voice* strategy is that it is not certain that Sweden has strongly negative feelings about enhanced defence cooperation. A focus on other policy areas in combination with a habit of following the UK has allowed Sweden to get away with not clearly identifying its interest with regard to the CSDP. *Loyalty*, or not standing out, can thus be an effect of newly identified common interests rather than a strategic choice.

Regardless of the motivation, there are already signs that Sweden has chosen loyalty. For instance, approval of the new military planning and conduct capability (MPCC), more or less the military headquarters that the UK has been such a long-time opponent of, and the decision to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are two examples of Sweden aligning itself with the majority position of the EU 27 even if this is done without any real enthusiasm.

The relationship between the eurogroup and non-euro Member States is another area in which Sweden and the UK have previously closely coordinated their positions, and where the UK, with its political weight, has been able to have considerable influence. The source of this coordination is a joint fear that deeper cooperation within the eurozone would have negative consequences for Member States outside, such as a general shift of power.

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3 This analysis is based on interviews conducted with German, Italian and British foreign and security policy experts between September and December 2016.
from Ecofin (the council formation for finance ministers) to meetings of the eurogroup. This could, for instance, occur through the pre-cooking of decisions by euro countries on regulations that affect all EU Member States – such as the single market. The UK has used its administrative capacity to closely follow the inner workings of the eurogroup, and has thus been able to act as a watchdog for policies that might discriminate against or have negative consequences for non-euro Member States – for instance by ensuring that non-euro Member States are not burdened by the economic risks of stabilization measures targeted at eurozone Member States. Will Sweden take over the UK’s role as a watchdog post-Brexit?

While Swedes chose exit in their referendum on the euro in 2003, they are still closely intertwined with the policy decisions made within the eurogroup. In contrast to the area of security and defence, it is more likely that Sweden will adopt the voice strategy with regard to the euro. This is mainly because the political costs of opposing discrimination against non-euro Member States is low – such opposition often involves technical and non-political issues of little symbolic value. There is also strong public support in Sweden for cooperation with members of the eurogroup without participating in EMU’s third stage. It should be noted that Sweden, unlike the UK, has shown increasing interest in gaining influence and representation in the decision-making processes surrounding the eurozone. For instance, Sweden has previously utilized the voice strategy with regard to the right to participate in eurogroup meetings. If the gap between the eurogroup and non-euro Member States increases, in terms of the degree of political integration, there is therefore reason to believe that Sweden would – at a manageable political cost – act as the new eurozone watchdog post-Brexit. This conclusion regarding voice could also become a reality in other issue areas in which Sweden has strong interests, for which there is broad domestic support and that are relatively non-politicized in the general EU debate. Issues around the EU-budget are examples where Sweden might choose an active influence strategy.

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4 For an overview see Craig and Markakis (2016).
5 The actions of the UK and Sweden with regard to the eurozone are summarized well in Eriksson (2017).
In summary, Sweden will have to significantly revise its strategic outlook once the UK has left the EU. Sweden’s journey into the EU has been characterized by doubt, but also by effective diplomacy – in terms of both negotiating and influencing EU policy. Depending on its preferences and the political cost of opposition, Sweden will probably shift between loyalty and voice in relation to new majority positions after the UK’s withdrawal. On a more general level, it is also possible that the forced introspection and new perspectives that Brexit have given rise to – and will continue to give rise to – may even eventually lead Sweden to find its role in European integration.

References


Actorness and roles
5 Identity and power in European foreign policy

Knud Erik Jørgensen

The EU experiences a hard time in the emerging global order.¹ Not only does the new order increasingly imply external contestation from revisionist aspiring powers, idealist civil society organizations (CSOs) and old-school international organizations, it also triggers centrifugal forces within the Union, epitomized by Brexit, the financial crisis and the current illiberal governments in Hungary, Poland and Italy. While the Zeitgeist at the beginning of the 21st century led numerous authors to publish books with titles such as The European Superpower (McCormick 2007), The European Dream (Rifkin 2004) and Why Europe will run the 21st century (Leonard 2005), the tide has changed, prompting book titles such as After the Fall: The end of the European dream and the decline of a continent (Laqueur 2012), Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide (Thornton 2007) and Europe’s Economic Suicide (Krugman 2012). At the same time, the proliferation of the X-power Europe literature (see Box 1) shows that scholars keep insisting that Europe is a power or has some kind of power, which is a remarkable contrast to both the decline literature and Robert Kagan’s (2004) claim in Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the new world order about a powerless Europe. In Kagan’s perspective, Europe opts

¹ A previous version of the chapter was presented at the symposium, The European Union and the Emerging Global Order, Department of Political Science, Lund University, December 1, 2017. Parts of the chapter were prepared for presentation at the EUIA conference in Brussels, May 2016. I would like to thank participants in both events as well as the editors for their very valuable and helpful feedback.
for multilateralism, that is, for what he considers to be the strategy of the weak. These contradictory interpretations of the EU’s role and clout in the world constitute a genuine puzzle. Some would probably dismiss either the decline literature or the superpower Europe literature, suggesting it is just a dozen of publications employed by misguided authors (or publishers). That is not the case. The book titles illustrate fundamental changes of perspective, and these dramatic changes will inevitably trigger profound reconsiderations of both the EU’s international identity and direction as well as the ambition of Europe’s foreign relations.

Similar to other major international actors, the EU has a contested (international) identity, and different political-ideological orientations compete in terms of defining the EU’s identity. The same applies more specifically to foreign affairs, where at least four transnational foreign policy schools of thought compete about giving direction and ambition to European foreign policy. Notably, visions of consequence about Europe’s future identity are no longer monopolized by centrist political forces but are now also in the hands of especially far right, nationalist and/or populist configurations and considerably less so promoted by far left orientations. This branching out of influential players results in a high degree of politicization and a fierce competition about Europe’s future identity, including the future of European foreign policy.

| Civilian Power Europe (Duchêne 1972; 1973) |
| Military Power Europe (Bull 1982) |
| Normative Power Europe (Manners 2002) |
| Transformative Power Europe (Leonard 2005; Börzel 2010) |
| Realist Power (Zimmermann 2007) |
| Ethical Power Europe (Aggestam 2008) |
| Integrative Power Europe (Koops 2011) |
| Normal Power Europe (Pardo 2011) |
| Market Power Europe (Damro 2012) |
| Idiot Power (Carta 2014) |
| Liberal Power Europe (Wagner 2015) |
| Irrelevant Power Europe (May 2016) |
| Soft Power Europe (Nielsen 2016) |
| Empire Power Europe (Zielonka, Behr, del Sarto et al. 2008-2017) |

Box 1: An Overview of Proliferating Adjective Power Europe
This chapter begins with the observation that research on European foreign policy appears to be on parallel tracks, one track of research being identity-oriented and the other track being power-oriented. In the latter case, the power perspective sometimes leads scholars to completely drop the EU from further investigation and instead rely on a traditional discourse of great powers and power politics. In the former case, scholars tend to have limited interest in power, instead celebrating the discrete charm of simply being Europe. The main argument of the chapter is that a combination of the two foci – identity and power – can potentially produce valuable analytical benefits and insights that separate studies do not allow. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the power aspect of the X-power Europe literature requires more attention. In other words, instead of an ever wider proliferation of the X-power argument, it is high time to aim at synthesized conceptions of power. Concerning the combination, I take Ted Hopf (2002) and Henry Nau (2002; Nau and Ollapally 2012) as analytical model examples that can provide guidance for the analysis. The analysis will also take guidance from three key concepts – role, negotiation and leadership – each of which Ole Elgström (2000; Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Elgström and Smith 2006; Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013) critically employs in his scholarship. Identity and role are not identical, yet clearly share analytical features. Moreover, both the employment of power and connections between political ends and means require processes of negotiation and leadership, internally as well as externally.

In order to examine identity and power in European foreign policy, the chapter explores linkages between polity, politics and policy as well as the extent to which foreign policy schools are ready to engage Europe in global affairs. Moreover, the chapter addresses the derived issue of the EU’s use of force, that is, to which extent and political ends foreign policy schools are ready to employ military power. I use a model of causal flows from polity to politics and policy, cf. Figure 1, to structure the chapter. Thus, the first task is to critically discuss if polity really determines or causes policy. I argue that the idea might be useful in political discourse, but as a general proposition in academic studies, it is potentially misleading. In order to become useful, the general propositions need to be unpacked or differentiated. The second task is to critically review the politics of European for-
The idea that the identity of a polity causes policy exists at two different discursive levels. In political discourse, that is, the sphere in which we find reasons or justifications for political action, it is not unusual to come across linkages between the EU’s constitutive characteristics and policy. The char-

Figure 1: Causal flows from polity to politics and policy
acteristics include the EU’s political DNA, the EU as a multilateral micro-
cosmos, the EU as a group of liberal democracies, the EU as a highly inter-
dependent and institutionalized region and the EU as a Christian club. The
DNA metaphor is used both positively, as in Frans Timmermans’ comment,
“Europe has been promoting gender equality since 1957 – it is part of the
European Union’s DNA” (Timmermans 2015), and negatively, as in Rosa
Balfour’s comment, “Despite a habit of producing lots of strategies, strate-
gy is not really in the EU’s DNA” (Balfour 2017). It is worth noting that
legitimizing reasons for action are often presented as causal claims. The
logic is the following: We want to change the state of affairs from A to B,
and if we employ instrument X, we believe the desired change is likely to
happen.

In theoretical and analytical discourse, scholars have an interest in caus-
al or constitutive explanations of outcomes but usually not in legitimizing
political decisions. Thus, while scholars have objectives that are different
from politicians or practitioners, the line of argument appears to be some-
what similar, that is, establishing a link between institutional identity and
policy. This type of analysis is what we know as second image explanations,
a type of analysis that is very popular among students of foreign policy
analysis, including analysts who study European foreign policy. In the case
of the EU, identifying root causes shaping foreign policy tend to be either
institutional characteristics (including legal settings and policy-making
processes) or international identity.

In institutional terms, the EU is constituted similar to a three-layered
(liberal) cake: i) the EU members are all liberal democracies; ii) the EU is
situated in a region characterized by profound institutional density as well
as, iii) there is a very strong economic interdependence among the EU
members. Coincidentally, the three layers are identical to the three main
currents of thinking within the liberal theoretical tradition. In a historical
perspective, the predominance of liberal features is for Europe a unique
situation. After all, during the main part of the 20th century, authoritarian
and totalitarian regimes governed most of Europe, and backlashes in Po-
land and Hungary demonstrate the fragility of the current state of affairs.
Nonetheless, the historical novel situation of predominantly liberal de-
mocracies produces an intriguing overlap between the claims we find in
legitimizing reasons for action and the policy prescriptions that are likely to come from liberal-oriented scholars.

In terms of identity, the EU’s international identity is no more fixed than the identity of any other polity. Actually, one could possibly argue that the EU’s identity is more fluid than other polities. Hence, among political elites, there is a constant competition to define the EU’s identity and to explain how it has implications for policy. It is for this reason I expect that a focused, structured analysis of, for instance, all commissioners in charge of foreign relations in the period 1957-2018 would demonstrate considerable dynamics in processes of international identity formation. It is for the same reason I am reluctant to subscribe to studies that make the EU essentially “a multilateralist” (Jørgensen 2006), a liberal power (Wagner 2017), a “civilian” or “normative” actor (Duchene 1972; Manners 2002) or an “empire” (Behr, 2007; del Sarto 2010).

In rational choice-informed literature, scholars assume actor characteristics, implying in turn that they leave issues of identity unexamined. By contrast, social constructivists Ron Jepperson, Alex Wendt and Peter Katzenstein (1996) employ the logic to explain national security cultures, cf. Figure 2. In such lines of argument, the conceptualization of identity is key to understand the dynamics of the polity and the derived interests and policies.

Whether in terms of political reasoning or analytical procedure, it seems to me that the lines of communication between the polity, characterized by

![Figure 2: Explaining policy by reference to a cascading causal logic: identity > interests > policy. Source: Author’s illustration, inspired by Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996.](image-url)
its three-layered configuration, and foreign policy are simply too long to allow for precise deduction. It might work in political discourse and thus appear as a persuasive reason for political action, but it works less well as a causal factor in academic studies. It is actually very difficult to identify the limits to what liberal democracies can do in global affairs. In reality, liberal democracies can choose between isolationist, unilateral and multilateral strategies, cultivate bilateral and multilateral relations, develop nuclear weapons (US, UK, France) and use them (US), engage in strategies of containment (e.g. vis-à-vis the USSR and Iraq, at least until 2003), nurture pluralistic security communities, build military alliances, conduct covert operations, topple presidents around the world, impose economic sanctions, lie to citizens and media alike, tap citizens’ communication on a mass scale (cf. Snowden’s revelations), and so on (and this is just the short list).

In studies of European foreign policy, power is not exactly an über-employed term. Apart from some of the titles mentioned above in the introduction and the X-power Europe literature, it is very seldom to see the EU conceptualized as a power or employing power. It is equally difficult, although not impossible, to find studies of the EU’s employment of military power. In the X-power Europe literature, scholars assume that what the EU is, the EU will be doing, implying that studies of the employment of power is less pronounced. They typically have more interest in exploring the adjective (e.g. normative) than the noun “power”.

The politics of European foreign policy

The politics of European foreign policy consists of encounters between identity claims, instrumental or not, and policy-making, including the employment of power. What do Europeans believe Europe is, and what do they want Europe to be recognized for? What do Europeans want internationally, and how much or which kind of power are they ready to employ in order to get what they want? Before we can begin to answer such questions, it is necessary to briefly outline the various ways they can be answered. One way to answer the questions is to stick to an individual level and present results in surveys (see Isernia and Olmastroni 2015). A second way is to follow an avenue at an aggregate or, rather, collective
level, that is, collective beliefs systems. In the present context, I have chosen the second avenue. Hence, it is necessary to briefly characterize the political-ideological sources of the making of European foreign policy.

We can take our point of departure in a typology that combines the three classical political ideologies in European history – conservatism, liberalism and socialism – with both nationalism and internationalism (Holbraad 2003; on ideology and foreign policy, see also Carlsnaes 1986). The combination obviously makes a six-cell table. If we take the example of liberal internationalism, it is merely one of six foreign policy orientations, but nonetheless an important one, that contributes to colour the politics of European foreign policy. Staying within the framework of Holbraad’s conceptualization, it follows that liberal internationalists will always face contestation and critique from five other orientations, what could be called the natural-born critics of liberal internationalism (Jørgensen 2015). The five contenders’ situation applies not only to liberal internationalism but, obviously, to all six orientations. It is also clear that each orientation experiences its ups and downs, having consequences for the relative strength of each orientation and, in turn, also for the changing configuration of orientations. Other sources of inspiration allow somewhat similar understandings (see e.g. Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Nau and Ollapally 2012). Instead of rationalizing the output (the ever-changing foreign policy) by reference to essential polity or identity characteristics (second-image approaches) or the vertical interplay between Member States and EU institutions (Hill 1983, 1996), the focus is on how relevant stakeholders make identity claims, feed preferences into the making of European foreign policy and represent different combinations of objectives and instruments.

A comprehensive study of the politics of European foreign policy would need to translate the general ideas outlined above into specifics while drawing on a rich reservoir of empirics. However, in the present context, the following five observations have purely illustrative purposes.

First, four rough indicators – humanitarian intervention, a liberal international order, support for multilateral institutions and development assistance – demonstrate that liberal internationalism in Europe is alive and influential. Very significant segments of the political establishment in Europe – parties, NGOs, think tanks and media – represent a liberal inter-
nationalist orientation in global affairs. Taking the main features of 20th century European politics – nationalism, isolationism and neutralism, as well as totalitarian and authoritarian illiberalism – into consideration, the relatively strong current position of liberal internationalism is nothing less than astonishing (Jørgensen 2015: 500).

Second, the EU continued with a foreign policy characterized by a strong dimension of democracy and human rights promotion; yet, it was increasingly out of sync with the priorities of the Obama Administration. While being out of sync does not make policy infeasible, the lack of a strong partner does change the conditions under which success is likely and thus weakens potential impact. In terms of military interventions, humanitarian or not, Libya 2011 can possibly be seen as the temporary endpoint of European foreign policy informed by liberal internationalist features.

Third, one decade into the 21st century, several diagnostic reports highlighted “the European crisis of liberal internationalism” (Haine 2009), “a retreat from liberal internationalism” (Youngs 2011, 2014) and, more specifically, efforts to save “liberal peacebuilding” (Paris 2010). In the long shadows of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the appetite for more interventions was declining. The abandonment of Syria clearly indicates an intervention fatigue.

Fourth, the financial crisis (in reality a package of a public debt crisis + a banking crisis + a currency crisis) has significant negative spill-over effects. It has generally reduced the EU’s soft power and undermined the attractiveness of the EU as a model. This is significantly more important for liberal internationalists than for other orientations because the model is very much the outcome of liberal internationalist endeavours “at home”, that is, in Europe. The migration crisis, including the construction of it as a crisis, has seriously damaged the credibility of the EU, including the previously cherished European values.

Fifth, in studies of the politics of European foreign policy, three levels of analysis are useful to examine: Europe, state and society. It is actors at the European, national and societal levels of political engagement who nurture foreign policy orientations, but their strength varies across levels and time.

In summary, and with a view to ongoing changes, we can conclude that whereas the direction of European foreign policy after the end of the Cold
War and the subsequent decades was defined by liberal and commercial internationalists, the direction during the most recent decade has been increasingly defined by conservative and commercial internationalists. Moreover, we have seen a turn away from internationalism towards nationalism, including a significant turn in national politics away from the EU, a turn epitomized by Brexit. While isolationists at the national level typically find the EU an internationalist step too far and make pleas to abandon the European enterprise, European isolationists prefer that the EU turns inward, thus disengaging globally, and instead begin to cultivate the European garden. They appreciate the accomplishments of the EU, yet do not support further steps in the direction of strengthening European foreign policy. In their classic study of American elite attitudes, Kal Holsti and James Rosenau (1990) conclude that the isolationist position is the most difficult to characterize or summarize, especially because it contains multiple lines of reasoning and is often primarily based on sentiments. Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove’s (2015) study of the “Counter Forces of European integration”, nationalist and/or populist, suggests that the dispersed feature also characterizes the policy paradigms of European isolationists and their politics.

The employment of power

Like other actors cultivating foreign relations, the EU employs power to achieve normative ends, whether market access, good governance or a Kyoto Protocol. What might differentiate the EU from other major players is the composition of the instruments of power, but then, all major players employ a unique package. Moreover, various stakeholders – politicians, practitioners or academics – have different preferences about the power the EU should employ or be able to employ. In order to understand these differences, it is helpful to conceptualize different forms of power. Because of the constraints of this chapter, I will use the well-known distinction between soft and hard power to illustrate the different political takes on Europe’s employment of power. Joseph Nye coined the term “soft power”, defining it as follows: “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants – might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast
Identity and Power in European Foreign Policy

with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants” (Nye 1990). The EU has considerable confidence in soft power in general and specifically in the Union’s own soft power. According to some observers, one great advantage of having soft power is that the EU does not need to do that much in its foreign relations. Being a soft power or model example is sufficient. This image builds a great deal on European exceptionalism and blends in with the politics of both those who prefer foreign relations to be cultivated at the national level and those (isolationists) who prefer to have as few global engagements as possible. The combination of soft power and leadership is essential for stakeholders who prefer the EU to employ soft power to achieve internationalist objectives.

Cultivating the EU as a soft power fits with priorities to multilateral relations. The EU has invested significant resources in “effective multilateralism”, sponsoring international institutions engaged in global governance (Aggestam 2004; Biscop 2005; Drieskens and van Schaik 2014). Rosenau defines global governance as follows: “global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussion” (1995: 13). While pursuing non-coercive global governance, it does not follow that the employment of EU power is absent. Illustrative examples include the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) receiving considerable funds from the EU. These funds are frequently earmarked, and thereby, the EU has power to influence the priorities of the IAEA. The second example is the WTO, designed by the US and the EU during the early 1990s, both players enjoying sufficient entrepreneurial leadership (and thus power) to give the WTO its distinct institutional design. Even the recently created AIIB, initiated by China and having China as the single most important member, seems to have governance structures – principles, norms and rules – that were proposed by the European members of the Asian Infrastructure

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2 They would forward one or more of the following arguments: i) we should cultivate our own garden and spend resources at home; ii) by engaging globally, Europeans will get dirty power politics hands; iii) Global engagements will trigger unwarranted responses; iv) getting involved will only make things worse; v) It is easy to get in, yet difficult to get out, i.e., the risk of mission creep.
Investment Bank (AIIB). Finally, the widespread employment of “minilateralist” strategies suggests that multilateral institutions are not the egalitarian or “democratic” power-free zones they are sometimes presented as (Snidal 1985).

In general, hard power is about the employment of coercive instruments, including tools such as ultimatum, occupation, intervention, coercive diplomacy (cf. the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo), sanctions and embargo. It is well known that the EU increasingly employs sanctions to achieve political-normative ends (Portela 2015), but in the EU’s toolbox, hard power instruments do not figure prominently. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has engaged in the politics of conditionality, that is, employed power in order to achieve normative objectives, both in Europe (enlargement) and beyond (neighbourhood and development policies). However, a politics of conditionality hardly amounts to ordering others to do what they would not otherwise do. The same can be said concerning the employment of market power in trade negotiations and the deployment of armed forces in peace support operations. Neither counts as coercive instruments, because the latter is frequently based on consent, not orders, and the former is closer to the use of leverage than coercion.

In summary, the existing literature confirms that the EU, when cultivating foreign relations, makes use of not only soft but also, occasionally, hard power. What remains to do is to briefly connect the EU-domestic foreign policy schools to the employment of power.

In Holsti and Rosenau’s (1990) analysis of elite attitudes in the US, “Internationalists” are defined as those who aim at international coopera-

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<td>YES</td>
<td>INTERNATIONALISTS</td>
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Figure 3. Source: Holsti and Rosenau (1990), who asked two questions: if respondents approve the use of military means (rows) and if they approve the use of cooperative international engagements (columns).
tion but do not reject the use of military force. While the conceptualization might not be applicable to Europe until recently, it is clear that several cases of coercive diplomacy – Bosnia 1995, Serbia/Kosovo 1999, Libya 2011 – demonstrate that several but not all EU Member States accept the use of military force.3

Debates on the employment of military force emerge as encounters between contending preferences. On the one hand, we have the former foreign affairs minister, Joschka Fischer, heavily criticizing the German government for its lack of commitment to humanitarian intervention in Libya (letter in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* entitled “Deutsche Außenpolitik – eine Farce”, March 2011). Similar to Fischer in orientation, the philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy managed to persuade the French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, to engage in such an intervention, and Bernard Kouchner has previously been very explicit about the existence of a right to intervene. On the other hand, we have “accommodationists” who are very reluctant to approve interventions, even humanitarian interventions. Some are so reluctant or risk-averse that they are far from the “internationalist” group. Others insist on UN authorization of the use of force, often counting on just a single veto player. Analytically, the fine nuances in differences between “internationalists” and “accommodationists” demonstrate the utility but also the inbuilt biases of 2x2 tables.

In the EU, “hardliners” have a hard time. At least, they do not figure prominently in processes of making European foreign policy. While there are political critics of the UN and similar institutions, few outright hardliners are ready to kick open foreign doors but not ready to engage in diplomatic negotiations within multilateral institutions. The closest we get to this is probably supporters of US bold action. During the row over the Iraq War, European “hardliners” surfaced discursively as strong supporters of US unilateral action.

“Isolationists” make some really strange bedfellows, including far-left and far-right orientations as well as centrist believers in model-example

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3 In the early 20th century, many of Holsti and Rosenau’s “accommodationists” would self-identify or be labeled “internationalists” (see Sylvest 2009). The same applies to a considerable segment of contemporary internationalists.
Europe. What these groupings share is that they do not accept neither the use of force nor elite diplomacy at international institutions. While they are not at home abroad, they are very much at home at home. Given the frequent interventions since the end of the Cold War – in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and so on – and the not-always-easy-to-identify successful outcomes, European politics is currently characterized by a decreased political will to engage in the world. The financial crisis at home contributes to the perception that Europe has problems at home that require attention.

Conclusion and perspectives

While it is highly unlikely that the EU will run the 21st century, the decline literature outlines an equally unlikely scenario. Both literatures select a given dimension and then boost it into a dominant, if not the one-and-only trend, followed by predictable conclusions. By contrast, the X-power Europe literature has potential to provide sound studies of the EU’s identity, role and occasional leadership in international negotiations. It provides nuanced perspectives on the different kinds of power and an interest in exploring the relevance of each kind across policy fields and time. At the same time, the X-power Europe literature is dynamic, especially in terms of conceptualization. However, the X-power Europe literature is currently torn between, on the one hand, an excessive reliance on constitutive explanation and, on the other hand, a limited appetite for empirical studies of the extent to which and under which conditions the EU provides global leadership, play a significant role or use power to assume leadership or achieve political ends.

The chapter has two main aims. First, it explores the potentials of connecting studies of identity and studies of power. It makes a plea to combine rather than separate or conflate identity and power studies. Short of being a comprehensive study, the illustrative examples are meant to demonstrate the synergetic potentials of the suggested integrative approach. Second, the chapter contributes to a horizontal, transnational, non-state-centric perspective on the study of European foreign policy. By suggesting such a perspective, I do not intend to turn attention away from the vertical axis
that has characterized most studies in the field during the last 50 years. Instead, I assume the field is sufficiently large to accommodate the existence of both approaches. The horizontal perspective is motivated by the idea that the vertical perspective, while rich in results, is bound to miss important insights, for instance, about the significant transnational politics of foreign policy. Moreover, the horizontal perspective is very suitable for the conduct of comparative research that would enable us to connect various niche productions on European foreign policy to the wider field of (comparative) foreign policy analysis. Existing research on US foreign policy (Mead 2002; Nau 2002) as well as research on aspiring powers (Nau and Ollapally eds. 2012) show that there are model examples that we can use for inspiration and comparison as well as research design.

Finally, the horizontal approach is an excellent device we can use to critically examine the prevalence of European exceptionalism among scholars and practitioners alike. Trading states (e.g. Japan, Germany and the EU), informed by commercial internationalism, obviously do not have strong incentives to engage in international military power politics (Rosecrance 1987; Holman 2015). Yet, the existence of this thread in the fabric of European foreign policy does not imply that the EU is unique in having commercial or normative objectives or in facing (moral) dilemmas in foreign policy (Kane 2008). The self-image of being a model for the world surely plays a role in justifications for a given approach to foreign relations and inform diplomatic relations with third countries, but it should not distract scholars to believe that the EU is unique in the world in having such a self-image or conducting this kind of relations. The horizontal turn enables scholars to connect and synthesize research findings that have been produced in the “1000-islands-of research archipelago”, thereby making findings more relevant to both specialists and generalists, perhaps even relevant to people outside academia.
References


IDENTITY AND POWER IN EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY

6 Leadership roles and institutional change in EU foreign policy

Lisbeth Aggestam

This chapter focuses on leadership in EU foreign policy and external relations. This is a concept that has received little attention in the academic literature. The work by Ole Elgström and fellow colleagues at Lund University stand out in this regard for pioneering theoretically informed studies of leadership, particularly in relation to negotiation in the European Union (Elgström 2003, 2006, 2007, 2014). Leadership in EU foreign policy is widely seen as an important condition for the EU’s ability to act, achieve its aims, and to have an impact on global affairs. The question of the EU’s capacity for leadership in foreign policy has become particularly salient after the European Union has grown rapidly to include new Member States and in response to power shifts in the international system. The Lisbon Treaty that entered into force at the end of 2009 was meant to address the problem of leadership in the European Union by delegating formal leadership functions from the national EU Presidency to the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the creation of a new diplomatic institution, the European External Action Service (EEAS). In contrast to the previous de-centralized foreign policy system, the new institutional changes centralized agenda-setting, policy formulation and policy implementation to Brussels.

I argue in this chapter that the European Union suffers from a leadership paradox at the heart of EU foreign policy. On the one hand, there is a drive to centralize and strengthen European leadership in response to the collective action problem of EU Member States. On the other hand, there
is an accompanying historical and ideological unease at the idea of a strong European leadership role, which is why the political construction of the EU consists of overlapping governance structures encouraging a dispersed and fragmented leadership (Hayward 2008). There is, in other words, an inbuilt paradox between leadership effectiveness and leadership legitimacy (Aggestam and Johansson 2017).

To analyse leadership in the European Union, I sketch out a framework of analysis based on role theory. This approach draws inspiration from Ole Elgström’s work on role theory (Elgström 2015; Elgström and Smith 2006; Bengtsson and Elgström 2011) and emphasises the relational aspects of leadership. Leadership is defined as a social role that is contingent on followers. It is therefore the leader-follower nexus that is central in the analysis. This analytical perspective de-emphasises the singular focus on the role of individual leaders and focuses our attention instead to the process of negotiation taking place between leaders and followers.

The chapter is organized in four main parts. The first part discusses the leadership paradox in EU foreign policy. The second part distinguishes four ways in which the concept of leadership tends to be analysed in the academic literature. The third part develops a model of leadership role analysis. The chapter concludes on the importance to distinguish between internal and external role expectations when we assess the leadership outcome of the European Union as a global actor.

The leadership paradox in EU foreign policy

European leadership in foreign policy is contested and complex. This complexity resides in a leadership paradox that is rooted in different ideas and discourses of what is legitimate and effective leadership in EU foreign policy. The European Union is organized on the principles of heterarchy rather than hierarchy: a highly polycentric and pluralist governance structure rather than the pyramid structure we associate with a state (Hayward 2008). This means that there is no single institution that is firmly in charge to lead the whole of the organization. Instead, responsibilities are shared and overlapping between different institutions. The power of delegation
varies depending on the particular policy field and issues (Da Conceiçao 2010). This has created a leadership paradox in EU foreign policy. On the one hand, the overlapping governance structures create a demand for effective leadership to enhance the coherence and consistency of the EU as a global actor. On the other, the political legitimacy to empower effective European leadership is constrained, for two reasons. Firstly, political legitimacy is still firmly anchored at the national level. Foreign policy, in particular, still enjoys a strong association to the executive function of national government as an arena for national politicians to demonstrate decisive leadership skills for domestic consumption (Hill 2003: 69). Secondly, it could be argued that the European Union is purposely founded on the idea that leadership should be dispersed on multiple levels to inhibit a powerful leadership at the centre. To avoid a repeat of past patterns of European history, there are strong normative ideas in European political thinking that power and leadership needs to be constrained and dispersed (Hayward 2008).

Yet, the original idea of European cooperation in foreign policy has largely been framed as an ambition to speak with “one voice” ever since the first steps were taken in the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1973. This is why Henry Kissinger, as US State Secretary, supposedly asked the rhetorical question – “who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” – born out of his frustrations with the lack of European leadership back in the 1970s. The Member States of the European Union have made far-reaching commitments in a number of treaties over the last two decades that they will harmonise their national foreign policies within a common European framework of foreign and security cooperation to enable them to speak with a “single voice” and undertake “common action”. And sometimes this voice is being heard, occasionally at the United Nations and currently in the common EU position on Iran over the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and sanctions against Russia after the Ukraine crisis. However, the question still remains why European leadership has proved to be so elusive in foreign policy when it is widely recognised as a necessity for multilateral collective action?

The first thing to note is that foreign policy in the European Union still remains essentially intergovernmental. While the Lisbon Treaty of 2009
provided a fundamental reform to the institutional leadership position by delegating this function from Member States to the post of High Representative, the role of national governments is still constitutive to European foreign policy-making and action. Yet, it could be argued that it is precisely because of this “logic of diversity” (Hoffmann 1995) between EU Member States that generates the demand for leadership. As Beach (2010: 97) notes, “in a situation where parties have perfectly overlapping interests, cooperation will be self-organizing” (see also Tallberg, 2006).

Another explanation for the emergence of a formal leadership position at the EU level is rooted in bureaucratic politics. Indeed, the dispersed and overlapping governance structures have generated intense competition between different European institutional actors, such as the Council and the Commission, for control over different policy domains falling under the external relations and foreign policy of the European Union (Menon 2008: 138). The creation of a new post in the Lisbon Treaty of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also doubles up as Vice-President of the European Commission, can be seen as an attempt to overcome bureaucratic rivalries generated from the polycentric governance structures of the EU.

The important question is where these treaty changes leave EU Member States and what they think of the role of the HR? While they have clearly acquiesced to this delegation of formal leadership, it would be naïve to think they have given up on any leadership ambitions altogether. In an extensive interview survey with European diplomats, Aggestam and Johansson (2017) found that there are conflicting role expectations of what role the HR and EEAS should perform in EU foreign policy. Representatives of EU Member States think the HR and EEAS should primarily perform a representative role, while EEAS officials themselves believe they play a key agenda-setting and brokering role.

Defining leadership

How then should leadership be conceptualized and what are the conditions to be a leader? An overview of the literature on leadership in the social sciences will provide for a range of schools of thought with foci on
different levels of analysis. Leadership is an essentially contested concept and the field is characterised by contending theories and methodologies (Alvesson and Spicer 2012). Above all, there is an epistemological divide on the agency-structure problem, that is, whether leadership is best understood and explained by focusing on the role played by individual actors, or alternatively, the structural context that enables and/or constrains leadership (Nye 2008). The study of leadership has moved a long way from the original fascination of “great man” theories, which largely treated leadership in terms of primordial individual characteristics. However, behavioural analyses of individual leadership styles continue to attract attention; for instance, Nye’s book on the role played by individual American Presidents in shaping US foreign policy and its outcomes in world politics (Nye 2013).

Grint (2005) points to four approaches in the study of leadership which are helpful when we try to categorise different perspectives in the academic literatures: as a (1) position (a spatial position with resources to lead), (2) person (individual character and trait), (3) process (leadership practices, style, sense-making) and (4) result (leadership judged in terms of outcomes).

The position-based approach to leadership sheds light on how leadership can be distinguished into two categories: formal and informal leadership (Burns 1978, Nye 2008). Formal leadership are traditional or legally ascribed positions of authority in a social structure, such as an organization or society (Weber 1978). In this view, it is the spatial position that makes leaders. For example, the Lisbon Treaty confers a legal position to the High Representative to perform four leadership functions:

(i) to set the agenda and ensure implementation of decisions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
(ii) to perform the role of Vice-President in the European Commission
(iii) to represent the European Union in international organizations and vis-à-vis Third parties; and
(iv) to lead the European External Action Service.

While this furnishes an important point of departure for analysing European leadership in foreign policy, it does not tell us much about how or why leadership—both formal and informal—is performed and enacted. In an-
answer to that question, I argue in this chapter that we need to focus on leadership as a process—a process in which an actor purposely uses influence to structure and facilitate activities and relationships in a group or organization, thereby guiding them towards collective goals and desired outcomes (Avery 2004: 22). From this perspective, the relationship between leaders and followers is central. As stated earlier, without followers there is no leadership. European political leadership can thus be defined as a collective form of action—a community of practice—rather than as simply the formal activities of a single actor endowed with positional power resources. Leadership at the Union level is contested, not least because it challenges the idea of leadership over foreign policy at the national level (Adler-Nissen 2014). As the debate over who is most suited to hold the post as the High Representative have shown, it is personal characteristics and individual skills that tend to get the most attention (Howorth 2011). While the focus on personal attributes is important, I would argue that it overshadows a deeper understanding of the process and structural context within which leadership is enacted. I therefore propose that leadership should be defined as a social role and a relational activity; one in which the leader-follower nexus is central to explaining the meaning, process and enactment of leadership in foreign policy. This is an important conceptual start for understanding and explaining the leadership paradox in EU foreign policy.

Leadership as a social role

Role theory offers a fruitful way to operationalize leadership understood as a relational process of negotiation. It also provides a useful bridge to examine role relations at both the agential and structural levels of EU foreign policy-making. Role theory incorporates the manner in which action is both purposeful (strategic) and shaped by structure (Searing 1991; Aggestam 2006). As Hollis and Smith (1990: 168) argue, “Role involves judgement and skill, but at the same time it involves a notion of structure within which roles operate.” In the following, I sketch out how we can use role theory for the study of leadership in EU foreign policy.

Role theory draws on the theatrical analogy of actors playing roles on a stage according to a script. It represents a major theoretical orientation in
sociology to conceptualise the relationship between the individual and society. One of its founding fathers, Ernest Goffmann (1959) used the dramaturgical metaphor literally when he analysed society as a stage on which individuals enter to play parts and assume different masks. The insight that “roles are an ‘emergent’ property not understandable in terms of the qualities of individuals alone but developing out of the interaction of the individuals in particular environmental settings” (Bradbury 1972: 43) is a critical insight when considering leadership. That is, leadership cannot be understood solely in terms of individual skills and personality, as many popular versions of leadership would suggest.

Over the last two decades, there has been a revival of role theory in International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis and EU studies (Elgström and Smith 2006; Harnisch et al 2011; Thies and Breuning 2012; Henökl and Trondal 2015). In the following, I sketch out a leadership role analysis by first addressing the agency-structure problem and then move on to outline a model that specifies the central role concepts.

Agency-structure. Traditional approaches to role theory, particularly in sociology, consider roles deeply embedded in institutions that structure the range of roles available and the way in which they are played. This perspective gives primacy to structure rather than agency (Winkler 2009: 75). Actors are expected to perform certain scripted roles given a particular social or material order. A leader, in this view, will define her or his role based on how other members within the organization express their behavioural expectations. Without some basic consensus and shared role expectations, it would be very difficult for any actor to take a leadership role. The problem, however, with this thicker version of institutionalism is that it gives no real independence to agency. Individuals are only relevant insofar as the roles they occupy within these structures. Thus, there is an assumed similarity in the performance by actors taking the same part, no matter who the individual actor is. Individuals are presented with roles that are built into an institutional structure (e.g. the role script) and will continue to exist whether or not these individuals choose to play them (Rosenau 1987: 45). This perspective leaves little scope for imagination, innovation and interpretation in the playing of a role, which can be deeply problematic when we think of leadership.
While not thinking of agency as completely free-floating, a leadership analysis has to incorporate some autonomy and scope for agency. This must be a necessary assumption if the working hypothesis is that leadership can be a decisive factor in successful cooperation in international organizations. Agency consists primarily of two components; a degree of self-interests and autonomy to advocate them. This means that a leader cannot be agenda-free, nor that it can simply be an agent strictly monitored by its principal’s wills. The key is to view leadership as a relational activity between leader and followers. It is in the interplay and process of negotiations between expectations and conceptions that the particular meaning of leadership emerges and can be enacted upon (Winkler 2009: 78). In this sense, we could talk of the actors being involved in role-making (Wendt 1999). “Legitimate” European leadership is not simply a structure of role expectations that an actor has to adapt to, but a process wherein the meaning of what is “legitimate” and appropriate is negotiated and changing according to the situation, context and issues. The agency-structure dynamic lies precisely in this process of learning the rules and obtaining sufficient situational knowledge to consider what behaviour is appropriate (Winkler 2009: 80-1; Stryker and Statham 1985). This interactional approach to leadership sheds important light on the process through which the role of leader emerges and allows actors scope to perform the role in a variety of ways through improvisation. This is possible precisely because it rests on a distinction between self (ego) and the position of role-holder that I outline in the heuristic role theory model in Figure 1.

Role concepts. Role theory provides a rich vocabulary for categorizing perceptions and behaviour as well as conceptualising types of processes and structures for how and why roles develop and are enacted in particular situations (Walker et al 2011; Thies and Breuning 2012). The role theory model makes five conceptual distinctions of role: (1) role expectation; (2) role conception; (3) role location; (4) role performance; and (5) role conflict. While closely related, they should be kept analytically distinct. The theoretical claim is that to explain and understand how the leadership role is located and eventually performed, we need to study how role expectations and role conceptions determine the process and outcome.
Role expectations are normative ideas about appropriate behaviour that other actors (alter) prescribe the role-holder (ego) to enact. As Biddle (1979: 5) points out, “Roles are induced through the sharing of expectations for role behaviour… those who exhibit the role are stimulated to do so because they learn what behaviours are expected of them”. These role expectations can be derived from the status and formal position that an actor enjoys within an organization (e.g. EU), but may also be more informally derived from the position or status within the international society of states (Carvalho and Neumann 2015; Paul et al 2015). Role expectations can therefore vary in terms of how formal or informal they are as well as in their specificity and scope.

Role conceptions shift the focus to the normative ideas of appropriate behaviour that the role-beholder expresses towards him/herself (ego). They reveal how the prescriptive rules of the formal leadership functions are interpreted and envisaged to be enacted upon. As such, they can provide insight to role location, defined as a cognitive process in which an actor
locates the position of the self in a system from which a role is selected appropriate to the situation (Sarbin and Allen 1968: 507). Cameron Thies (1999) suggests that role location can be interpreted as a form of socialization. An actor learns which roles are appropriate to enact in response to role demands and expectations. The question of socialization and role location is particularly pertinent to examine in the case of new international actors like the EU. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has had to learn new roles of appropriate behaviour in response to role demands and expectations from a variety of other actors both internal and external to EU policy-making. Role conceptions are informed by both formal and informal rules in the positional role, but also the ego role, as indicated in Figure 1.

Role performance refers to the actual leadership behaviour in a specific situational context. In the leadership literature, these are referred to as modes and types of leadership behaviour and frequently draw on the typologies of Young (1991) and Malnes (1994) distinguishing between different types, such as structural leadership, instrumental leadership, idea-based leadership and directional leadership (Parker and Karlsson 2014). Although it can be assumed that the scope for action that a leader has is largely determined by the general role expectations that are directed towards him or her, the actual performance in terms of the precise leadership mode is highly contextual and contingent, as most academic studies will point out (Nye 2013). What we learn from the role theory literature that may have a bearing on how we assess the performance of the EU High Representative is that the more roles an individual has in her repertoire, the better prepared she is to meet the demands of social life (Sarbin and Allen 1968: 491-497). A “novice” role-taker with few roles in her role-set could find it harder to locate the appropriate role in a critical situation. This would perhaps explain why Javier Solana, despite a weak formal position in the Treaties but extensive experience of leadership in international institutions, was able to exercise considerable leadership in EU foreign policy in contrast to the inexperienced Catherine Ashton (Howorth 2011; Dijkstra 2012).

Finally, it is important to pay attention to patterns of role conflict given that leadership, particularly in the European context, is contested. A role conflict exists when two or more roles prescribe incompatible behaviour,
which complicates the process of role location and the fulfilment of role expectations (Barnett 1993). If we consider that role expectations are generated from different institutional contexts of the European Union, governmental institutions of Member States, as well as the broader international society, it is not unreasonable to assume that a critical task of the EU High Representative is to “manage” these role expectations so as to avoid the infamous “expectations gap” in EU foreign policy (Hill 1993). The challenge is to find a mode of leadership that delivers on leadership effectiveness, while also remaining sensitive to the heterarchical governance structure that is the legitimate basis for leadership in EU foreign policy.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have sought to develop a theoretical framework for the study of leadership as a relational process and activity between leader and followers. As such, leadership is conceived as an activity that is co-constructed and negotiated rather than simply the personal or behavioural characteristics of a particular individual leader. This perspective provides us with a tool of analysis for understanding why leadership in EU foreign policy is so complex and at times contradictory. There is an inbuilt paradox between leadership effectiveness and legitimacy that requires a constant negotiation to enact a specific leadership role. Some of these leadership roles encourage socialization through persuasion and ideational inspiration – a form of transformational leadership – while others are more task-oriented and may involve a transactional style of leadership based on a mixture of material rewards and punishments (Burns 1992).

The European Union is a heterarchical organization consisting of overlapping hierarchies and networks where formal leadership functions are distributed at different levels. To examine the leadership role of the EU High Representative in the post-Lisbon context therefore requires an investigation into at least four different empirical domains of leadership activity:

1. **Vertical leadership:** The relationship between the High Representative and EU Member States.
2. **Horizontal leadership:** The relationship between the High Representative and EU institutions.
3. **Organizational leadership:** The relationship between the High Representative and officials in the European External Action Service (EEAS).

4. **External leadership:** The relationship between the High Representative and international Third Parties.

This chapter has mainly focused on developing a framework of analysis for the first three dimensions that more directly addresses the internal leadership process of the EU rather than external leadership. However, as Ole Elgström (2007, 2014) has constantly reminded us of in his work, external role perceptions and expectations held by international actors have a profound impact on the Union’s ability to lead on a range of external policies and in global governance. However, for analytical purposes, it is important to distinguish between the internal and external leadership processes in EU foreign policy. It is possible to envisage that the EU High Representative is successful in leading EU Member States to speak and coordinate their action on an international issue, while still failing to lead internationally in its relations vis-à-vis external actors.

**References**


This chapter brings together work that I have conducted with Ole Elgström on the analysis of roles in international relations and specifically on the roles played by the European Union (EU) in international relations (Elgström and Smith 2006), with work I have undertaken over a very long period in relation to transatlantic relations, and specifically EU-US relations (see e.g. Smith 1984; McGuire and Smith 2008). As all of the authors in this collection know, Ole has played a major part in the development not only of role theory as applied to the EU, but also of negotiation theory in the European context, and I hope to build to a limited but significant extent on such work in analysing the past, present and future of transatlantic relations. Such an aim is particularly relevant in a period when thanks to changes both in the United States and in the EU, and in the broader world arena, the structures and processes of transatlantic relations are placed in question. A focus on the evolution, performance and impact of roles is thus given added meaning by what some have seen as a crisis not only in EU-US relations but also in approaches to multilateralism and the liberal world order as a whole.

The chapter centres on four areas of enquiry. First, it discusses the nature of roles in international relations as discursive constructs and social constructs, and the ways in which they relate to the broader structure of the world arena and world order. In so doing, the argument relates to the five elements of roles that Ole and I (drawing on many others) deployed in our work on the EU’s roles in international politics (Elgström and Smith 2006:
Introduction), and raises a number of questions that then help to frame the remainder of the argument. Second, the chapter assesses the nature of the EU’s roles more specifically in relation to the general questions posed, and examines the ways in which the EU’s self-conception of its roles in the world arena has evolved, especially in light of the recent debate about an EU global strategy. Third, the argument turns to the EU’s roles in transatlantic relations, initially discussing the general array of forces shaping the EU’s roles and then proposing four coexisting and overlapping roles as a means of organising thinking about the past, present and future of EU relations with the US. Finally, the chapter concludes by posing some questions about the ways in which the EU has or has not established a stable role or set of roles in transatlantic relations and relating these to the initial argument about the nature of roles more generally.

The nature of roles in international relations

This is not the place for an exhaustive discussion of the nature of roles in international relations, but it is important to identify some key elements of those roles as a means of framing later discussion. In particular, I will draw attention to the nature of roles as discursive constructs and as social constructs, and then relate these to the significance of roles in reflecting broader structures of international relations and ideas of world order.

First, it is important to remember that roles in many cases if not all are the result of “speech” or discourses entered into by the actors concerned in international relations. The ways in which actors describe themselves and ascribe status to themselves or others within the world arena reflect underlying and often unstated assumptions about the ways in which they are positioned in the overall processes of world politics. In turn, the many-sided discourses that centre around key international institutions or negotiating arenas play a key role in framing the agendas for political action in the world arena and in shaping the process of negotiation itself. Discourses of roles in world politics are strongly linked to ideas of self-image, and form the basis for arguments about national or international role conceptions as reflected in a wide range of “speech”, including official documents, interventions in international organizations and negotiation processes, and forms of political action.
Second, roles are inherently social constructs, reflecting processes of social and political interaction, often shaped by institutional contexts. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that roles are in important ways the product of interaction in specific institutional arenas, and that one of the characteristics of world politics is that it constitutes a series of overlapping and many-layered institutional settings for role institutionalization and role performance. The key element in this approach to roles is that of social action and interaction, and of the learning (and sometimes un-learning) of appropriate role centred behaviours. In many ways, of course, this approach to roles complements the approach based on discursive actions and interactions, since the development of appropriate “languages” for international interaction and negotiation is a central part of that form of analysis.

If we accept that for the purposes of the argument here roles can be seen as discursive and as social constructs, the question arises, how do those constructs take effect in particular international settings? Exploring this question is a key part of the later argument in this chapter, but here it is important to focus on the impact of international structures (Cox 1983).

At one level, these can be seen as centred on the underlying distribution of power in the world arena, and thus as reflecting both short and long-term shifts in that distribution. In this respect, roles are a reflection of the constraints and opportunities generated by the operation of overall power structures and changes in them; the performance of roles is not determined by international power structures, but is shaped by them, in terms both of adjustment to the imperatives of world politics and of creative responses to opportunities generated. At a second level, and as already indicated, the performance of roles is shaped by institutional structures in the world arena, broadly defined, which generate rules of conduct and structured contexts for negotiation and communication. These institutional structures may or may not directly reflect the underlying power structure, especially in periods of power shift, and thus they also play a part in the generation of opportunities and constraints for the playing of particular roles. Finally, an important part in structural terms is played by the ideational structure of the world arena – in other words, by the dominance or contestation of certain “reigning ideas”. Positioning in relation to these “reigning ideas” can be a central feature of role performance and role im-
pact on the part of particular international actors or groups of actors, since it relates strongly to notions of legitimacy and status in the world arena.

The argument thus leads inexorably to consideration not only of the nature of roles and the structural forces shaping them but also to their implications for world order. It seems clear that the generation, performance and impact of roles have strong links to issues of legitimacy and credibility, stability and change, and normative dominance and contestation in the world arena. Tensions between “established” and “revisionist” actors, between dominant and dependent groupings and between rising and declining powers are clearly linked to issues of role conceptions, role performance and role conflict within certain configurations of the world arena, and thus they express in a particular form the linkages between agency and structure that have been a focus of academic analysis for decades (Wendt 1987, 1999). Importantly, though, roles are not simply an abstract analytical construct – they relate to the lived experience of practitioners and to the lessons they derive from action and interaction in the world arena. It is in light of this as well as the other areas explored in this part of the chapter that I now move on to examine the roles of the EU in international relations.

The nature of the EU’s role(s)

The role(s) that are played – or that might be played, or should be played – by the EU in the world arena have been a focus of debate since the point at which the then European Community (EC) began to develop mechanisms for engagement not only with the world political economy but also with issues of security and “high politics” in the 1960s. From the early 1970s onwards, there has been an almost continuous concern with the appropriate and feasible ways in which the European integration project might engage with, shape and modify the nature of world politics as a whole – a concern which has frequently come into collision with the realities of both European interests and external constraints. Here, the aim is to relate these debates and engagements to the arguments about roles outlined in the previous section, with particular but not exclusive reference to the development of the EU’s Global Strategy from 2014 onwards (European External Action Service 2015; European Union 2016, 2017).
In the first place, it is clear that the development of the EU’s roles in world politics has had a strong discursive element. Indeed, at times it has appeared that the development of a discourse has been the key aim of the EU’s foreign policy debates, and that this has become separated from the world of international practices. The familiar roll-call of academic labels – “civilian power”, “normative power”, “civilising power”, “force for good” and their close relatives – has expressed not only an empirical recognition of the limitations of the EU’s roles, but also a normative assumption that in some ways the EU is “different”, and this has been reflected in official documents and statements as well as in academic discourse. In terms of the EU’s Global Strategy, there has been a distinct modulation of the discourse, in favour of “principled pragmatism”, “strategic autonomy” and other more material concerns. The discourse, then, is not undifferentiated – indeed, one of its key characteristics is that it has embodied a wide variety of strands, best epitomised recently by the contending but also overlapping concepts of “normative power Europe” and “market power Europe”, which both carry with them strong elements of the material and the normative reflecting the EU’s status as a hybrid international actor (Manners 2002; Whitman 2010; Damro 2012, 2015).

Alongside the discursive tensions embodied in the EU’s search for a role or roles, there has gone an awareness that the generation of such a role or roles embodies a complex set of social and political interactions. A key characteristic of the EU order is the way in which it centres on processes of negotiation and deliberation within often highly structured institutional frameworks. As a result, the generation of role conceptions and performance of roles embodies a complex process of internal negotiation and the generation of shared understandings that may come to appear as the major form of EU international action. That is to say, the process is the point, rather than the eventual policy outcome, actions or interventions. In this version of the EU’s role generation, there is a strong role for institutions, including those of EU Member States; there is a role for broader civil society; and a form of multi-level negotiated internal order shapes the search for a distinctive “European” identity and role. It also makes it very likely that such a distinctive identity or role will always be contested, both within the Brussels institutions and more widely. It is not surprising in this
context that the process of developing the EU Global Strategy in some ways resembled a two-year seminar conducted with a variety of audiences and institutional interests, and that the strategy itself reflects the interplay of a wide range of competing interests and pressures. The key question in such a context is, what happens when the painstakingly developed package meets the outside world?

This is where the structural forces outlined earlier come into play. The Global Strategy itself started from the assertion that the world arena is increasingly “complex, connected and contested” (European Union 2016), and there is much evidence to support this claim. In terms of the distribution of power, we are in the middle of what almost all analysts see as a far-reaching global power shift, in particular between the established and the “emerging” or “rising” powers. International institutions, both separately and as part of the broader multilateral liberal order, have become increasingly the terrain for competing views on global governance, the roles and prerogatives of leading state actors and the best means of achieving stability and progressive development at national, regional and global levels (Alcaro, Peterson and Greco 2016; International Affairs 2018). This is not simply a matter of organization or administration; it is also a matter of normative contestation about the nature of and the means to achieving a better world. Not surprisingly, whereas the liberal international order expresses a certain range of norms and ideas, the current conjuncture is characterised by ideational contestation and often confusion, with different models of development, human rights, conflict management and security played off against each other. As a result, even actors with an apparently well-established and unquestionable international standing have become subject to challenge, often from the past, present or potential future leading powers in a transitional world order.

In such a context, the challenges to an essentially hybrid international actor such as the EU are plain to see. Roles that seemed to be well-recognised and consolidated have come into question, and the EU’s international aspirations to be a “force for good” in such areas as development, conflict management and human rights have been challenged both from inside and from outside Europe. The EU is in essence both a producer of international order – primarily on the European scale, but with broader aspirations
– and a consumer of the same order, since its very existence owes much if not all to the development of the liberal international order since the 1950s. In an international order that is in a state of flux and transition, the balance between the EU’s roles as producer and consumer of order is itself open to growing challenge (Youngs and Smith 2018). The Global Strategy expresses this set of tensions with on the one hand its aspirations still to be a “force for good” in terms of providing stability, development and normative standards, and on the other hand the recognition that the Union needs to enhance its “strategic autonomy” in a fluid and challenging world. One of the key arenas for challenge is that of transatlantic relations, and this is the focus of the next part of the argument.

The EU in transatlantic relations: four roles in search of an actor

Throughout the development of the European integration project, its most significant other has been the United States, and its most profound external engagement has been with the transatlantic area. In terms of power, the USA has been a predominant feature of the landscape surrounding the EC and then the EU; in terms of institutions and transactions, the North Atlantic area has been highly integrated and regulated; and in terms of ideas, this area has been the crucible of the liberal international order and thus of key norms such as multilateralism which are central to the EU’s roles in the world arena. As a result, the definition and understanding of an EU international role is deeply entangled with the transatlantic relationship and in particular with the politics of EU-US relations.

This means in the first place that discourses of EU identity and international role have inevitably incorporated a discourse about the United States. On the one hand, and especially in the early days of European integration, there has been a tendency to see the US as a key support for the project; this in turn has been reinforced by the fact that the US, through direct investment, through its security presence and through its cultural impact on West European and then all-European society, has effectively got under the skin of the Europeans. The US presence in EU discourses has been buttressed further by institutions such as NATO, which form
part of a transmission belt for US predominance (see e.g. Sloan 2005). As
a consequence of this process, it has been possible to incorporate the US
into EU discourses as part of a collective “we”, expressed in the liberal
world order and in the rhetoric of shared values and institutions that can
broadly be termed “transatlanticism”. But on the other hand, and increas-
ingly, it has been possible to define the US as “other” and to see its presence
as challenging if not threatening to the European project. This definition
leads in turn to a discourse that defines the EU in contrast to the US, both
in terms of values and in terms of institutions, and sees the US as repre-
senting a different world view shaped by presumptions of hegemony and
by a rejection of multilateralism. Both the positive and the negative ele-
ments in EU discourses about the US are also affected by the development
of US discourses about the EU, which have tended simultaneously to
present it as an essential ally or group of allies, as an economic competitor
and as a weak link in the defence of the West that can be the object of
(conscious or unconscious) policies of divide and rule vis-à-vis Brussels.
Convincing evidence of this fluctuating balance in US discourses can be
found in the positions adopted by the Obama and Trump presidencies: on
the one hand, Obama was the president wanted by almost all EU citizens,
but proved a demanding taskmaster when it came to security in particular,
whilst on the other hand, the Trump administration has evinced little in-
terest in the EU beyond presenting it as an effete organization that dilutes
the verities of the nation-state system (Smith 2012; Peterson 2017).

This ambivalence on both sides of the Atlantic, expressed in discursive
terms, has been accompanied by a complex yet uneasy set of interactions
and encounters. On both sides, the generation of role conceptions has
been affected not only by images of the other but also by the sheer range
of interactions that take place across the Atlantic over the entire spectrum
of activity. The challenge of this context can be expressed with some ac-
curacy as the management of interdependence or of interpenetration, or
indeed of globalization more generally, but it also relates strongly to the
idea that roles are socially constructed as well as discursively developed.
The EU and the US engage on a bilateral level, in the multilateral arena
and in a vast range of “bi-multilateral” activities that take place across the
Atlantic but have a wider resonance in the world arena (Smith 2005). This
is the case in trade policy, security policy, environmental policy and a wide range of other sectors. In consequence, understandings of the appropriate roles and appropriate behaviours in these areas are both sectorally specific and informed by wider perceptions of values and institutions at the global level. For the EU as a whole, the problem is one of role performance and role evaluation in a highly complex and interconnected set of policy spaces, which can and often do conflict. This tendency has become more apparent since the end of the Cold War, with the lifting of the “security blanket” that contained the EC within the “western alliance” and suppressed at least some of the connections between commercial and security concerns. It is not surprising in this context that the EU has faced a series of transatlantic crises in which its role(s) have been contested both from Washington and from Member State capitals; still less surprising has been the impact of the Trump administration and its “America First” rhetoric, expressed in a wide range of transatlantic and multilateral arenas.

These assessments feed into analysis of the structures within which the EU has developed its role(s) in transatlantic relations. From a position where US hegemony was almost (but not quite) taken for granted in the Cold War, through the “unipolar moment” of the early post-Cold war years and now into the flux and confusion of a world characterised by major power-shifts and challenges to key institutions, the EU’s conception of its transatlantic identity has been challenged and re-shaped on a number of occasions. Assumptions of US leadership and EC/EU followership, along with their overtones of legitimacy and trust, have been in flux arguably since the Vietnam War in the 1970s, but have been subjected to ever more severe tests as the US position in the global power structure has come under threat. For the EU, which is nothing if not risk-averse, this is a continuously challenging situation which also creates internal difference in relation to the demands of transatlantic relations (cf. the Iraq War of 2003, but also issues of terrorism and broader security) (Rees 2009; Peterson and Pollack 2003; Alcaro, Peterson and Greco 2016). A key feature shaping conceptions of role at the EU level is the perceived costs of compliance with US policies, and this has been underlined by the impact of the Trump administration.
In world order terms, it is relatively easy to see that transatlantic relations have posed a continuing challenge to EU perceptions of the Union’s role in the liberal world order. One effect of this has been to engender ambivalence about the EU’s continuing commitment to liberal order itself, but another has been to raise basic questions about the role of the EU in relation to the US, which is no longer easy to see as the guarantor of such an order. The cumulative effects of challenge to the US’ position not only in transatlantic but also in world order create uncertainties about the EU’s position in the structure of world power, in international institutions and in the normative order. These have not been resolved, but they can be analysed in terms of a series of co-existing, overlapping and potentially conflicting roles for the Union in transatlantic relations.

These roles can be labelled as follows: first, the role of proxy; second, the role of partner; third, the role of protagonist; and finally, the role of power. The first of these sees the EU as a channel (willing or unwilling) for US power and preferences. Although it might be argued that this role was most salient during the Cold War years, an argument can certainly be made that in the post-Cold War period the EU acted as a conduit for US-generated neo-liberal practices in relation to globalization and the organization of the European political economy. Understandably, this is not a role that has been foregrounded by EU leaders, since it implies a subaltern status for the Union that is at odds with perceptions of an EU identity distinct from that of the US; traces of it can however be found in the role conceptions of some EU Member States, such as the United Kingdom and Poland. The second role, that of partner (and its close relative, “partnership in leadership”) corresponds to much of the rhetoric of transatlanticism, either as a means of promoting the western world order or as a means of defending it against pressures created by the current phase of power transition; but it is subject to what might be termed the problem of perceived seniority, given that US administrations have tended to assume this position in relation to a junior-partner Europe. Not surprisingly, role conceptions in the EU have tended to react to this set of assumptions by emphasising the strengths of the EU and its comparative advantage in areas where the US is distrusted or rejected as a potential leader in the world arena. The third role, that of protagonist, arises directly out of the search for EU distinctive-
ness and the discourse of difference that sees the EU as a different type of power in the world arena; but it also arises from concrete clashes of interest in key areas such as trade and broader commercial policies, as well as development and environment. Finally, the fourth role, that of power, expresses the belief that given the state of flux in the world arena, the EU can present itself and project itself as a distinct “pole” within the emerging multipolar system, and thus as a rival to the US in broad power-political terms. As noted in the EU Global Strategy, the capacity of the Union to practice network diplomacy, to build institutions and to shape international rules is key to this role conception.

My argument is that these four roles exist in a state of dynamic tension when it comes to the EU’s place in transatlantic relations. Clearly, some are more salient at some stages of the evolution of transatlantic relations, or in some states of the transatlantic relationship, than at others. Clearly also, at any one time or in any one context, there will be overlaps and clashes between the demands of the four roles, and this is likely to lead to role conflict affecting EU actions and interactions, both in terms of its relationship with the US and in terms of its wider role(s) in the world arena. As I have argued, each of these roles is at the same time both a discursive construct (reflecting the development of discourse within and about the EU) and a social construct (reflecting the EU’s engagement in international interactions, both with the US and more broadly). Each of these roles – and the quartet of roles as a whole – is shaped by structural factors in the world arena, including the changing position of the US, the perceived role of international institutions, and the “reigning ideas” shaping views of norms and appropriate behaviour. Each in turn has a specific relationship to concepts of world order and the EU’s distinctive role within it. The discussion here raises more questions than answers, though, particularly in relation to the ways in which the EU as an actor can enact or perform these roles, and in my conclusion I will draw attention to some of those questions.
Conclusion: four questions in search of answers

The argument in this chapter indicates that the question of the EU’s role(s) in transatlantic relations is far from resolved. I have indicated that a combination of discursive factors, social forces, structural constraints and opportunities, and world order considerations, has created a situation in which a number of overlapping, cross-cutting and potentially conflicting roles characterise the EU’s involvement in transatlantic relations. Four resulting questions can be identified here, arising from this situation: co-incidentally, they also relate to areas in which Ole has made a significant contribution, and in which his work can be used as a guide for further research. They are:

First, how far is there a settled view in the EU of the Union’s role(s) in transatlantic relations? My provisional answer is that there is no such settled view, and that there is a continuing state of tension and flux in the EU’s role conceptions as they relate to the transatlantic arena, but this requires further testing in the light of Ole’s work (with Rikard Bengtsson and others) on the forces and factors surrounding the EU’s attempts to develop its international role(s) more generally (Bengtsson and Elgström 2011, 2012).

Second, how far is there a settled view in the US of the EU’s role(s) in transatlantic relations? Again, my provisional answer is that no such view exists, although there may have been times at which it has existed, maybe for periods of years at a time. In the Trump era, it is clear that not only is there no settled view of the EU’s role(s), but there is also no inclination to develop such a view, given the marginal importance attributed to the Union in US foreign policy. Here, the work undertaken by Ole with Natalia Chaban and others on external perceptions of the EU is clearly relevant and potentially fruitful (Chaban, Elgström, Kelly and Li 2013; Elgström and Chaban 2015).

Third, what are the key institutional, situational and issue-based factors shaping the EU’s roles? The answer here can be more positive, since the argument in this chapter implies that the EU’s role(s) are shaped by a combination of discursive, social, structural and world order factors. But the unanswered question relates to the impact of different combinations
of these factors over time, and here the work undertaken by Ole and others on long-term historical change and adaptation in foreign policy can clearly be relevant (Elgström and Jerneck 1997; Elgström 2000).

Finally, what does all of this imply for world order itself? The key implication seems to me to be that uncertainty about roles is a sign of the state of flux in world order, and also more narrowly in the EU and the US, noted throughout this chapter. But there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: is role uncertainty a cause or a product of the state of flux in world order? To my mind, it must be both, and to that extent, the EU is unlikely to develop a stable view of its international or transatlantic role in current or foreseeable conditions; at the same time, uncertainty about the role of the EU will contribute to continuing flux in the world arena and in transatlantic relations. In this sense, the four roles discussed here are symptoms of the EU’s continuing search for a coherent and consistent contribution to transatlantic and world order.

References


The dynamics of global order
8 The EU and the crisis of liberal order: at home and abroad

Sonia Lucarelli

In recent years there has been a flourishing debate on the crisis of the Liberal World Order. Most of the attention has been devoted to the rise of non-liberal actors who could challenge the foundations of the liberal world order, be they states (Russia and China in the first place) or non-state actors (Daesh/ISIS). Since the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency, however, also the US has gradually become a challenger to the world order it had contributed to shape since World War II. At the moment, if to some observers the liberal order continues to look rather resilient (Ikenberry 2014, 2015), to the eyes of many it is in serious trouble and there is a widely shared expectation that the future world will be “less liberal, and […] less American” (Alcaro 2018: 1). To be true, the world is already – and will be even more – less Western, and in being so, it will also be less European.

Europe’s role in shaping the core norms of world order has been frequently overshadowed by the predominant (US dominated) IR reading of

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the liberal order as predominantly a result of American – more or less benevolent – leadership. Europe has, however, played a fundamental role in the expansion of the basic norms of the liberal international society. Not only the expansion of international society with its core norms started in Europe – for good (Bull and Watson 1984), or for worse (Suzuki 2009) – but during the Cold War Europe developed a system of regional integration in which all core principles of the liberal order were developed as nowhere else: continuity between domestic and foreign policy, liberal democracy, a *constitutionalization* of international politics – based on the assumption of the existence of a core set of universal norms (human rights *in primis*), multilateralism and embedded liberalism (welfare systems and free trade combined). Such a system, institutionalised in a dense set of institutions, transformed Western Europe into a laboratory of an enhanced liberal order.

It was this Europe which, although institutionally still immature to face the challenges ahead, took the burden to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe through the expansion of liberal norms (Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig 2005; Schimmelfennig et al 2006). The expansion of institutions was the carrot to achieve the transition of Central and Eastern states to liberal democracy and free market, as well as their adherence to international law. Moreover, the so-called “structural foreign policy” of the EU (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014) has always embedded a liberal Kantian receipt for the construction of long-term peace: spread of democracy, development of (regional) forms of *foedus pacificum*, support/development of international law and human rights. The distinctiveness of such a foreign policy led scholars to talk of the EU as an “adjectivised power” (normative, civilian, soft …) whose *sui generis* international role was to be found in the EU’s socially and historically constructed political identity (Elgström and Smith 2006; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006, 2012). The EU has been able to diffuse liberal democratic norms both for what it was (a successful model of regional integration) and for what it purposely did. The extent and the mechanisms of this diffusion have been object of debate, but there seem to be little doubt on the EU’s liberal credentials.

And today? Is the EU still a pillar or the liberal world order based on liberal democracy, free trade, embedded liberalism, universalism of norms
and multilateralism? And can it work to save what is left of the liberal order globally? The answer is “hardly so” and the rest of this chapter will explain why.

EU’s weakened liberalism at home…

The European integration process, despite its accelerations and periods of stagnation, has always represented the incarnation of the liberal faith in progress, the trust in the possibility that the modern, rational human being could shape and transform the socio-political and material environment to create a better world for him/herself and offsprings. One of the most successful political versions of this liberal worldview has been the institutionalised cooperation among former enemies in Europe and the gradual, incremental, creation of common institutions following the logic and the practice of the spillover among areas of cooperation. Particularly since the EU acquired a more visible international stance, in the 1990s, its self-representation as an international actor was inspired by the same worldview. The texts of the Laeken declaration (2001) affirmed that “Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation […] to do] battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, […] and against] the world’s heartrending injustices” (European Council 2001). The guiding principles, proclaimed the Lisbon Treaty, should be those “which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.” (Article III-292 of the constitution; Art 23 of the TFEU; emphasis added).

In essence, the idea was that the EU’s guiding principles, which allowed the political, social and economic development of Europe should guide the EU’s global action. Now the pact, internally and globally, was that liberalism would bring more diffused wellbeing (social, political and economic) to more people. The EU, as the liberal order at large, was all the more supported by those affected, the more it brought advantages. The promises of liberalism on the one side, and of European integration on the
other, were high. This is why the EU’s failures to deliver severely damaged the EU and the liberal order at large. Three have been the most relevant failures to deliver in recent years (not in the past) by Liberal Europe: economic equality and solidarity, liberal democracy and pluralism.

Equality and solidarity

It was clear to those who drafted the Laeken declaration that the responsibility to shoulder the burden of globalization was necessary also to respond to the concerns of EU citizens. On the contrary, liberal Europe’s promise of wellbeing and diffused growth crashed not so much with Europe’s relative economic decline, but with rising inequalities and social polarization in Europe, both in objective and subjective/cognitive terms.

In the 1980s, in Europe, the average income of the richest 10 per cent was seven times higher than that of the poorest 10 per cent; in 2017, it was around 9.5 times higher (OECD 2017: 7). Income inequalities are however unevenly distributed in Europe, with the UK, Eastern and Southern European countries being much more unequal with respect to northern European countries (although it has increased also in traditionally egalitarian north European countries such as Finland and Sweden). An even more dramatic picture of absolute inequality emerges if one compares the average per capita income of the richest and poorest national quintiles in Europe. The richest national quintile in Europe is that of Luxembourg with an annual income of 73,832 euros (at exchange rates) and 61,304 euros at purchasing power parity (PPP). The poorest quintile is that of Romania with an annual income of only 685 euros or 1,289 euros in PPP. The ratio is more than 1:100 at exchange rates and 1:47 in PPP. Furthermore, these indicators of extreme inequality have deteriorated further since 2009. This implies that a person’s living standards in the EU depends more on the country s/he is born and grow up in than on whether s/he belongs to the

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3 The US and Europe are losing relative economic might, but to a much lesser degree than it seemed a few years ago and maintain a lead position: US GDP share 24 %; EU 21 %; China 14 %; India about 3 % (World Bank data February 2017).

relevant upper or lower stratum of their national society. It also depends on age, as the worst off are young generations, who have replaced the old in terms of risk of poverty. As for wealth, currently 10 per cent of the wealthiest households hold 50 per cent of total wealth; the 40 per cent least wealthy owns little over 3 per cent (OECD 2017); again, with national differences. To such a wealth inequality are associated inequalities in terms of education and life expectancy. Given the fact that the youngs of worst off families (and even more of non-native-borns) are the most affected, it is expected that inequality trends are replicated with the next generation (OECD 2017). The net effect is polarization, both geographic (within countries and among countries) and social polarization: industrialized areas vs deindustrialized peripheries, South-Eastern vs. Northern countries… A geography which coincides with the geography of dissatisfaction reproduced in recent elections: the geography of vote in the 2016 British referendum, the 2017 French Presidential elections, the 2018 Italian parliamentary elections all tell the same story: one of domestically divided countries. This is not at all a solely European phenomenon (as the US Presidential elections of 2016 demonstrate), but in Europe, it delegitimizes not only so-called neoliberal policies, but the EU’s liberal ontology and the EU’s historical experiment as such. An unwelcome output of the failed Europe’s promise of combining welfare with free trade in order to diffuse wealth, enact solidarity and guarantee a progressive future.

Liberal democracy

The EU’s failure to “shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation” so to avoid the negative economic effects of a globalization which led to rising inequalities and relative empowerment, had important repercussions in the Europeans’ attitudes towards Europe and the established elites (Kuhn et al. 2016). The geographic map of euroscepticism, populism and support to illiberal tendencies largely overlapped with that of economic inequalities and relative impoverishment, with a sharp societal distinction between highly educated young employees of big cities (much more likely to share a cosmopolitan/European identity, supportive of the integration process and of an EU leading role in the liberal world
order) and middle-aged workers of depressed areas. The latter group being particularly sensitive to feel ontologically insecure and call for “protection” for their own interests and identity – as Mr Macron has clearly understood, proposing “une Europe qui protège” (“a Europe that protects”, see Macron 2017). It is a group that is largely adverse to the core elements of the European liberal integration project: free movement, free trade, enlargement, and common currency. It is the group that feels most threatened by immigration and adopts nativists’ perspectives on national identity, a group which calls for a new Westphalianism, and which is not reluctant to support illiberal tendencies.

The rise of terrorist attacks in Europe since 2004 and the fragmentation and complexification of security threats has further challenged liberal democracy from within. Global terrorism showed the vulnerability of liberal societies and triggered an ontological anxiety which allowed reductions of individual liberties in the name of an enhanced security. Citizens are ready to give up part of their liberty in exchange for more (perceived) security, gradually allowing for (even demanding) the transformation of their liberal democracies into simplified electoral systems.

The most clear political embodiment of such attitudes at the moment of writing (2018) is the Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán, who since several years legitimizes illiberal attitudes and regimes in his public speeches and political practices (Freedom House 2017). Tellingly, in a 2014 speech delivered before an audience of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, he accused liberal values to “embody corruption, sex and violence”. For this reason, he argued, “the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state”, a non-liberal democracy. Internationally, declared Orbán, “the stars of the international analysts today are Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey” (Orbán 2014).

Orbán, however, is not anymore an isolated case. The political results have been particularly visible in the 2017-18 rounds of elections and referenda. In October 2017, the elections in Austria led to the formation of a government coalition which includes the Freedom Party (FPÖ), the reactionary and anti-European party that European governments had managed to contain in 1999. In Italy, the populist and sovranist Lega of Matteo Salvini took 17.4 per cent (from 4 per cent in the 2013 elections). The anti-es-
tablishment Five Stars Movement got the striking majority of 32.7 per cent, becoming Italy’s first party. In Hungary, the Eurosceptic, nativist and sovranist Viktor Orbán has been reconfirmed as Prime Minister in the 2018 elections with 50 per cent of votes, followed by the even more right-wing Jobbik Party (18.9 per cent). In Poland, the anti-democratic drift of the ultra-nationalist and anti-European government of Mateusz Morawiecki continues (Wojcie and Strzelecki 2017). The countries of the Visegrad group (i.e. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) are now united against Brussels on migrants, media freedom, and human rights (Freedom House 2017). Even where the populist forces did not win the elections, they got important results. In Germany, the conservative and populist force of Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) obtained more than two million votes. In the Netherlands, the xenophobic party of Geert Wilders (PPV) gained five seats and shortened the distance from the first party, the conservative Freedom and Democracy Party. Even in France, if the victory of the young pro-European Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 French Presidential election gave progressive forces a sigh of relief, it cannot overshadow the striking fact that Marine Le Pen, of the Front National, passed the first round and challenged Macron to the Presidency.

The wave of populist nationalism that overwhelmed Europe has also conditioned the tones and decisions of other political forces and made the foreign policy (European and international) of Member States less predictable and bipartisan than in the past. However, while in the past authoritarian drifts in some Member States (such as Haider’s Austria) had been punished in a timely manner (and not only in the figurative sense) by the other Member States, today the blatant democratic setbacks in Hungary and Poland, the xenophobic positions of political movements everywhere in Europe, and the open violation of common standards by the Visegrad countries (especially with regard to immigration and asylum rules) have not been sanctioned in a quick and strong way.5 It seems that Europe is

5 Although the deterioration of the rule of law in the country have been expressed since 2016, it was only at the end of 2017, after years of ascertained violations, that the Commission invoked Article 7 of the TEU for “a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law”. At the moment of writing it is still to be seen whether the Council, with a four-fifths majority, will decide to suspend some of Poland’s rights (including the right to vote in the Council).
becoming accustomed to a new normality that denies itself and the values on which it is based.

The split between national-populist Euro-sceptic and other forces (including euro-critical ones) does not only affect countries, but also the domestic societies, as shown by the results of the polarised vote for the referendum that led to Brexit, the vote for the French Presidential election, and the Polish and Dutch elections. If liberal democracy is a pillar of the liberal international order, in the West, and more precisely in Europe, the threat comes from within. Moreover, if Europe is ever more illiberal, how can it support the liberal order internationally?

Pluralism

The third element, connected to the previous one, in the crisis of the liberal order in Europe is what can be labelled the “ontological challenge”. Liberalism was based on a cosmopolitan worldview, on the idea of man as primarily a “citizen”, with a non-ascriptive (based on achievement) socio-political identity. In multicultural societies like the US this led to a steady affirmation of a double track policy: adopt measures to protect members of groups that are known to have previously suffered from discrimination (affirmative action), and at the same time nullify the political relevance of ascriptive identities (based on predetermined factors such as sex and race) portraying them as irrelevant for citizenship rights and national identity (the hyphenated identity – Afro-American, Asian-American etc.). In Europe, different countries experimented with different roots to national identity and citizenship in growingly multicultural societies.

Since the 1950s, Western liberal democracies have struggled to develop strategies to deal with diversity in societies until that moment considered homogeneous (secular, white, and Christian). Racism and discrimination characterised the European societies’ responses to the arrival of people from the former colonies in the 1950s and 1960s. This time the “Other” was not the assimilated other European of the past, but it was a somatically different other, considered different and – frequently – inferior. His difference was perceived as a threat to European national identity, and the history of Europe is also the history of the responses that different societies
have provided to the challenges of national identity in a growingly multi-
cultural society (Chin 2017; Taras 2012). However, European societies
gradually developed ways to cope with cultural and ethnic pluralism ac-
cording to the basic principle of equal treatment of citizens in a liberal
society. Gradually European societies found ways to accommodate ele-
ments of group rights without abandoning liberalism’s individualist per-
spective.6

The European integration started from the beginning as a liberal project
and since the late 1960s human rights steadily gained importance in EC
legislation. Eventually, human rights norms have been “mainstreamed”,
becoming integrated in all aspects of policy-making and implementation.
At the same time, since its creation, having to pull together countries with
different cultures, the EC recognised that national cultural differences
should be respected and protected (Article 151 EC Treaty). The Charter of
Fundamental Rights – legally binding since the Lisbon Treaty – affirms
that “The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”
(Article 22) and prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, colour,
ethnic origin and religion or belief. The Member States are bound to com-
bat public incitement to violence and hatred against people of different
race, colour, religion, or national or ethnic descent by means of criminal
law. Yet, even when there is not proper discrimination, evidence of a ten-
sion of an ethno-cultural type within European liberal societies is again all
the more clear. The discrimination on the basis of religion embedded into
the request of Poland and Slovakia (Financial Times 2015; BBC 2015) to
accept only Christian asylum seekers not to put the national culture “at
risk” is but one of the most visible manifestations of a general malaise.

For a long time liberal democracies under-evaluated the role of cultural
identities and their link with political identities in the construction of le-
gitimate institutions. No liberal democracy has ever been able to transform
its people into mere “citizens”, but they have made attempts. In the past
few decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War and, more so, since

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6 The debate on the possibility to combine liberalism and multiculturalism is rich and
articulated. One of the most known authors claiming the compatibility of liberalism and
9/11, ascriptive identities have started to call loud to be recognised. Liberal democracies had to fight against the obstacle of multicultural societies where ethno-national groups called for a political recognition, not only in Iraq or Afghanistan (where they tried to export the model) but also inside the West. The European construction embedded the idea that an overall European citizenship could coexist with national and (enriching) cultural diversities. However, particularly since the early 2000s multicultural coexistence showed its limits in several European societies and the surge of Islamic terrorism significantly worsened the situation (Chin 2017). Between 2010 and 2011, the leaders of France, Britain and Germany publicly proclaimed that multilateralism had failed in their countries (BBC 2010; 2011; France24 2011). No specific national European way to multiculturalism had succeeded, no all-European formula had been found. When the so-called European “crisis of migrants” arose in 2015, the arguments were politically used to depict migrants as a threat to European communities’ ontological security. Migration and the cultural diversity issue were eventually crucial arguments in the debates leading to the success of the nationalist, eurosceptic, largely illiberal forces that won the elections (or referenda) in Hungary, Poland, Austria, and the UK and which had unprecedented electoral successes in Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands.

To summarise, three important promises of liberal Europe were missed: wealth and enhanced socio-economic equality, liberal democracy, and pluralism. The three elements are linked among themselves and part of global trends in the crisis of liberalism. However, their impact on Europe (and the EU in particular) as a pillar of the liberal world order are particularly troublesome: they threaten the EU’s core identity, the legitimacy recognised to European institutions as bearers of collectively shared values, the ability for the EU to undertake collective policies in support of the liberal order, as well as the EU’s credibility in the eyes of the others.

…and abroad

The first signals of transformed “role conceptualization” and “role performance” are rather clear and they point to a compromise with (if not a metamorphosis of) the “adjectivised power” Europe. Following the new
momentum, the EU documents have abandoned the emphatic self-representation of a force for good, with only values and no interests. However, this “normalization” has also been characterised by a reduced faith in the possibilities to shape the world according to its principles. The 2016 Global Strategy called for “principled pragmatism”, a catchy oxymoron to describe a more pragmatic and – hence – efficient foreign policy which however has to be grounded on some fundamental principles. Even the objectives of EU’s foreign policy are described in a transformed continuity with the past (to keep with the register). The keyword in this respect is “resilience”, which in psychology implies the ability to stand still before difficulties in life, and that applied to states and societies conveys the idea of an ability to “resist” more than an ability to transform in a progressive way. It is a word for moments of crisis, used into the political debate by US President Obama (Selchow 2016), and then used in the EU documents in a rather polisemic way, from ability for European societies to resist and keep their living standards, to the ability of third countries to develop enough to prevent civil conflicts but also emigration towards Europe. In recent documents (European Commission 2017), it is a word for a joined-up and comprehensive approach to challenges.

However, the real transformation in the EU’s contribution to the liberal order is visible looking at actual policies. Michael Smith and Richard Youngs (2018) convincingly argue that the EU is gradually adopting a “contingent” form of liberalism, mixing liberal and realpolitik strategic principles in a number of areas, from international trade, its relation with Donald Trump’s USA, its approach towards different countries in the Eastern neighbourhood.

In international trade, despite continuing to adhere to a liberal economic order, the EU has begun to exhibit a degree of “soft mercantilism” (Smith and Youngs 2018: 47). In several trade negotiations, the EU insisted on multiple safeguards and limits to trade liberalization. This is not that surprising since the EU has never been a supporter of liberalization at all costs, rather it has always combined domestic protection with trade liberalization. However, the protectionist mood has risen with respect to the past. Some new trade agreements, like the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA), were held hostage by the worries of local European produc-
ers backed by populist forces for months. Moreover, new mechanisms screening inward foreign investments are under study by the Commission (Smith and Youngs 2018: 47). In its relations with Donald Trump’s gradual dismantlement of multilateral agreements (from climate change to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP) and threat to collectively achieved agreements (as in the case of that with Iran) the EU has balanced blame with compromise. In the Eastern neighbourhood, the EU adapted its effort to uphold and promote democratic norms to what could be feasible given each country’s role in the Russia sphere of influence. In other words, argue Smith and Youngs, the EU “shifted towards a more consequentialist-utilitarian foreign policy, more concerned with immediate outcomes and less uniquely driven by the Union’s institutionally embedded liberal norms and identity” (2018: 52). This can be easily regarded as the “normalization” of the EU’s actorness, responding to the need to compromise principles and pragmatism. Not by chance, the EU Global Strategy of 2016 called for “principled pragmatism” in EU’s external relations.

However, the area in which EU’s policy has more been significantly affected by the internal illiberal trends that we have described above, and also the area in which the liberal credentials of the EU are more put under strain, is that of migration. The issue is particularly telling as it stands at the crossroads of the three challenges to the European liberal order that we described above: economic, political and cultural.

For the EU, coping with the challenge of migration has a triple strategic meaning: first, it implies envisaging solutions to a long-term phenomenon that is there to stay; second, it means identifying ways to cope with Europe’s demographic decline and its economic shortcomings (cf. Ceccorulli, Fassi, Lucarelli 2015); third, it entails figuring out which kind of actor the EU is and will be: an inward-looking one, committed to ‘secure’ its homeland and borders at the cost of compromising the migrants’ rights as human beings, or one upholding its liberal values and fundamental rights (which would imply upholding human rights and non-discrimination). The challenge is not an easy one, and different concerns and justice claims are at play (Fassi and Lucarelli 2017; Ceccorulli 2018a, 2018b); however, it is indisputable that the European reaction to the so-called migrant and refugee crisis in 2015-2016 was largely a response to the pressures of ever
more frightened societies and to the EU’s ontological insecurity that the response by the Member States generated.

To the sudden rise in number of sea and land arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers in 2015, the EU responded with implementation packages of its Agenda for migration (2015), which gradually shifted the balance between its double aim of saving migrants’ lives and protecting its borders, in favour of the second. The process which triggered such a shift was the concern that the migration crisis was putting one of the most important achievements of European integration – the Schengen agreement – at risk (Ceccorulli 2018b). Faced with the temporary uncoordinated suspension of Schengen in several countries, the construction of physical fences to stop migration flows in Hungary and the refusal by several states (particularly the Visegrad countries) to implement the relocation scheme envisaged by the EU), the Commission adopted a second implementation package which rose attention to borders protection (by creating the European Border and Coast Guard and strengthening the operation Triton).

Since then the EU and its Member States have adopted measures to enhance border protection and patrolling of the Mediterranean sea to fight smuggling (through the operations Triton and Eunavfor Med Sophia), collect/detain migrants at the points of arrivals (the hotspot system implemented in Greece and Italy) to avoid secondary movements of asylum seekers (through improved fingerprinting), improve return effectiveness through strengthened relations with third states, externalize the control of migration to third countries (as in the case of the EU-Turkey Statement or of the Italy-Libya agreement supported by the EU), and proposing a Regulation on a common list of safe countries of origin which de facto would render some asylum requests automatically unfounded on the basis of the nationality of the asylum seeker. What is at risk the most, in this scenario, are the human rights of migrants, which several attentive observers and NGOs denounce to be systematically violated, not only in the

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Libyan camps (Amnesty International 2017) or in Turkey (Human Rights Watch 2018), but also within Europe (Human Rights Watch 2018), where the hotspot system has de facto created different categories of asylum seekers depending on their nationality, hence allowing different rights and priorities and not guaranteeing adequate living conditions. In other words, the net effects of the “securitization” of Schengen (Ceccorulli 2018b) has been a policy of migration and asylum which has led to a significant reduction of the level of human rights standards in Europe and which has brought a dangerous (for the migrants) externalization of policies.

The launch of a Trust Fund for Africa, looks like a promising return to a holistic, long term and joint-up approach to cope with the root causes of migration, a step in the direction of a concrete implementation of the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) launched in 2011. However, the way in which the Trust Fund has been shaped so far is not particularly promising. With its limited budget of 2.5 billion euros for Africa and the Middle East (23 eligible recipients), it is not likely that the Fund can have a significant impact on the receiving societies, particularly since most of it is directed to enhance border control and migration management rather than development (Castillejo 2014). In general, the link made in the GAMM between development and migration rises the concern, also within the European Parliament, that there could be an “‘instrumentalization’ of development aid for migration management purposes” (European Parliament 2016). Smith and Youngs report that “In early 2016, a group of EU donors pushed the OECD to change its definition of ‘aid’ to include some military spending and funds for refugee camps.” It also seems that some Member States have exercised pressure on the Commission to allow the “development funds to be used for border controls and other measures to restrict migrant flows” (2018: 53-54). Even the fund to train and equip the Libyan coast guard to intercept and return back migrants (200 million euros) points to a particular liberal actoriness on the side of the EU. Here again, pragmatism seems to prevail over principles.
In *lieu* of a conclusion

Europe, and particularly the EU, has for a long time represented a pillar and a laboratory of the liberal order. The EU’s role in the world was very much shaped around a self-understanding as a liberal democratic area which applies to its foreign policy the same liberal values that have shaped its internal development. Now liberalism is in trouble within Europe in the first place: to use Emmanuel Macron’s words before the European Parliament (14 April 2018), Europe is in a state of “civil war” and is afflicted with a “fascination with the illiberal”, putting its “unique model” at risk. Liberalism does not seem to have delivered on at least three fundamental fronts (which are also three aspects of the crisis of liberalism): economic equality and solidarity, liberal democracy and pluralism. Europe is today less egalitarian, less democratic and less open to cultural diversity. Such a Europe, under the pressure of populist and new nationalist forces is also more concerned for its own survival as a union. Its foreign policy can only be affected by these internal developments: on the one side, populist parties provide less guarantees for the maintenance of the traditional bipartisan pillars of foreign policy (national and European) than traditional parties did. In second place, they are frequently Eurosceptic and less eager to give competence to the EU in relevant external matters. Third, the EU tends to be dominated by its internal struggle and ready to compromise its liberal values if this appears to be necessary to save achievements of the integration process (as in the case of migration and the challenges to the Schengen agreement).

The root causes of illiberal tendencies in Europe (as in the world in general) are too structural to think that they will easily disappear, too grounded in the deep dissatisfaction of those who most suffered the negative effects of globalization and felt abandoned by the distant “Berlaymont man”. Only by addressing those deep causes, keeping faith to its founding values and upholding its liberal order, can the EU hope to save itself and start again to play the role of a liberal power in a not-so-liberal-anymore world. But how can the domestically troubled and divided Europe described above find the energy to address such causes, keeping faith to its original values?
References


THE EU AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL ORDER


9 Developing and legitimizing the just peace: the EU’s contribution to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Anders Persson

There have historically been great expectations on the role of the EU as a peacebuilder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both in the region and within the Union. Many people in the region, both Israelis and Palestinians, have long desired closer ties with the EU. At the same time, there is great suspicion towards the EU among both Israelis and Palestinians given the historical record of colonialism and the Holocaust. For the past four and a half decades, the EU and its predecessor, the EC, has been active in trying to establish a just and durable peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, beginning in the early 1970s (Dosenrode and Stubkjaer 2002: 84). This fact alone suggests that the EU has not been successful in its efforts to bring peace to this troubled region. Indeed, the conflict continues unabated and observers from basically the whole political and academic spectrum criticize the EU for not having done enough or for having done nothing at all to contribute to a future solution to the conflict, and for being a weak and divided actor more generally in international affairs, unable to speak with one voice (e.g. Youngs 2006: 150; Hyde-Price 2008: 30; Smith 2008: 235; Musu 2010: 3; Miller 2011: 2; Bouris 2014: 85; Persson 2015: 158; Pardo and Peters 2010: 9). It is important to note that the EU’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict takes place in the shadow of American leadership and without the possibility of offering membership in the Union to either Israel or the Palestinian Authority. This makes the
EU a much weaker actor in comparison to the role it is playing in the Balkans or Eastern Europe. Member States are also generally very divided over strategies for approaching the conflict, even if there is no disagreement over the end result.

In this chapter I problematize the rather simplistic notion of the EU as a historical failure in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially when it comes to being a weak and divided actor which has not contributed to the peace process. Even if much of the above criticism against the EU is true, I argue in this chapter that the EU has actually contributed significantly to keeping the peace process alive thus far by developing and legitimizing the parameters of a just peace in this conflict. Far from being divided, it is clear that the EC/EU early on managed to form a common position among the members regarding a just peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This unity persists even today and no EU Member State would disagree that a future solution lies in the parameters of the just peace the EU has developed and legitimized for the past four and a half decades.

The ambition in this chapter is not to prove causality; that the EU’s declarations directly and without other factors contributing have led to changes in Israeli, American, or Palestinian policy. I am not suggesting that was the case. Rather the ambition here is more limited in that I try to show that the EU has played an important role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by developing and legitimizing the parameters for a just peace between the two sides, and that others subsequently have changed their positions and themselves adopted these ideas. All in all, this development underscores the underutilized potential of the EU as a normative and legitimizing actor in the conflict. In the following parts of this chapter, I identify the major policy departures, which together have created the EU’s parameters for a just peace in the conflict.

The EC enters the Middle East

The original six members of the EC were generally considered to be quite supportive of Israel in the first decade after the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 (Yacobi and Newman 2008: 181). Diplomatic relations between the EC and Israel had been established in 1959 and the first economic agree-
ment between the two was signed five years later in 1964 (Harpaz 2006: 4). During the 1960s, the main concerns for the Member States of the EC were not a common foreign policy or the Middle East, but further integration, internal trade and agricultural policies. In November 1970, the foreign ministers of the then six member countries met in Munich for the first time within the framework of the newly established European Political Cooperation (EPC). The issue on the agenda was foreign policy and the situation in the Middle East was one of the top priorities (Peters 2000: 154). Within the framework of the EPC the conflict in the Middle East was consciously placed highest on the agenda for both external and internal reasons. Besides the importance of finding a solution to the conflict, which indeed has always been a real concern, not least in the wake of the growing dependency on energy and trade with the countries in the region, this conflict was singled out and used by the EU to foster integration within the Union. The rationale behind this “hidden agenda” was that by being able to show a united stand on this particular issue, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which already then was considered to be one of the most difficult issues in international affairs, the international community would start seeing the Union as a serious international actor (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 46). A year later, in 1971, the EC issued its first official statement regarding the situation in the Middle East (Bulletin of the EC 6-1971: 31). In this statement from what was called the second EEC foreign ministers’ conference on political cooperation it was declared that:

> it is of great importance to Europe that a just peace should be established in the Middle East, and they [the foreign ministers] are therefore in favour of any efforts which may be made to bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict, and particularly of the negotiations in which Mr Jarring is involved. They urge all those concerned to ensure that this mission proves successful. They confirm their approval of Resolution No. 242 of the Security Council dated 22 November 1967, which constitutes the basis of a settlement, and they stress the need to put it into effect in all its parts (Bulletin of the EC 6-1971: 31).

\footnote{1 Gunnar Jarring was a Swedish diplomat who mediated in the conflict.}
Important to note is that nowhere in text is the term “Palestinian” used, which is also the case for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 242, the landmark resolution so often referred to by all the parties involved in the conflict.

Legitimate rights of the Palestinians

The early 1970s saw a dramatic increase in the EC’s diplomatic and economic activity in the Middle East as well as three new members to the EC: the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland. The October 1973 war between Israel and two of her neighbours; Egypt and Syria, came as a surprise for the then nine members of the EC and the following Arab oil embargo had a shocking effect on them. The nine EC members were dependent on energy supplies from the Middle East, both when it came to stabilizing the price of oil and ensuring its supply (Dosenrode and Stubkjaer 2002: 85). As much as 60 per cent of Europe’s total energy came from the Middle East, a figure far higher than that of the US, which was relatively independent of energy supplies from the Middle East (Dosenrode and Stubkjaer 2002: 85). In addition to that, the EC Member States had a growing interest in the region as a trade partner. In 1972, EC exports to the eight Arab members of OPEC were valued $2.97 billion. By 1979, they were valued $27.7 billion, an almost tenfold increase in seven years (Garfinkle 1983: 8). There should be no doubt that energy and trade considerations played a significant role in shaping EC policy towards the Middle East in the 1970s. Panayiotis Ifestos sums up the effects of the oil crisis on the EC in this way:

It [the oil embargo] made Europeans brutally aware of their vulnerability in both economic and political terms; it changed the pattern of relationships with both Israel and the Arab world, and brought about a dramatic shift towards more pro-Arab attitudes; it revealed the extent of European external disunity and generated calls for more integration as a result of this experience; it had economic effects not imaginable before the crisis; and last but not least, it brought to the surface the uneasy nature of Euro-American relations (Ifestos 1987: 421).
After the October 1973 war and the subsequent Arab oil embargo, the foreign ministers of the then nine members of the EC met on November 6 to discuss the situation in the Middle East. The meeting resulted in a statement that again emphasized the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation in line with UNSC 242 and the newly issued UNSC 338. For the first time in an official EU statement, the term “Palestinians” was used and “the Palestinians” were explicitly recognized as a party to the conflict (Bulletin of the EC 10-1973: 106). Not only that, the statement went on to recognize “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians” (Bulletin of the EC 10-1973: 106). Terminology like “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians” had prior to this statement been a phrasing used only by the Arab states (Dosenrode and Stubkjaer 2002: 86). The 1973 statement signaled a new change of tides in the EC’s relations with Israel and the Palestinians, and it also constituted the first major shift in how the EC conceptualized a just peace in the Middle East. From not having mentioned the Palestinians at all two years earlier, the 1973 statement said that “in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians” (Bulletin of the EC 10-1973: 106). As could have been expected, the reaction from the Israeli government was sharp, and in a political communiqué three days later, the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Abba Eban said that the statement meant “Oil for Europe” and not “Peace in the Middle East” (quoted in Greilsammer and Weiler 1984:135). Eban also put forward three points of criticism which would become the standard reply of various Israeli governments’ whenever the EC/EU issued statements which were not appreciated by Israel; that they are counter-productive; that they are ill-timed, and that the EC/EU if it wants to be relevant should stop dictating the conditions for peace (Greilsammer and Weiler 1984: 135).

A Palestinian homeland

The EU’s next major policy departure and a new notion of just peace in the conflict developed in the latter half of the 1970s when the EC turned even closer to the Arab narrative of the conflict. At a meeting in London on 29 June 1977, the European Council issued a statement which again
recognized, like the previous statement from 1973, that the legitimate
rights of the Palestinians had to be taken into account “in the establish-
ment of a just and lasting peace” (Bulletin of the EC 6-1977: 62). The nine
members also reaffirmed their view that a just peace settlement should be
based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, and once again emphasized the
rights of the Palestinians in that:

a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the
legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its
national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the
need for a homeland for the Palestinian people (Bulletin of the EC 6-1977:
62).

What was new in this declaration and what constituted the second major
shift in the EC’s notion of just peace was first that the Palestinians were
referred to as “the Palestinian people” with a “national identity”. Second,
the Palestinians had to be included in the negotiations. Third and most
importantly, the statement called for “a homeland for the Palestinian peo-
ple” (Bulletin of the EC 6-1977: 62). Again, Israel reacted harshly to these
statements. The Israeli government under Prime Minister Menachem Be-
gin knew all too well what was meant with expressions such as homeland,
a term which had been used by the Zionists themselves in their struggle to
establish Israel (Greilsammer and Weiler 1987: 39).

Right to self-determination

In April 1980, Time magazine ran a six-page cover story with the title “The
Palestinians—Key to a Mideast Peace”. It was by now clear to everyone that
the Palestinians had emerged as a major player in the conflict during the
1970s and that they could no longer be ignored. Yehuda Blom, Israel’s UN
Ambassador at the time, was quoted in the article calling the seemingly
growing numbers of supporters for the Palestinian cause, many of whom
were European states, “a sorry parade of nations supplicating the Arab oil
gods” (quoted in Time Magazine, April 14, 1980: 41). But times were in-
deed changing and the rapprochement between the EC and the Arab states
culminated in the seminal Venice Declaration of June 1980. The declaration also marked the emergence of a more unified EC stance towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the Venice Declaration, it was clearly reflected that the Member States of the EC sought to play a more prominent role in the conflict:

The nine member states of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace (The Venice Declaration, 1980).

Moreover, the Venice Declaration condemned the construction of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and stated that the Palestinian people must be allowed “to exercise fully its right to self-determination”. Maybe most significantly, the Venice Declaration called for the inclusion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into any negotiations for a settlement (The Venice Declaration, 1980). Israel and the US had tried to prevent the EC from issuing the declaration, and in Israel, the declaration was condemned by virtually the entire political spectrum (Alpher 2000: 196). The Israeli Cabinet issued the following response:

Nothing will remain of the Venice Resolution but its bitter memory. The Resolution calls upon us, and other nations, to include in the peace process the Arab S.S. known as “The Palestine Liberation Organization.” The principal component of this organization of murderers passed the following resolution in Damascus, on the eve of the Venice Conference: “Fatah is an independent national revolutionary movement whose aim is to liberate Palestine completely and to liquidate the Zionist entity politically, economically, militarily, culturally and ideologically.” Not since Mein Kampf was written have more explicit words been said, in the ears of the entire world, including Europe, about the desire for the destruction of the Jewish state and nation (The Israeli Cabinet statement on the Venice Declaration, June 15 1980).

Originally, there had been widespread speculations both in Europe and elsewhere that the Venice Declaration would include a proposal to change
the mythical UNSC 242 by replacing the word “refugees” with the word “Palestinians” (Greilsammer and Weiler 1984: 142). As this did not happen, the Arab side was somewhat split over the Venice Declaration. The PLO had hoped for a change in UNSC 242 in addition to being recognized by the EC as the sole representative of the Palestinians, which did not happen either (Greilsammer and Weiler 1987: 51). King Hussein of Jordan said nevertheless that the shift in EC positions represented “a major change in the situation in the world…. We would like to encourage it. We would like to see it evolve. We believe that it will represent a tremendous change in terms of possibilities in the future” (quoted in Garfinkle 1983: 51). But as the Arab side realized that the EC was not capable to outweigh the US, their optimism started to fade.

Originally, the Venice Declaration was meant to be a platform from which the EC would develop a genuine Middle East policy. But as Dosenrode and Stubkjaer correctly have noted, the Venice Declaration fulfilled neither EC nor Arab hopes. The EC’s initiative for a new Middle East policy vanished after a year or so, and for the rest of the 1980s, the role of the EC was, in the words of Dosenrode and Stubkjaer (2002: 106) “virtually non-existent”. Despite never being implemented, the Venice Declaration established the EC as a fairly independent international actor in the shadow of the Cold War rivalry. Almost four decades after it was issued, the Venice Declaration still constitutes the basic principles of the EU’s policy towards the peace process, while at the same time, the declaration marked a low-point in the EC’s relations with Israel from which it has not fully recovered to this day.

A Palestinian state

The Venice Declaration of 1980 had fallen short of explicitly calling for a Palestinian state and it took almost another two decades before the EU was ready to stand behind the idea of a Palestinian state; this also constituted the fourth major shift in the EU’s notion of just peace in the conflict. The Cardiff European Council of 1998 had called “on Israel to recognise the right of the Palestinians to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a State” (Cardiff European Council 1998: 29), but it was not
until the Berlin Declaration of 1999 that the EU explicitly endorsed the idea of a Palestinian state:

The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfillment of this right. It appeals to the parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any veto. The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region (The Berlin Declaration, 24 and 25 March 1999).

Like previous EC/EU statements, the Berlin Declaration led to a predictable angry response from Israel (Peters 2000: 157). Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in his response that “it is particularly regrettable that Europe, where one-third of the Jewish people perished, has seen fit to try and impose a solution which endangers the State of Israel and runs counter to its interests” (Netanyahu 1999).

Jerusalem as capital

The fifth shift, and the latest evolution of EU’s notion of just peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, took place in December 2009 when the Council of the European Union under the Swedish Presidency issued a statement which recognized Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state (Council of the European Union 2009). This statement did not explicitly discuss just peace, but six months later, in June 2010, at the 20th EU-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg, the Council of the European Union issued a similar statement which “reaffirmed the EU and the GCC shared position that a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East is vital for international peace and security…The two sides reaffirmed their shared position not to recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders other than those agreed by both parties including with regard to Jerusalem, as the future
capital of two states” (Council of the European Union 2010). As could have been expected, Israel reacted harshly to these statements, which called for the division of Jerusalem. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a response which said that “any attempt to dictate for either party the nature of the outcome on the status of Jerusalem, is not helpful and wrong” and that “[t]he process being led by Sweden harms the European Union’s ability to take part as a significant mediator in the political process between Israel and the Palestinians” (Haaretz 01/12/2009).

Conclusion

Despite often-repeated accusations of being unable to speak with one voice in the conflict, the EC/EU has shown a remarkable degree of consistency in its declaratory policy towards the conflict over the years. The EPC managed early on to form a common position among the members, and history has proven that the EC/EU was forward-thinking in promoting Arab and later Palestinian claims as legitimate demands. As Yacobi and Newman (2008: 183) have correctly noted, the EC/EU has issued statements that were adopted some years later in a similar way by other countries in the international community, most notably by the US and by Israel. Even the present government under Benjamin Netanyahu has come to accept many of these ideas, most notably the concept of a two state solution. Both EU leaders and many academics consider it a major success for EU diplomacy that today there is a widespread consensus on the two state solution (see e.g. Biscop 2003: 65; Dieckhoff 2005: 53; Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 185; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 282). But while the EU is indeed important as a legitimizer in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is clear that it faces legitimacy problems vis-à-vis both the Palestinian and the Israeli people, given the historical record of colonialism, the Holocaust and perceived bias in the conflict. Legitimacy problems aside, there is no doubt that the EU has made an important contribution to peace in the conflict through its visionary and legitimizing role in defining a just peace in the conflict. As two Israeli academics noted in an editorial in The New York Times, published in June 2010, the 30th anniversary of the Venice Declaration:
The verdict is clear: The Europeans were right. They were right to point out that solving the Arab-Israeli conflict required Israel to recognize Palestinian “self-determination”, the diplomatic code word for independent statehood. They were right to call for bringing the P.L.O. into the peace process... In fact, the European declaration was not only right but also visionary in that it boldly spelled out the principles that such a comprehensive solution would require... These are the principles that continue to define the contours of the only plausible agreement possible between Israel and the Palestinians (Touval and Pardo 2010).

The normative and legitimizing power of the EU will no doubt play an important role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the foreseeable future as well, not least in questions such as explicit recognition of a Palestinian state and labeling products made in Israeli settlements. At the same time, the rise of various right-wing, nationalist or populist governments and parties in Europe, many of whom are pro-Israeli and anti-Muslim, have made common EU positions in the conflict much harder to achieve in recent years. With no common EU position, there is nothing to legitimize and thus no normative power on behalf of the EU. It remains to be seen how the EU’s parameters for a just peace in the conflict will be affected by this development.

References


DEVELOPING AND LEGITIMIZING THE JUST PEACE


The main purpose of this chapter is to map and evaluate European and international donor coordination on health assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Examining four relatively successful and hitherto undocumented case studies within the health sector donor coordination group, the *Groupe Interbaillleurs Santé* (GIBS), we want to make an empirical contribution to the literature on health coordination. At the same time, we hope to add to the theoretical state of the art by shifting the attention from a sole focus on constraints to also highlight some enabling factors for coordination.

Our analysis starts from two premises. First, the importance of donor coordination is undisputed. Notwithstanding the numerous constraints against effective coordination that have been illustrated in existing studies and that are highlighted by policy-makers involved in coordination processes, there is a widespread scholarly and policy consensus that donors should coordinate for the purpose of aid effectiveness (ECDPM 2015; Carbone 2017; Furness and Vollmer 2013; Delputte and Orbie 2014; Bourguignon and Platteau 2015; Fuchs and Öhler 2015; Bodenstein et al 2017; Klingebiel et al 2016). Overcoming the problems of aid fragmentation through donor coordination is all the more crucial in fragile states, such as the DRC, where ineffective development programmes are more likely
to occur (OECD 2011; Hearn 2016; Leblanc and Beaulieu 2006; Bigsten and Tengstam 2015). The European Union (EU), the largest donor of development aid in the world and an active promoter of donor coordination, has also prioritized coordination as a main strategy to help overcoming fragility in Africa (European Union 2016; European Commission 2017).

Second, health has long been recognized as a key development concern. This can be seen from the importance of health in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG 4, 5, 6) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 3). Again, this has also been endorsed by the EU and its Member States, as can be seen from the European Commission Communication on the EU Role in Global Health (European Commission 2010) and the subsequent Council conclusions on this topic (Council of the European Union 2010), as well as the new European Consensus on Development (Council of the European Union et al 2017).

Health assistance in developing countries is typically characterized by a large proliferation of different donors who work through various aid modalities (ranging from projects that focus on specific diseases to funding of governmental programmes), which further evokes the need for effective coordination in this area (Buse and Walt 1997). Given the problematic health situation in the DRC (under-five mortality rate of 98.3 per 1,000 live births; maternal mortality ratio of 693 per 100,000 live births; 106 deaths due to malaria per 100,000 people (UNDP 2016)), several donors have for many years attempted to intervene on issues such as malaria, child mortality, sexual and reproductive health, and the country’s health system at different levels of governance. While several studies have analyzed donor coordination in health in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Hill et al 2012), there is to our knowledge no recent literature on recent coordination initiatives in the DRC.

Starting from these premises, we aim to better understand donor coordination in health by mapping and evaluating four recent cases in the DRC. Interestingly, we find that, taking into account the inherent constraints to development and coordination in fragile states, the GIBS has been a relatively successful platform for donors to coordinate their health-development policies and provide some alignment with the government. Donor coordination within the GIBS includes most relevant EU
and non-EU donors in the health sector and seems more promising than would have been expected given the difficult circumstances in the DRC: diverging ideas amongst donors, limited ownership of the Congolese government, and limitations to only soft coordination mechanisms.

Importantly, this observation leads us to discuss not only constraints against coordination – which have been repeated over and over again in many studies – but also some enabling factors. In doing so, we hope to set the ground not only for more in-depth empirical research but also for more systematic comparative research into the dynamics behind donor coordination and its impact on the ground.

The study is based on two different but interrelated research projects. First, a doctoral project on the role of the EU and its Member States in international health assistance (Steurs 2018)¹, for which Lies Steurs and Jan Orbie conducted explorative interviews with 29 respondents (4 in Belgium from July to October 2015, 25 in Kinshasa in November 2015) and attended a GIBS meeting as observing participants (Kinshasa, November 2015). Second, a study for the Practitioners’ Network on European Development Cooperation (Orbie et al 2017) on European coordination in fragile states, for which Jan Orbie, Lies Steurs and Yentyl Williams did semi-structured telephone interviews between January and April 2017. Interview data were triangulated with primary and secondary sources where available. The four case studies emerged from the interviews as being the most relevant ones (see below)².

The chapter is structured as follows. First, we provide a summary of the case for donor coordination in fragile states. Second, we give a general overview and evaluation of different coordination mechanisms on health in the DRC. Third, we describe and evaluate the role of the GIBS, which turned out to be the most relevant coordination forum. Fourth, we examine coordination within the GIBS more thoroughly through four case studies: medicines, single contracts (contrats uniques), daily substance al-

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allowance (*per diems*), and salaries (*primes*). Fifth, we discuss the main findings with specific attention to the enabling factors for donor coordination. Although this chapter does not put the focus specifically on the EU, in this final section we will also touch upon some relevant findings on the role of EU donors in donor coordination in the DRC.

### Health coordination in the DRC

The conflict situation in the DRC during the 1990s led to ad-hoc, uncoordinated and vertical (disease-specific) interventions in the health sector, mostly implemented by international NGOs. Since the beginning of the 2000s, several donors restarted their bilateral development cooperation programs (Fig 1), but donors largely used parallel systems. This posed several problems for an already fragile health system. In addition, the absence of leadership of the Ministry of Health (MOH) posed a major problem. Despite this difficult context, the country has received an increasing amount of international health assistance (Fig 2). Amongst the main donors in the health sector are the EU and several of its Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands and Italy), the US, Japan, Canada, Norway, the World Bank, the UN, Global Fund and GAVI.

There have been several efforts to coordinate health support since the early 2000s. The main coordination mechanisms are the GIBS (previously GTS), the CNP and the CCM. In the remainder of this section, we will

![Figure 1: Total number of donors in health sector.](image-url)
provide a brief overview and evaluation of these three coordination mechanisms.

First, the “Groupe Thématique Santé” (GTS) was launched in 2001 in order to coordinate the health sector in the DRC. Although the GTS came at the impetus of the EU, which also started to coordinate more in other sectors, it was quickly decided that also non-EU donors and UN organizations would be involved. The objective of the group was to create synergy and complementarity among donor partners in line with the vision of the Congolose government (Termes de référence du Groupe Thématique Santé). In 2005-2006, the MOH adopted a sector strategy called Stratégie de renforcement du système de santé (SRSS), which was developed in collaboration with the developing partners. Through a common declaration the donors pledged to align with the SRSS. At the same time, the Groupe Thématique Santé was relaunched as the GIBS.

Second, there were also developments within the MOH to improve coordination in the health sector beyond the GIBS. In 2006, a steering committee of the SRSS was put in place, named le Comité National de Pilotage du Secteur de la Santé (CNP-SS). While the GIBS only includes donors, the CNP-SS would be government driven. The committee is chaired by the MOH and comprises several governmental and non-governmental actors. At provincial level, steering committees, called the Comités Provinciaux de Pilotage (CPP), were also established.

Third, the Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) constitutes a coordination mechanism to manage the funds of the Global Fund. The
CCM coordinates, supervises and evaluates the activities funded by the Global Fund (Zinnen 2012). It includes representatives from government, the private sector, donor agencies, civil society and communities living with HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. Currently, France and the US are the bilateral donors attending the CCM. There have been efforts to integrate the CCM in the CNP, but it still largely continues to function as a separate structure.

In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on coordination with the GIBS. First, due to the weak leadership of the Ministry of Health, the CNP is encountering several challenges (for example irregular meetings), which makes is considered not to be an efficient and effective platform. Second, the CCM is a relevant platform, but it only concerns the Global Fund. In addition, the CCM does not play a clear coordinative role and the number of donors that are members is limited (bilateral donors typically only have one or two representatives in a CCM, in the DRC these were France and the US in 2015/2016). Third, this is in contrast to the GIBS, which is recognized to be the key platform for coordination in health in the DRC. Moreover, as will become clear in the next sections, the GIBS has been relatively successful in forging coordination.
The central role of the GIBS

The GIBS plays a key role in health coordination in the DRC. This section provides a brief description and evaluation of this coordination platform.

When the GIBS was established in 2005, its Terms of Reference (GIBS, 2005) stressed that: (1) the GIBS members support the coordination efforts from the government side, (2) coordination should go beyond the stage of simple information sharing, and (3) effective coordination is even more necessary given the start of several new financial initiatives (such as the Global Fund, the European Development Fund, some programs from the World Bank, etc.).

The GIBS currently includes 19 donors (countries, development agencies, international organizations): Germany, Belgium, World Bank, Canada, KOICA (South Korea), DFID, Global Fund, France, GAVI, JICA (Japan), WHO, UNAIDS, Sweden, European Union, UNFPA, Unicef, USAID, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Switzerland (based in Bukavu). Despite this wide membership, some members are more active than others, as will become clear in the case studies. There seems to be a discussion as well on whether implementing agencies should be invited in the GIBS as well (for those donors who have this division). The first Terms of Reference of the GIBS (2005) stated that the members consisted of “bi- and multilateral donors, possibly represented/supported by their technical agencies”. But currently, no technical partners are officially involved in the GIBS.

The GIBS has a rotating chairmanship. Over the past years, the following countries/organizations have held the chair: Belgium (2006-2007), Canada (2008-2009), European Union (2010-2011), United States (2012-2013), UNICEF and vice-chair DFID (2014-2015), DFID (2016-2017), and the European Union again since March 2017. In addition to the plenary GIBS meetings that take place on a monthly basis, there are also thematic sub-groups that correspond with the technical committees within the Comité National de Pilotage: (1) human resources, (2) medicines, (3) health services (4) health financing, (5) governance and decentralization.

Interviewees involved in (health) coordination in the DRC evaluate the GIBS as a relatively successful forum for donor coordination. There is a consensus among interviewees that the GIBS is working much better than
coordination platforms in other sectors in the DRC. Several even stressed that it is considered as an example for donor coordination in other sectors within the country. Some interviewees with experience on health coordination in other countries also emphasized that the GIBS works relatively well in the DRC, especially taking into account the difficult country context.

Specifically, three positive features of the GIBS are stressed. First, interviewees were very positive about the Chartre de Partenariat, which they consider as a major achievement as the principles are quite far-reaching. In 2014, the Chartre de Partenariat was signed by all partners, which aimed to “define the principles and mechanisms that will guide the behaviour of those donors gathered within GIBS” (GIBS, 2014). Second, the GIBS is seen as very valuable for information sharing. As observant participants at a GIBS meeting in November 2015, we witnessed the presentation of cartography of health assistance in the DRC, which made it clear that donors often did not know about who is doing what in which region. Third, several interviewees emphasize that the GIBS’ role effectively goes beyond information sharing, as they are also discussing policy issues and harmonizing administrative issues, as will also be illustrated in the case studies below.

Despite this relatively positive evaluation, interviewees also mention two main weaknesses of coordination through the GIBS. Firstly, there is limited ownership of and alignment with the government. Several stakeholders – including donors – criticize the GIBS for working totally parallel from the CNP. The lack of leadership of the Ministry remains a huge challenge, but the idea of the GIBS creating a “parallel” government can be considered as being problematic as well. In line with this, some interviewees claimed that the GIBS works “reactively” (instead of proactively), depending on the priorities of certain active donors.

It seems that the GIBS remains a parallel group to the Comité National de Pilotage. Even if not all donors want this. (Interview 26)

It is the basic problem, if you are not able to align, you cannot harmonize as I see it. They go hand in hand. (Interview 30)

To be sure, there are continuous efforts to try to align more and involve the government on policy-related decisions. The fact that the GIBS’ five
thematic sub-groups are the same as the CNP technical working groups (see Fig 3), also illustrates a principled willingness to align. The representative of the EU who is currently chairing the GIBS wants to make it a priority to involve the Ministry more, but she also notes that this remains a challenge given the current political situation. The extent to which the GIBS effectively achieves alignment with the partner government remains to be researched, as will be done in the case studies below.

Second, it proves difficult to implement commitments. Even when agreed principles within the GIBS go beyond information sharing, it can be difficult to put them into practice. For example, the *Chartre de Partenariat* states that the national system of medicines will be used but it is unclear to what extent this has been adhered to by donors. The same is true for the agreement on per diems. Again, further case study analysis needs to reveal the (un)successfulness of the GIBS.

**Four cases**

Although the GIBS is considered a relatively successful instance of donor coordination, we need to take a closer look at cases of health coordination to make a more profound evaluation of its success. In this part, we will attempt to do this by focussing on four cases of health coordination within the GIBS: medicines, *contrats uniques*, per diems and *primes*. These four cases are selected because they constitute the major topics of discussion within the GIBS in the previous years. Therefore, they are the most representative to describe and evaluate this coordination practice. The four cases also display a degree of diversity as they have been discussed in different sub-groups (with different donors and chairs) namely the sub-group human resources (per diems and *primes*), medicines, and health financing (*contrats uniques*). Moreover, the four cases display interesting similarities and differences: both per diems and *primes* concern payments by donors to government officials of the partner country, but the former are temporary and the latter are more structural; both medicines and *contrats uniques* concern health plans at governmental level, but the former topic is specific whereas the latter is generic.
Medicines

The question of procurement and distribution of medicines has been one of the major debates at the GIBS in recent years. It stems from an intensive discussion between donors on the use of the current system. In 2002, a national system for the procurement and distribution was developed, the SNAME (Système National d’Approvisionnement de Médicaments). This pharmaceutical policy is based on two principles: centralization of procurement and decentralization of distribution. The central strategy document in this regard is the PNAM (Programme National d’Approvisionnement de Medicaments essentiels). Relevant institutions are the CDRs (Centrales de Distribution) that distribute medicines and that are united in the FEDECAME (the central organization that is responsible for buying and distributing the medicines).

As there were several problems with the system, most donors were not using it. This created a fierce ideological debate between those donors (mainly Belgium and the EU) who fully support the system and make use of it in their programs, and most others donors who do not trust it and prefer parallel systems. The EU and Belgium claim that by not using the system and preferring parallel systems, the government system had no way of improving and – on the contrary – it got destroyed.

The drama now is that a shop without customers, well, it closes. (Interview 33)

The 2014 Chartre de Partenariat makes some progress in this regard, as it states that the GIBS members will make use of the SNAME: “the support and the use of the national budgetary supply system for health and the improvement of its implementation rate” (GIBS, 2014). Nevertheless, this engagement still needed to be put into practice. In 2015, the plan national stratégique for the SNAME expired and a new one needed to be developed. Taking into account the principles of the Chartre de Partenariat, this was a good opportunity to develop a new plan to bring together everyone. The GIBS donors hired consultants to assist the government in developing the new plan. However, several donors – especially those who were strongly
supporting the use of the national system – claimed that the final document was totally contradictory to what should be done and some felt that the strategy would actually weaken the system rather than strengthen it, as it was taking a market approach and wanted to focus more on involving private actors.

This caused a big fight among the donors, and it was difficult to reach a consensus within the sub-group medicines. The chair of the GIBS organized bilateral meetings with all members to get a better view of each donor on this topic. In the end, it was agreed to hire a new consultancy study. These consultants had more experience with the Congolese context and were more closely involved with all partners and the ministry.

As a result, an agreement on a new strategy was finally agreed in April 2017. One European participant emphasizes the relevance of having this agreement by stating that it enables all actors (the government, the donors as well the implementing partners) to align to the same system (Interview 32). Furthermore, the implementation of the strategy should avoid distortions in the system, with regards to the availability, quality and accessibility of medicines (ibid.).

The medicines case showed that despite very different visions, it is still possible to reach a consensus with the donors. In addition, the efforts to involve the ministry can be considered to be quite successful. Ideally, the new strategic plan will enhance the capacity of the country to procure and distribute medicines. Nevertheless, the case also showed some weaknesses. The first version of the plan was a failure, which was a waste of time and money. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether partners will finance the plan and whether they will align with the system in their own programs.

Contrats uniques

The second case also concerns a donor-steered plan for adoption by the government, yet this time at provincial level. In line with the ongoing decentralization process in the DRC, in each province *Divisions Provincials de la Santé* (DPS) have been created. The main goal of the DPS is to support health zones in order to provide health services to the population. However, these DPS are poorly financed or financed in a very fragmented
way. This became clear after a joint mission of donors in July 2014 in the province Equateur as well as through a study of the DEP.

Consequently, the donors and the government launched the idea of a contrat unique, which would be agreed by all donors active in a province, and which has the main objective of “federating the means in a harmonized vision around the DPS” (CNP 2016:3). The DPS will make one annual plan (le plan annuel opérationnel, PAO) and all financing should be aligned with this plan. This allows for more transparency, less duplication, more alignment and facilitation of the dialogue with the provincial health authorities. In each province, the contrat unique will be signed by one donor or technical agency, which will also be responsible for the follow-up.

Discussions on the contrat unique started in 2014. By the end of that year, an agreement was reached on the principle, and in April 2015 a workshop was organized in Matadi, chaired by the Secretary General of the MOH, where the content of the contrats uniques were discussed. Since then, discussions on implementation are ongoing. In July 2016, a joint mission by the Secretary General, the DEP and the donors took place to start the process of the contrats uniques in two pilot provinces: Nord and South Kivu. The contrat unique for Kwilu is at an advanced stage and will be signed by Belgian Technical Cooperation (the Belgian development agency, currently “Enabel”) in the name of all relevant donors and agencies (Interview 31).

The main strength of this initiative is that it provides a framework for alignment of donors working in health in provinces. However, it is important to note that funding is only put together in a “virtual” way. At this stage, there is no agreement for real “physical” joint funding. Donors will use their own procedures and the DPS will be supported to work with this variety of procedures (CNP 2016:7).

In the long term, it might be possible to move towards joint procedures or even joint funding. However, for the moment the donors agree that the country and the structures are not ready for this (Interviews 68 and 39).

For now, the main value of the contrat unique is that (1) it provides a framework for information exchange, which could (2) potentially involve more transparency, a better division of labour and complementarity with-
in provinces, (3) in a way that is aligned with the governmental authorities. As the plan is flexible and does not involve any pooled funding mechanism, a wide range of partners could be involved. However, this flexibility can also be considered as a weakness. More generally, one interviewee emphasizes that the development of *contrats uniques* should be seen as an interactive process from which donors will be able to learn (Interview 31). It is however too early to say what the impact of this learning process would be and to what extent the *contrats uniques* will effectively improve health-related aid.

Per diems

As in every development context, also within the DRC donors pay per diems (daily substance allowance) to government officials when they have to go outside the capital, for example to cover costs for their accommodation. The diversity of rules on this created a competition between donors whereby officials would prefer to go on a mission with partners paying more rather than with partners who pay less. Especially the UN agencies were paying high amounts of per diems, which other partners could not afford to pay. This problem was particularly clear in the health sector in the DRC. Consequently, the donor community within the GIBS has aimed to harmonize the practices of paying per diems.

A first agreement among the donors was reached in 2012. In 2016, this agreement was revised to take into account the changes with regards to the decentralization. The GIBS agreed that they would apply the UN 2015 scale starting from April 2016 for each new project. For ongoing projects, it was advised to discuss the alignment with this scale with the ministry.

The present document serves as a reference for the GIBS and constitutes an internal tool for harmonizing its interventions. It comes into effect on 1 April 2016 for each new project. However, it is suggested to partners with projects running since more than one year, to negotiate with the MSP to align them to this new scale. (GIBS, 2016)

The GIBS will revise this agreement every three years.
The strength of this initiative is that donors managed to sign an agreement. Remarkably, health is the first and only sector within the DRC where an agreement on harmonizing per diems has been reached. As such it is also perceived as a frontrunner and a model for other sectors (Interview 31). Ideally, the agreement would entail less competition amongst donors who pay per diems, increase transparency and reduce perverse effects. However, it seems that implementation is still lagging behind, in particular for those programmes that were initiated before the agreement (Interview 39). Implementation might also be impeded by the fact that donors are often using several instruments and implementation partners (Interview 31). This makes it difficult to check whether the rules are applied. Internal communication remains a challenge. As an effort to deal with this challenge, the GIBS invited representatives of NGOs during the discussions, to inform them about the decisions. Another weakness is the fact that this issue is difficult to discuss with the government, as the officials have a direct and personal stake in it. As one interviewee explained, government officials are sometimes purposely trying to organize or attend meetings outside of Kinshasa, as they are getting higher per diems for this (Interview 39).

Primes

As in every development context, also in the DRC, some donors pay salaries (primes) of health care workers. However, not all donors agree that they should pay salaries, as some claim that it is the responsibility of the government. In addition, among those donors that pay salaries, there are significant differences in the amount of money paid. Because of a lack of transparency, some health workers might also receive primes from several donors at the same time. Consequently, efforts are made to harmonize this and to progressively diminish the payment of salaries.

Discussions on this already started in 2006 and an agreement was reached in 2012. However, as not everyone adhered to this agreement, the discussion was re-opened in 2014. Donors tried to reach agreement with the government as well, but as the positions between the Ministry and the donors did not converge, no agreement was reached. In 2015, the GIBS
launched a new technical note in which donors agreed to apply the principles of the agreement of 2012. The main principles are that (1) the total amount of the salary and primes paid to an individual should not exceed the maximum scale of the GIBS 2012 agreement and (2) in case no reliable information exists on the total salary of an official, a coefficient of 60% should be used on the 2012 scale.

However, within this technical note it was stressed that it is a temporary measure until a final agreement would be reached. Until today, this technical note of 2015 is followed up by most of the donors. The Global Fund and UNICEF are actively following up on data management systems to trace the implementation of the primes (Interview 31).

The (temporary) agreement on the primes is a success in the sense that an agreement was reached among donors, and most donors are currently adhering to this. However, implementation challenges are present here as well, and the difficult relationship with the government is a huge challenge for moving forward on this topic. Donors want to reduce the payment of

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<tr>
<th>Medicines</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Despite different visions, consensus reached</td>
<td>- First version was a failure, waste of time and money</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Alignment with the government</td>
<td>- Implementation and financing still unclear</td>
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<td>- Plan could lead to enhanced capacity of the country to procure and distribute medicines</td>
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<th>Contracts uniques</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Agreement reached on the principle</td>
<td>- Implementation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Could lead to more transparency, a better division of labour and complementarity within provinces</td>
<td>- Only virtual pooled funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Alignment with (local) governmental entities</td>
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<td>- Flexible, which makes it possible to include several partners</td>
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<th>Per diems</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
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<td>- Agreement signed</td>
<td>- Implementation?</td>
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<td>- Could lead to less competition, increase transparency and reduce perverse effects</td>
<td>- Difficult to discuss with the government, as the officials have a direct and personal stake in it</td>
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<td>- Health sector is the frontrunner to harmonize the per diems</td>
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<th>Primes</th>
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<tr>
<td>- (Temporary) agreement</td>
<td>- Implementation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Could lead to less competition, no double payments and more transparency</td>
<td>- Difficult to discuss with the government, as the officials have a direct and personal stake in it</td>
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primes, as the state should be the sole responsible for paying its personnel. However, efforts on moving forward on this are not being taken by the government.

Discussion and conclusion

While a systematic comparison between the four cases is impossible because of differences in set-up, objectives and timing, the overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each case (see Table 1) makes it possible to further evaluate the relative success of the GIBS and to point at some explanatory factors.

Indeed, the four cases further substantiate the initial finding that donor coordination within the GIBS has been relatively successful. “Relative” implies, first, compared to donor coordination in other sectors in the DRC, and second, taking into account the difficult environment for donor coordination. The latter implies the fragile state context (weak state apparatus), limited ownership by the government (GIBS donor forum taking over the role of the ministry-led CNP), ideological divergences amongst donors (especially in the medicines case), and the “soft” approach to coordination (beyond information sharing but not involving common funds or binding decision-making). The four cases confirm that the strength of the GIBS lies not only in its functioning as a platform for information sharing, but more importantly also in its ability to coordinate policy issues (e.g. medicines) and harmonize administrative issues (e.g. per diems).

One weakness that came out of the general evaluation of GIBS, namely uncertainties on effective implementation, was confirmed in the case studies. Even when decisions achieved within the GIBS constitute clear steps forward for improved coordination, it remains to be seen to what extent the donors will implement these in practice. Interestingly, however, the critique of limited alignment was nuanced as we could witness forms of indirect alignment in the medicines and contrat uniques cases. The medicines case is essentially about strengthening capacity of national systems of procurement and distribution. The contrat unique aims to facilitate dialogue with provincial authorities and provide a framework for alignment with provincial authorities. Although the DRC government is not official-
ly involved in the GIBS, this points to some degree of ownership and alignment. To be sure, ownership and alignment remain limited, and to some degree we may even witness “upside down ownership and alignment” whereby donors dictate the partner countries’ policies. However, GIBS initiatives appear more embedded within governmental programmes than one might expect in a fragile state context such as the DRC.

Not surprisingly, each of the four cases illustrates the significant constraints against donor coordination that are well documented in the literature. The weakness of the partner government, visibility concerns of individual donors, budgetary and administrative complexities, political sensitivities, commercial interests, and time and staff constraints have all been cited by interviewees. What is more interesting than another enumeration of constraints against coordination, however, is to analyze which are the enabling factor that make these cases – relatively – successful. Why is it that despite the challenging contexts, donors in the health sector in DRC have managed to achieve some relative successes in coordinating their approaches?

First, a number of institutional factors can account for the general functioning of the GIBS. The permanent secretariat of the GIBS plays a very important role, as it is considered to be the institutional memory of the GIBS. The regularity of the meetings, the active role of the chair and the division of thematic sub-groups that correspond with the technical committees within the CNP have also been quoted as facilitating factors for donor coordination. Furthermore, there is a broad membership, including donors such as the Global Fund, GAVI, KOICA (South-Korea) and the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, who are not always involved in health donor groups in other countries.

Second, this provides an enabling context for committed *individuals* towards coordination. For example, the former representatives of the EU Delegation, the Belgian Delegation, and the World Bank played an important role in the first years of the GIBS. They were sometimes referred to as “the 3 musketeers”. Also, the person who has been the permanent secretary of the GIBS in the past ten years has been lauded by many interviewees for her competence to “coordinate the coordinators”. GIBS participants are a mix of practitioners and diplomats, but also the latter often
have a good knowledge of health issues (e.g. because they had a medical training or were previously practitioners).

Third, *interests* of donors can explain the progress made in the cases of *per diems* and *primes*. Donors have a clear budgetary interest in coordination on these issues as it concerns payments that are made by them and there is direct competition with donors who would be paying more.

Fourth, a certain degree of *like-mindedness* between the European partners – and certainly between the EU and Belgium can help to move certain things forward on the medicines case. This case has been characterized by strong ideological divergences on whether medicines should be procured and distributed through state structures or parallel systems. Through sustained and continued efforts by European (in particular EU) and other donors in the GIBS, these divergences have been overcome.

Fifth, the ability to somehow *align with the government* has been seen as a major contributor for the relative success of the medicines and *contrat unique* cases. As stated above, the GIBS has in these cases managed to (somehow) involve the partner government and provide (indirect) alignment.

These factors have enabled a relatively successful coordination. Although this chapter did not put the focus specifically on the role of the EU in donor coordination, the cases show that European donors have played a particular role in enabling the relative success of the GIBS, especially through their commitment to align as much as possible with national policies, the contributions of certain dedicated individuals and a certain level of like-mindedness, especially between the EU and Belgium. The relevance of like-mindedness has already been indicated by Elgström and Delputte in relation to the “Nordic” group of European development donors (Elgström and Delputte 2016). On the other hand, it shows that extensive EU internal coordination is not a prerequisite for relatively successful donor wide coordination in a specific sector. Interestingly, the EU has played a facilitating role without playing the first fiddle in internal or external donor coordination. All this suggests that EU-wide coordination efforts such as Joint Programming are not necessarily the best way forward for European development cooperation and that flexible coordination formats may be more fruitful (Orbie et al 2018).
The big challenge will be the implementation. Currently, the GIBS also started a debate on the financing methods in the sector, on which there are – again – many different views among donors. This case and others will show whether the GIBS will continue to be relatively successful in reaching coordination agreements among donors, despite the differences in visions among donors and the extremely fragile context with a very difficult relationship with the government, and whether the EU will continue to play a facilitating role in this regard.

References


External perceptions
II Communicating the EU externally: media framing of the EU’s irregular migration crisis (case-studies of New Zealand and Canada)

Natalia Chaban, Serena Kelly and Antoine Rayroux

The European Union (EU) faces an international environment which is increasingly characterised by change, challenges and contestations. These challenges, and their intensity, invite an innovative analysis of the EU’s external relations. Addressing an overlooked “outside in” approach in EU foreign policy scholarship, this chapter examines external recognition and reception of the EU’s leadership in one critical case-study – irregular migration. Our study contributes to a growing area in EU foreign policy studies of EU external perceptions (for reviews, see Chaban and Holland 2014, 2015; Elgström and Chaban 2015). Factoring global uncertainty and changes (short-term impacts) vis-à-vis long-term influences of historical and cultural filters affecting both the EU and its external partners, this chapter investigates if and how EU external images were affected by the 2015 migration crisis. The chapter aims to develop a better understanding of the role of current news in mediating information about the EU in third countries. Research into EU external perceptions has stressed the relevance of studies of EU narratives and images communicated outside of the EU’s control by popular influential media beyond EU borders (e.g. Chaban and Elgström 2014, 2018; Chaban, Elgström and Gulyaeva 2017). In contrast to previous studies, this analysis explicitly focuses on the link between
media framing of the EU and location-specific historical-cultural filters, operationalised in our case as the choice of news sources in a particular location when reporting the EU. It argues that the colonial legacy of two members of the British Commonwealth – Canada and New Zealand – as well as current country-specific media business realities act as filters that shape those countries’ choices of news sources when reporting the EU, and thus the framing of the EU’s reactions to the migration crisis.

Although the EU rates as an important trading partner for both Canada (second) and New Zealand (third and rising), the study aims to understand whether Canada’s and New Zealand’s traditional relationships with Britain influences how the EU is portrayed in their news media discourses. Apart from their common Anglo heritage, both Canada and New Zealand share a number of similarities. They are strong agriculture countries; New Zealand felt “abandoned” by Britain when it joined the EEC, while Canada struggled with agricultural and fisheries issues with the EC and then EU on several occasions. Both have “big brothers” – the US and Australia – as influential neighbours and have retained on-going links to the UK. Not lastly, they share connections to the British media (including news agencies, individual outlets and newsmakers).

Although New Zealand has traditionally been considered a bastion of British culture at the edge of the world, its relations with integrating Europe became particularly strained following British accession to the EEC in 1973, ending free trade with Britain. Nevertheless, political links have strengthened particularly since 1999. In 2018 New Zealand is expected to begin negotiations on an FTA. This new development will undoubtedly have a huge impact on how the EU is portrayed in New Zealand. Important for our case-study of the migration crisis is the EU’s self-vision of a normative actor (if not world leader), as New Zealand shares many of these values, important as the EU’s ineffective dealings with the crisis invited international criticism, specifically in the area of human rights. However, New Zealand also sees itself as normative beacon in the world (not lastly in the areas of human rights, solidarity, good governance, rule of law).

The EU ranks second as a trade partner for Canada globally, although far behind the United States. Until the 1970s and the election of the Liberal government of Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Canada’s relationship with the
EU was mostly one of indifference. The slow foreign-policy shift was not directly a result of the UK becoming a member of the European Community, but mostly, the economic need to diversify from the “special relationship”. Since then, the EU and Canada have signed numerous agreements, which culminated in the negotiation and signing of a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement in 2014 – ratification is pending – as well as a Strategic Partnership Agreement covering non-trade-related issues. That being said, the Canada-EU relationship has always taken place in the shadow of the US for both parties (Potter 1999). In the 1990s, both Canada and the EU shared a common worldview as normative powers in the areas of climate change, human rights and multilateral governance. This common normative agenda had weakened in the context of Canada’s foreign policy shift under a conservative majority from 2004 to 2015, but it has been revived since the election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberals.

There are two hypotheses guiding this analysis. The first hypothesis is that the “British” historical legacy in both countries suggests a significant reliance on British news sources, typically known for their Euro-sceptic message. Thus, our first expectation is that this reliance may lead to a more Euro-sceptic framing of the EU and its reactions to the migration crisis in the local media. Yet, media links to UK sources are fading in both Canada and New Zealand due to a number of factors including aggressive bottom-line policies, affecting how media organisations acquire news (including pushing outlets to purchase international news from leading Western news agencies, rather than posting their own special correspondents abroad). With US news agencies leading in international news production sold globally, our second hypothesis is that the tendency to use more US sources to report the EU in the two countries creates a more Euro-distant (US-focused) framing of the EU. Importantly, the choice of British and/or US news sources is also conditioned by linguistic similarities (English) and political affinities (Canada and New Zealand are Western liberal democracies as are the UK and the US) – long-term factors. Our findings are significant for EU public diplomacy as images of European integration presented through a Euro-sceptic (UK) or Euro-distant (US) media lense will serve as “road maps” and “focal points” for local readers (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, cited in Chaban and Elgström 2014).
Theoretically, our analysis is informed by the cascading activation framing theory, which outlines how ideas about foreign policy actors and international relations are spread and activated within a given society (Entman 2003). The theory is increasingly popular in studies of EU perceptions (e.g. Chaban and Elgström 2014; Chaban et al. 2017). According to this theory, news media is a mechanism that spreads ideas on foreign policy and actors, typically originating from the national administration and elites – the typical readers of national prestigious press – “down the cascade” to the general public. News media then serve as the mechanism that “pumps up” feedback from the public to the decision-makers. This widely recognised model has overlooked the importance of sources (local vs. international) in its theorisation – this is where our chapter will contribute, and from a comparative perspective. Empirically, this chapter will employ data from the daily content analyses of four leading newspapers in the two countries – The New Zealand Herald and The Press in New Zealand (NZ) and The Globe and Mail and National Post in Canada. The news outlets were observed in 2015, when international media reported the beginning of the irregular migration crisis and the EU’s reaction to it.

Theoretical reflections

The media, and news media in particular, are seen as playing a vital role in communicating and framing foreign policy events and actors. Fahmy (2005: 396) argued “…as most people know little about the complexity of world events, … it becomes, therefore, imperative to assess news frames, particularly in issues related to international reporting”. Yet, there is little research to understand how the origin of news sources influences the framing of the EU as a foreign policy and external action actor and how these frames may influence opinions voters come to hold about their nation’s conduct in the international arena, and specifically its relations with the EU (one exception is work by Chaban, Beltyukova and Kenix 2016). Our analysis addresses this gap – it seeks to understand whether the nature of news sources acts as a filter to shape how third countries (New Zealand and Canada in our case) communicate the EU in influential news media.
Both Canada and New Zealand, by virtue of their economy, have the financial means to maintain their own newsgathering systems. Yet, the two cases differ slightly. The New Zealand press has traditionally relied on British news sources to report international news and increasingly US sources. The Canadian press has always been more influenced by US sources, while relying on British ones too. Decisions about what news sources are used to report international actors – which are rendered according to cultural but mostly financial logics – will inevitably influence the framing of actors and events. This chapter follows a popular definition of framing by Entman: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993: 52). Effective political communication “requires the framing of events, issues, and actors in ways that promote perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other” (Entman 2003: 417). We predict that Euro-sceptic positions often observed in the UK media – and specifically in context of the Brexit referendum – may resonate within New Zealand and Canadian societies (both once upon a time have been on the receiving end of the EU’s protectionist trading and agricultural policies). We also predict that the Euro-distant positions characteristic of the US coverage of the EU also match the political and economic aspirations of NZ and Canada who are increasingly re-orienting themselves in the geo-political terms in the so-called “Asia-Pacific Century”. Finally, we are interested in comparing between EU frames created by foreign news sources vis-à-vis local sources reporting the same events (in our case, the EU migration crisis). If found, the difference may inform EU public diplomacy which views local news makers as one of the key targets of the EU’s diplomatic outreach towards third countries.

Method

Media monitoring of the influential national dailies (all with established online presence, Table 1) has been conducted by pre-trained local researchers between 1 April-30 June 2015 using Press Reader e-search engine to
ensure a high accuracy in data collection. The period of observation was conditioned by the time span of two different research projects on EU external perceptions: both were run at the same time with identical methodology, but supported by different funding schemes.¹

_The Globe and Mail (GM)_ and _National Post (NP)_ are the only two country wide Canadian dailies. _GM_ has been the number one reference for business, government and intellectual elites for many years, as well as the daily with the bigger reputation (its predecessor _The Globe_ existed from the mid-19th century).² Its political orientation tends to be labelled “red tory”, i.e. between liberal and conservative.

In the Canadian press, generally the liberal individualist ideology prevails (Vipond 2011), meaning some newspapers have a clear political orientation, e.g. _NP_ being a conservative one, but others such as _GM_ are more balanced and independent in their views. The sample selection is somewhat biased towards right wing opinions. However, there is no ma-

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¹ In Canada, research took place within the framework of an international research project “Analysis of EU Perception of the EU and EU’s Policy of the EU” supported by the European Commission, European Foreign Policy Instruments Service, European External Action Service (EEAS). In NZ, it took place within the framework of the research project, “European Union Outreach and Dialogue with New Zealand” supported by the NZ EU Centres Network.

The general freedom of opinion of Canadian dailies is also explained by the fact that all major newspapers are owned by the private sector, with little government control and oversight.3 The two selected newspapers belong to private Canadian media conglomerates, following a trend towards media concentration that began in the 1990s (Soderlund and Hildebrandt 2005). GM is owned by the Woodbridge Company (the main shareholder in the media firm Thomson Reuters) and by Bell Canada, a telecommunications and media company (including Internet, cell phone, cable TV and TV channels, etc.). NP belongs to the Postmedia Network, a Canadian media and publishing company that owns almost all major regional dailies country wide.

The selection criteria for the New Zealand newspapers were based on location and readership. Newspaper ownership in New Zealand is extremely centralised, with few independent newspapers existing. The Press is, since 2003, owned by an Australian company, Fairfax. Other high profile newspapers owned by Fairfax New Zealand include The Dominion Post and The Waikato Times. The New Zealand Herald is owned by NZME (after a merger with APN News and Media and The Radio Network in 2014), which also owns publications such as The Herald on Sunday and Bay of Plenty Times. Because of the concentrated newspaper ownership in New Zealand, there is less competition for readers in the regions.

Published in New Zealand’s biggest city, Auckland, The New Zealand Herald is New Zealand’s highest circulated newspaper with readership reaching into the northern part of the North Island, including King Country. Traditionally viewed as politically aligned with the centre-right, since its acquisition by APN it has taken a more centralist position. The Press is the largest circulating newspaper in the South Island. Like The New Zealand Herald, The Press aims to be non-partisan. Our findings on its use of international sources will also offer some insight into both papers’ political views. Media companies in New Zealand have needed to adjust to decreasing readership and increasing financial pressures. “For example, Fairfax partnered with Sky TV, The Huffington Post and The New York Times;

3 Ibid.
and APN with News Corp and The Washington Post in content delivery” (Auckland University of Technology 2016). In other words, the use of international sources may be due to financial and partnership choices rather than political leanings.

Daily coverage of the EU was monitored with the key search terms (including acronyms): “European Union”, “European Commission”, “European Parliament”, “European Court of Justice”, “European Central Bank”, “European Presidency”, “Council of the European Union”, “Eurozone”. Only articles that referenced the key search terms and dealt with the topic of the migration crisis entered the final dataset for our analysis: 31 news texts in NZ (15 in The New Zealand Herald and 16 in The Press), and 42 news texts in Canada (22 in The Globe and Mail and 20 in National Post).

Categories of content analysis

Respectively, this chapter examines media content with the goal of identifying EU frames that may be described as more “capable” than others – i.e. visible, locally resonant and emotionally loaded (Entman 2003; Chaban et al. 2017). Our analysis also asks which EU framings were “weaker” – i.e. of peripheral visibility, not locally grounded and not emotionally charged. Finally, we identify “latent” frames – facets of the EU invisible in media coverage of the migration crisis, since invisibility of certain issues also conveys a message about the EU’s status as an international actor. We correlate this analysis with the nature of the news sources: local vs. international, and between different international sources.

Following the content analysis method detailed by Chaban et al. (2017), visibility was operationalised in tripartite terms – volume of coverage, degree of centrality, placement and presence of visual support. Volume was measured through the number of stories that contained the key search terms. To complement volume as a measure of visibility, we also employed a notion of degree of centrality. In this category, we assessed whether the EU was mentioned with a minor reference (only once and peripherally), a secondary one (the coverage of several actors in a news story is balanced, with neither dominating), or a major one (the actor was the lead, dominant
actor of the story). *Degree of centrality* is introduced to ensure a more nuanced assessment of actors’ media visibility. *Placement* – assessed in terms of premium vs. non-premium terms – allowed us to examine if stories on EU migration crisis were provided with a prominent positioning in the bulletins, suggesting a higher visibility for the readers. Presence of *visual support* (measured in the numbers of accompanying visual images – photographs, cartoons, maps, etc.) is argued to raise general visibility of the news articles referencing the EU and its institutions.

*Local resonance* was operationalised in terms of *sources, foci of domesticity* and *themes*. The *sources* (journalists, opinion-makers or news agencies) were assessed in terms of their origin – local vs. international sources. This category also accounted for non-attributed news items. The locally sourced news was hypothesised to possess a higher potential for being “understandable” for and strike local resonance with the domestic audiences, as they are often “anchored” in local contexts and feature familiar personalities. Linked to this idea is our next category – *the focus of domesticity*. In it, we identified the focus of the story according to a five-member framework: whether the news story about the EU was situated within domestic, regional, EU-specific, non-EU country or global contexts.

*Emotional charge* was categorised through the evaluation category. Our analysis firstly determined generic evaluations employing the following set of perspectives: *positive*, *neutral*, or *negative*. To confirm the generic assessment and to retrieve location-specific emotive images, we also assessed evaluations attached to metaphorical categorisations of the actors (defined within the tenets of the Conceptual Metaphor Approach (Lakoff and Johnston, 1980)). Analyses of news texts, and evaluations within them, was carried out by pre-trained researchers, who are educated native speakers able to differentiate subtle nuances in connotations. Textual and visual data were the focus of analysis in this project, and visual data was also analysed in terms of its sources and emotional charge.
Findings

Visibility

In the timeframe under consideration for New Zealand, there were a total of 31 articles identified which mentioned the beginning of the EU’s migration crisis (Figure 1) (16 per cent of the total number of articles reporting the EU in the two NZ newspapers in this time frame). In Canada, 42 articles were published over the three-month time period considered in the analysis (Figure 1) (11 per cent of the total number of EU-related articles).

It is logical to expect that the story of the EU’s migration crisis, broadcast around the world, is a story about Europe and hence perspectives originated from European countries affected by the crisis would be welcome – all of them provide news services in English. Yet, in New Zealand, European continental sources (with exception of the French AFP) were not consulted. “European” in our NZ case research equated to “British” – 15 out of the 24 internationally sourced news (or 70 per cent) came from the UK sources (Table 3), with the Telegraph group the most active contributor. The Telegraph group was also among the most preferred sources in Canada (one fifth of news of foreign origin were from this source), though exclusively in National Post. Presumably, this is a continuing prac-
tice connected with the fact that NP and the Telegraph group were both owned by the same conglomerate, Conrad Black’s Hollinger Inc. group, until 2004. The Telegraph group is known for its conservative political stance, close political links to the leadership of the Conservative party, a general right-wing stance and a noticeable Euro-sceptic position.⁴

In Canada, National Post is also known for being more clearly aligned with conservative positions than The Globe and Mail. Only one third of internationally sourced news in Canada (11 out of 35) was of British origin. Four news stories were of French origin (AFP and PlayBac Presse). The rest of the news was sourced from the US – 20 articles (55 per cent of the foreign news). These patterns in sourcing confirm our initial suggestion that the Canadian press relies more on US sources, with AP being a leading supplier of news about the EU’s migration crisis (almost half of all internationally written news). AP is also a visible contributor in the New Zealand case authoring almost one third of the NZ news stories originated from abroad (7 out of 24) (Table 2). The question that remains is whether this use of sources in some way impacts how the EU was reported on.

What is striking is a small and limited pool of the consulted foreign sources in the two cases. AP and the Telegraph Group were the two leaders in both cases. Notably, Reuters and AFP were also among the sources chosen in NZ and Canada, but much less preferred. The use of Reuters has diminished significantly over the past ten years. However, Reuters was the preferred source for images in New Zealand and was also an important one in Canada. Regarding the latter, the two selected newspapers vary considerably. In both, the articles and images on the migration crisis, Reuters was used exclusively by The Globe and Mail, and not at all by National Post – GM is owned by the Woodbridge Company, which is also Thomson Reuters’ main shareholder.

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⁴ Loughborough University conducted research on newspaper’s political alignment during Britain’s debate on EU membership. Although not as Eurosceptic as the British tabloids, their study found The Daily Telegraph to be more pro-leave than remain. See Centre for Research Communication and Culture, Loughborough University, accessed 1 July 2016, http:www.lboro.ac.uk/news-events/eu-referendum/.

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Table 2: Distribution of the sources by newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>NZ Herald</th>
<th>The Press</th>
<th>NZ total</th>
<th>National Post</th>
<th>The Globe and Mail</th>
<th>Canada total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph Group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PlayBac Presse</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwynne Dyer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total International</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The totals exceed the number of articles in Figure 1 because some articles (especially in the case of Canada) use both local and international sources, or two different international sources.

Local Resonance

Offsetting the dominance of the international sources in the coverage of the EU’s migration crisis is a dearth of local voices. The number of stories originating from local sources was minimal in the New Zealand case (only 1 article) and low in the Canadian case (21 per cent). When local writers choose to comment on international events and actors it demonstrates a perceived local relevance of this international actor/event to the readers – local writers tend to introduce “local hooks” that anchor foreign happenings in domestically relevant and meaningful discourses in order to make them feel more connected to local readers.

The single story generated from a local journalist in the New Zealand papers was printed in The Press in June (van Beynen, 2015). In it, columnist van Beynen quoted The Economist (British source) stating:

The EU has a plan to stop the people smuggling operations in Libya by destroying boats and other facilities. The Economist calls it a “risky effort to satisfy conflicting political imperatives: voters want to banish from their screens the disturbing images of drowned migrants washing up on beaches but without having to accept too many newcomers”.

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Van Beynen was also at pains to point out the geopolitical differences between New Zealand and other countries dealing with migration: “Our isolation allows us to take the high moral ground on lots of international issues” (van Beynen, 2015). He was sympathetic to the problems facing Europe.

In the Canadian case, there were a more significant number of articles written by local sources, mostly from *The Globe and Mail* (10 out of 13 in total), which puts traditionally a bigger emphasis on international news than *National Post*. *GM* is the only Canadian daily with a permanent correspondent for European affairs – based in Rome, not in London – noteworthy when it comes to covering the migration crisis. The European correspondent wrote four pieces on the topic over the three months covered in our analysis, some of which were long pieces with a lot of informative content on the unfolding of the crisis and Europe and Italy’s reactions to it, which were featured on the newspaper’s frontpage (Reguly 2015a,c).

As shown in Figure 3, unsurprisingly, the majority of articles about the EU’s migration crisis were geographically concerned with the EU and barely linked to domestic contexts. In Canada, there was one single article with an explicit “local hook”, which reported on the personal experience of a Canadian doctor who was operating on search-and-rescue missions during six months (Chowdhry 2015). The EU countries where most of EU action took place varied between Italy and Hungary (*The Press, The New Zealand Herald*) or Italy and other Mediterranean countries (*The Globe and Mail, National Post*). *GM* was the outlet that most portrayed the migration crisis as being an EU-wide issue. Notably, the UK, as a Member State, was not the most reported among the EU countries, despite the prevalence of UK sources in both NZ and Canada in terms of European sources. In New Zealand, the UK was only mentioned when its then home secretary, Theresa May, criticised the EU’s plan to more evenly distribute migrants amongst all Member States (*The Press* 2015). In Canada, although UK officials were quoted on several occasions (mostly former Prime Minister David Cameron, but also Theresa May), there was no correlation with the use of UK sources.

In New Zealand, articles which referenced the EU generally (with no specific Member State) showed a continent attempting to make a collective
decision on how to best deal with the crisis. There were 16 articles with a pure “EU” focus of domesticity (i.e. not concerned with any specific EU Member State).

Emotive charge

The use of emotion as a way of gaining a response from readers is increasingly acknowledged. As demonstrated in the overall evaluations of the EU in New Zealand, although this case study is considering a “crisis”, the overwhelming majority of articles framed the EU and its actors in a neutral manner (Figure 3). Of the three negative articles printed in *The New Zealand Herald*, two were from the somewhat Euro-sceptic Telegraph Group and the other from the British *Independent*. One article from *The Telegraph* was emotively titled “Call for action as details of tragedy emerge”. The article, describing a boat capsize in which 700 lives were lost, noted that the current EU rescue mission was failing the migrants and “Médecins Sans Frontières said it was taking matters into its own hands and launching its own ship” (Phillips et al. 2015).

*The Press* printed an equal number of both negative (from *The Independent* columnist, Gwynne Dyer, a Canadian based in London, who is often overtly Eurosceptic and *The Times*) and positive articles (from the Telegraph Group Ltd). *The Times* article interviewed Jean-Francois Dubost, from Amnesty International who “claimed the EU had turned its back on its responsibilities” (*The Press* 2015b). One of the positive articles from *The Telegraph* described the positive action the EU was taking to counter the flow of refugees (*The Press* 2015c). Dyer’s article openly criticised the EU’s methods to stop migrants drowning on their way to Europe, lambasting the EU’s Triton operation as “pathetic” (Dyer 2015). He also chose to quote a right-wing columnist from the British Euro-sceptic *Sun* newspaper, Katie Hopkins. The use of Hopkins is interesting as New Zealand tends to stay away from publishing material from British tabloids.

A positive story in this area of analysis was also from *The Telegraph*, reprinted in the Canadian *National Post*. Colin Freeman defended the EU from the United Nation’s scathing perception of its ability to deal with the crisis: “Seldom do they [the EU] denounce the traffickers with as much
enthusiasm as they denounce EU states for cutting back on search and rescue services, or for failing to have a more generous asylum and immigration policies” (Freeman 2015).

The case of Canada shows an interesting contradiction with the New Zealand one. Articles reporting on the EU during the period under study were mostly framed in a neutral manner (around two thirds of the total). However, in the case of the migration crisis, as featured in Figure 3, the proportion of articles framed as negative was much higher, with 35 per cent for *National Post* and almost 60 per cent for *The Globe and Mail*. The former only had two articles that framed the EU in a positive tone, and the latter had none.

The seven negative articles that appeared in the *National Post* were primarily from international sources, two of which by the Telegraph group. However, two other relied on AP reporting (US sources). Hence, it is difficult to draw a solid conclusion on the importance of sources here. In *NP*, the most negative article published on the crisis was written by the newspaper’s most well-known international affairs columnist, Matthew Fisher, who reported from Europe on several occasions (Fisher 2015). It was also one of the longest pieces published on the topic, appearing on page 1 of the World news section. In the article, Fisher criticized both the EU and Member States for betraying their supposedly liberal policies and for their
“niggardly response” to the crisis: “the political mood is so gloomy it is unlikely previously open-mined and openhearted Europe will reverse itself and welcome this exodus on its fair shore.”

The observation that it is local correspondents that frame the crisis most negatively in Canada was confirmed when looking at *The Globe and Mail’s* articles on the topic. Out of 13 articles framed as negative, seven were written by local sources. What characterised this local reporting was also the length of the articles and their placements. Reguly wrote two 1000-words long pieces at the early stages of the crisis, which appeared on the newspaper’s front page (Reguly 2015 a,b). Another piece was noteworthy: a 2400-word long essay published in the “Globe focus” section of the newspaper and written by Doug Saunders (Saunders 2015). In this article, the columnist went on to criticize the dysfunctionality of Europe’s migration policies implemented during the last decade, in what was probably the most well-informed article on the crisis overall.

The use of metaphors in the articles was another way to influence readers. Most of the metaphors tracked in both cases’ papers used negative imagery. Specifically, in both New Zealand and Canada, there was a proliferation of metaphors about floods and the ocean, referring to the migrants arriving by boat as a “relentless wave” (*The Press* 2015d), a “surge” (*The Press* 2015b,e), “unremitting waves” (*The Press* 2015f), a “torrent of
smugglers’ boats” (Yardley 2015), a “flood of migrants” (The Globe and Mail 2015) and the EU trying to “stem the tide of traffickers” (The Press 2015g).

In NZ, The Telegraph claimed: “…the waves of wretched people washing on to the shores of southern Europe cannot easily be calmed” (Philips et al. 2015). In Canada, a Globe and Mail columnist warned that “the flood of refugees could turn into a tidal wave” (Wente 2015). Reading such stories would no doubt cause alarm, especially for readers based in Europe. In New Zealand, all of these metaphors were written by British sources; in Canada, they were primarily found in US and local sources.

The other dominant set of metaphors in both cases was related to the EU being portrayed as going to battle. For example: “the fight against human trafficking” (The New Zealand Herald 2015a) and “Europe must mobilise” (The Press 2015h) in NZ; “Europe is fighting a losing battle to control immigration” (National Post 2015a) and “an operation to battle human traffickers” (National Post 2015b) in Canada. The crisis was also labelled as “threatening”. A Times article, published in The Press, said: “Europe is wrestling with how to help those who make it, arguing about quotas for EU countries and the financial burdens involved” (The Press 2015i).

Visual support is yet another powerful avenue to convey emotions and influence how readers frame an actor. In NZ newspapers, while The Telegraph dominated the number of news stories, Reuters was the most published supplier of images. The published New Zealand images carried a heavy negative connotation. For example, they often depicted African men staring desolately at the camera. The men often held their hands up around their face, showing despair (The Press 2015b). One such picture, published in The New Zealand Herald, showed desperate looking African men, this time standing in a line next to a fence, holding plastic bags (presumably their only belongings). One of the men was only wearing socks, no shoes (Philips et al. 2015). This same article criticised the EU through the use of a quote from the Maltese Prime Minister: “A time will come when Europe will be judged harshly for its inaction, as it was judged when it had turned a blind eye to genocide” (ibid.). Yet another showed distraught young African men leaning over the edge of a boat (The New Zealand Herald 2015b). A particularly emotional image showed a mural with crying eyes staring straight ahead, with a young African man sitting below it looking
in the same direction as the mural (*The Press* 2015j). The article, published by AP, was similarly emotive, with the title, “We found a floating cemetery” (ibid.)

In some pictures, migration was also depicted as an epidemic, invading Europe. For instance, there were pictures of Europeans wearing masks and covered in anti-bacterial uniforms. One particularly emotional photograph showed a rescue worker wearing such an outfit, completely covered, including a mask and gloves carrying a baby. The female worker is looking straight ahead with a look of determination in her eyes. Women wearing head scarfs are in the background (i.e. depicting Muslims) (*The Press* 2015h). In this instance the accompanying visual image was a “match” for the text of the article, which was calling for action from Europe.

With regards to the Canadian case, the first observation was that there were much more visual support in the case of the migration crisis than on EU reporting in general – reporting on the migration crisis, 38 per cent had some visual support (photos) vs. only 20 per cent in general. As already hinted from our discussions above, the topic of migration and refugees is one that is particularly prone to conveying emotional feelings through the use of visuals. There was an equal number of articles with visuals (eight) in each of the two newspapers. As in the case of news sources for the articles, the sources for visuals depend on newspaper ownership: seven photos came from Reuters, and they all appeared in *The Globe and Mail*. *National Post* did not use Reuters at all, and relied primarily on AFP/Getty images instead (which *GM* also did on two occasions). The AP was also used by both.

Only two of the 20 visuals could be characterized as neutral.5 Both came from the AP and illustrated articles coming from journalists writing for *The New York Times*, which tends to illustrate the more neutral/distant coverage of US sources. The first one featured the screenshot of a video from the Italian Coast Guard showing a team of rescuers in action from quite far away (Yardley 2015a); the second one pictured a large group of migrant men aboard a rescue boat, wearing life jackets (Kanter 2015).  

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5 On three occasions, there were more than one photo to illustrate the article.
The content of visuals was very similar to those encountered in the New Zealand press, sometimes with the same photos being used. The most typical and frequent set of images would picture male migrants, either individually or in groups, looking exhausted, sad, absent and/or worried. For example, one article was illustrated by a photo of half a dozen Black African migrants looking concerned at what might be security forces waiting for them to disembark from a rescue boat (Fischer 2015). Another photo portrayed a young male being attributed a specific ID number by an Italian police officer whose hand only is visible on the photo (Yardley 2015b). The man is supposedly a smuggler, and the symbol is obviously to treat him as a convict. This reinforces the content of the article which dealt with how Europe’s lack of financial commitment had caused a blow to the Italian operation Mare Nostrum and its mandate to arrest migrant traffickers.

Another trend also seen in the New Zealand press was the use of pictures that evoked a health crisis akin to an epidemic, with Europeans wearing uniforms and masks while waiting for large groups of migrants to disembark (Saunders 2015). Also, the very emotional photo of a Greek man rescuing a migrant woman on the island of Rhodes, which also appeared in New Zealand, was featured on front page of National Post and inside a Globe and Mail article (National Post 2015c; Reguly 2015b). More dramatic pictures by the same AFP photographer, and probably from the same event, were published in another article on the same day in NP (Freeman 2015b). Also on that same day, GM published a series of photos that combined several of the main elements identified here. First, a photo that showed a dead migrant carried by security forces wearing anti-bacterial uniforms, which reinforced the idea of an emergency situation. Secondly, one where a masked rescue worker took care of a baby under the worried look of several veiled women. And thirdly, a non-sourced photo that represented a screenshot of a radar or camera filming a refugee boat from distance, which was very reminding of the metaphors of war highlighted above (Reguly 2015b).
Discussion

A first observation drawn from this study is that, for better or worse, the migration crisis put the EU under the spotlight of the Canadian and New Zealand media. According to the number of articles, their placement in the print media, and their visibility, there has been a certain surge of interest for the EU. These peaks of media attention contribute to diffusing a different image of the EU than the ones we traditionally have seen in Canadian and New Zealand press. In the past, such frames were very much focused on the role of the EU as a powerful trade actor and a regulator.

We observed in all four newspapers how the migration crisis was depicted as a pan-EU crisis. It was striking how the initial phase of the crisis was portrayed with relatively little attention given to individual EU Member States, with the notable exception of Italy (and a few others), as well as individual Member State officials. Instead, there were a lot of articles where “the EU” and “Europe” would be used indifferently, including in titles, which reinforces the idea that the migration crisis is one that questions the nature and existence of the EU as a whole (Europe vs. “the rest”; issues of borders, identity, culture, security, etc.).

Consequently, articles that reported on the EU migration crisis had very little “local hooks”, thus making it harder to appeal to local readers (although Canada had more than New Zealand, possibly because of its reporters being based in Europe). Again, this is quite different than the usual reporting on EU news related to trade, agriculture, competition policy or the state of the EU economy, where the media tries to build connexions with local realities.

We hypothesised that sources make a difference to framing, and we tested this on the coverage of the EU’s migration crisis. Our first hypothesis was that the more print media rely on UK sources, the more Euro-sceptic their reporting of the EU would turn out to be. Our second hypothesis was that the more a print media would rely on US source, the more Euro-distant (US-focused) its reporting would be.

Our two hypotheses received partial support. Out of the two cases considered, the New Zealand press relied more on UK sources than the Canadian one did. Looking at the preferred news source in the two leading
New Zealand dailies, we found confirmation that news reporting relied especially on the Euro-sceptic Telegraph Group. EU reportage that originated from the Group was an important contributor to shaping New Zealand opinion on the distant drama. Significantly, news from this source tend to depict the EU in a more divided and negative way than news originating from the US’ Associated Press. The Canadian case confirmed this pattern. There were several instances where the use of US sources proved to be instrumental in framing the EU in a rather distant, US-focused, manner, vis-à-vis a more involved, and more Euro-sceptic, coverage coming from the UK sources (e.g. if we compare the use of The New York Times with the use of the Telegraph Group).

However, several caveats were found. First, there was relatively little use of UK sources in the Canadian case, which makes the comparison more difficult. Secondly, many Canadian articles rely on both US and UK sources at the same time, adding a further hindrance to making conclusions. Thirdly, when it comes to the use of visuals, it does not seem like there was much difference in tone, level of emotion or negativity between US (AP), UK (Reuters) or other (AFP/Getty) newswires. And fourthly, we should also remember that the use of sources differs from one newspaper to the other within the same country, because of variables such as ownership, financial and human resources available, etc.

More importantly, and this is where our hypotheses might appear as being discarded at first glance, if we acknowledge that the New Zealand press is more British than the Canadian one, the reporting on the migration crisis should logically be more negative. However, this is not the case. In this regard, our empirical analysis points to a different factor observed in the Canadian case – a much bigger reliance on local sources (correspondents) in Canada. It is this reporting by local journalists based in Europe (or posted there during the crisis) that ends up being the most negative in portraying the EU challenged by the crisis. Specifically, The Globe and Mail, which has more human resources to report on international affairs, was the most negative in our study.

One provisional explanation is that typically most articles that rely on international sources (especially newswires such as Reuters or the AP) are usually shorter pieces that are purely informative. In contrast, articles writ-
ten by local correspondents tend be longer and more emotionally charged, as they also frequently feature individual stories too. Editorial comments also turned out to be more prone to expressing negative feelings about the crisis and how the EU is handling it. This finding is important for EU public diplomacy. With newsmakers (journalists and editors) among the key public diplomacy targets, EU dialogue with opinion-makers who regularly comment on the EU, may consider new formats and exchanges to address a negative trend. In addition, this study identifies another area of potential concern for the EU’s global communication efforts – the continuing reliance of many third countries on the Anglo-Saxon news sources (UK and US) in the coverage of the EU post-Brexit and during the Trump administration. The long-term connexions and news sourcing practices imbedded and institutionalised within media systems and supported by cultural and historical links are very difficult to change.

To conclude, our analysis indeed suggests that the choice of UK vs. US sources does influence the reporting on EU news, but our hypotheses need stronger (larger-N) empirical support. Further research should strive to compare international media coverage of the EU in a global context – e.g. other Commonwealth countries – to allow more decisive conclusions about the trends observed here. Future studies may also expand the empirical analysis to assess the media coverage of other crises such as Brexit and the Greek debt crisis. Not only would that increase the sample available for the analysis, but it might also open up to other news sources (newswires or correspondents) and topics that might strengthen some of our observations. Finally, keeping in mind that news is not only a product, but a process (as discussed above), future analysis may include a large-scale survey of journalists from different media systems to assess decision-making process behind the choice of news sources when reporting the EU. Understanding the dynamic of news sources used to communicate the EU to local audience may provide additional insights into short- and long-term changes in EU media imagery and framing by internal opinion-making discourses.
References


“Free Trade needs a champion”: the EU as seen in US media discourse during the TTIP negotiations

Maximilian Conrad

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze images of the European Union (EU)1 as they have been constructed in the online editions of US daily newspapers in the context of the negotiations on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). One of the research interests in Ole Elgström’s more recent work on the EU has been to explore external perceptions of the EU, most importantly in the context of questions about the leadership role that the EU tends to claim to play, for instance in international trade and environmental negotiations (e.g. Elgström 2007; Elgström 2014; Kilian and Elgström 2010; Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013).

One key insight of this research has been that leadership in international politics is only to a limited extent a matter of self-perception, that is, of the ambition on the part of a state or organization such as the EU to act as a leader. Due to the relational nature of the concept of leadership, leaders evidently also need to be perceived as such by prospective followers. Because of this relational aspect, furthermore, the perception of an actor’s

1 The “European Union” is this context includes the EU as such, the European Commission as the institution negotiating on behalf of the EU, member state governments and civil society groups campaigning against TTIP. While this is obviously a very broad definition of the EU, this choice was made purely based on the observation that the material included in the empirical analysis does not always distinguish clearly between these four categories of actors.
leadership role is intimately connected to (normative) issues of legitimacy and credibility. Regarding the EU’s role, the latter is often questioned by reference to the heavily protectionist approach that the EU takes on agricultural trade, not least with developing countries (Elgström 2007).

Two of the most important and controversial international trade projects that the EU has been involved in in recent years are the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States (e.g. Bauer 2016; Keith 2017). Key points around which campaigners against the two projects have mobilized opposition include the lack of transparency in the negotiation process (e.g. Gheyle and De Ville 2017) and the perceived risks and threats that the proposed agreements are viewed to represent with regard to issues of democracy/popular sovereignty, rule of law and European standards on environmental and consumer protection (Peterson 2016; Aggarwal and Evenett 2017). Considerable academic attention has by now been devoted to public contention over these two projects, most of all in contexts of citizen participation in EU decision making, in particular as regards the role and relevance of democratic innovations such as the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) (Bouza and Oleart 2017; see also the contributions in Conrad et al. 2016). In this context, perceptions of the EU Commission as the institution responsible for negotiating the two agreements on behalf of the EU have played an important role in framing the twin issues of TTIP/CETA; similarly, social media framing by the transnational Stop TTIP campaign has heavily emphasized the role of the US government in undermining European environmental and consumer protection standards, claiming that the negotiation process suggests that TTIP and CETA promote the interests of corporations while undermining the significance of citizens and democratic institutions (Bauer 2016).

By comparison, hardly any attention has so far been paid to the discursive construction of images of the EU in the US public sphere in the context of the negotiations, neither in terms of the role played by the European Commission nor in terms of the public claims-making by European civil society. This chapter aims to fill this gap by presenting the findings of a qualitative content analysis of the images of the EU (and of

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: following this introduction, the second section discusses the relevance of studying external perceptions of the European Union; the third section then introduces the question of why the TTIP project has been received as controversially as it has in the EU (whereas it was considered much less contentious in the US) and emphasizes the role of civil society groups in framing the issues at stake and mobilizing opposition against the project. Here, emphasis is placed on the role played by the novel participatory instrument of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) and the rejection of the Stop TTIP initiative as a formal ECI by the European Commission. The fourth section then presents the findings of the qualitative content analysis, before the chapter ends with a concluding discussion.

**The relevance of studying external perceptions of the EU**

External perceptions of the EU have been a central theme in Ole Elgström’s more recent work on the role of the EU in international negotiations, in particular in the areas of trade (e.g. Elgström 2007) and climate/environmental negotiations (Elgström 2014; Kilian and Elgström 2010; Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013). The relevance of external perceptions is closely connected not only to understanding what kind of actor the EU is on the international stage in the first place. By now, this discussion has a fairly long tradition in EU studies, in which the notion of the EU as a “normative power” figures prominently. In this perspective, the EU’s international role is shaped not by “what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners 2000: 252). In this context, the question of the self-perceptions and ambitions that the EU has in terms of a global leadership role in various policy areas is important, for instance regarding the question of how to deal with global climate change at the international level. This also resonates well with some of the conventional wisdoms of the small states
literature in International Relations. Here, the argument goes that small states’ power potential in international politics does not reside in aspects measurable in terms of traditional indicators such as population size, territorial size or military expenditure, but instead depends crucially on “perceptual size”, that is: the self-perception of the role that a state wants to play and the issues that it wants to promote, but also the extent to which other states perceive the small state in question to have the potential to play such a leadership role (cf. Thorhallsson 2006). Although the EU is neither small nor a state, the notion of perceptual size is clearly relevant, especially in the context of debates about the ways in which the EU’s external role is characterized by a “capability-expectations gap” (Hill 1993): The EU should be able to play a much more prominent (and assertive) role on the global stage due to its economic weight, but has not been able to live up to such expectations so far. Arguably, this aspect is of particular importance in the field international trade negotiations. Since the EU (or rather: the European Commission) negotiates international trade agreements on behalf of the member states, expectations that the EU uses its weight to promote European standards are particularly high. This is also clearly reflected in the TTIP negotiations, as the empirical analysis will demonstrate below.

Against this backdrop, the question of external perceptions of the EU is primarily relevant because of the relational nature of the concept of leadership. Leadership necessitates more than that an actor (in this case the EU) proclaims to play a leadership role (Elgström and Chaban 2015); in addition, this leadership role also has to be convincing to other actors, i.e. leaders need to be accepted as such by other actors (who thereby become followers) (e.g. Elgström 2007). In more recent work, the relevance of external perceptions in the context of the EU’s leadership role is explored in relation to normative concepts such as legitimacy, credibility and coherence (Elgström 2015; Elgström and Chaban 2015). In order for an actor such as the EU to be perceived (and followed) as a global leader in any given policy area, it is necessary that the actions proposed by the EU are perceived by other actors as normatively justified (and thus legitimate), but also that such proposals are viewed as credible and coherent, i.e. that the EU not only acts out of more than mere self-interest and instrumental
considerations, but also that its actions – beyond its words – are perceived as aimed at achieving goals collectively at the international level (cf. Elgström 2015). Particularly in the latter context, Elgström’s empirical analyses – based on interview data collected in various institutional settings – have generated a fairly ambiguous and/or ambivalent image: although the EU is indeed seen as an extremely important actor due to its economic weight, its protectionist track record in the field of agricultural trade (and opening access to European markets for agricultural products from developing countries) has led to external perceptions of the EU as a powerful, but not entirely credible and coherent actor.

External images of the EU can also be argued to be highly important when it comes to exploring the development of the negotiations about transatlantic free-trade deals such as the CETA (with Canada) and TTIP (with the US). Also in this context, questions of legitimacy, credibility and coherence play key roles, especially in light of the sudden politicization and contestation over the perceived risks associated with the project. In particular in European contexts (and especially in Germany and Austria), the Commission’s credibility as a promoter of transparency, democratic standards and environmental/consumer protection have been questioned by anti-TTIP campaigners (e.g. Bauer 2016). Although the two projects have been highly controversial in Europe (and much more so than in Canada or the US), both are at times framed not only as a significant economic opportunity, but more importantly as a chance to promote European (or at least Western) standards and values in an increasingly globalizing economy. The question is however whether the EU is indeed perceived as an actor committed to upholding such principles – and whether there is a transatlantic community of values in such areas to begin with. In addition, the question of legitimacy (and indeed democratic legitimation via parliamentary assemblies at the national and subnational levels in the EU) has made the successful conclusion of such projects increasingly problematic.
The controversy surrounding the TTIP negotiations

It is certainly justified to speak of the TTIP/CETA projects as two of the most controversial projects in the recent history of European integration.\(^2\) In Europe, TTIP and CETA have resulted in the creation of a transnational network of more than 500 civil-society organizations (including public service unions and political parties) campaigning and mobilizing against the agreement.\(^3\) The transnational *Stop TTIP* campaign even applied for registration as a formal European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) to urge the European Commission to abandon the negotiations with the US\(^4\), but was refused registration as an official ECI on formal grounds by the European Commission (e.g. Organ 2017), i.e. the institution responsible for checking the legal admissibility of new initiatives. Despite the Commission’s formal rejection of the Stop TTIP initiative, the campaign nonetheless proceeded with its signature collection – partly for symbolic reasons, but also in order to “quantify” the amount of public opposition to the TTIP project, as one key organizer of the initiative put it. In the end, the campaign collected well over three million (albeit unverified) signatures EU-wide.

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\(^2\) One can certainly question the plausibility of construing and discussing TTIP and CETA as two sides of the same coin. The main reason why this is done in this chapter is that the two agreements have been framed in precisely these terms by the transnational Stop TTIP/CETA campaign. The frames constructed by this campaign have furthermore resonated remarkably well in European debates about TTIP and CETA, where the latter has frequently been portrayed as a “Trojan horse” for the former (e.g. Conrad and Oleart 2017).

\(^3\) The whole list of organizations that have been part of the Stop TTIP “alliance” (as of May 30, 2016) is available on the campaign’s website at https://stop-ttip.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ECI-Partner-List_16_05_30.pdf.

\(^4\) The ECI was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and has been in use since April 2012. As an instrument of transnational participatory democracy in the EU (Conrad 2011), it allows a minimum of one million EU citizens residing in at least seven different member states to “invite”, in the wording of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission to propose legislation on a issue identified by the organizers, provided that the initiative falls within the scope of the Commission’s legislative competence.
An earlier analysis of the frames employed in making sense of the implications of TTIP (and CETA, for that matter) indicated that there is at least a partial convergence of frames used by campaigners on social media sites such as Facebook and those advanced by journalists in the online editions of quality newspapers (Conrad and Oleart 2017). In a study of the debate on TTIP in four European countries (France, Germany, Spain and the UK), TTIP was framed both by campaigners and by newspapers alike primarily as a matter of risk, that is: the proposed agreement is perceived to undermine European standards, most importantly as regards environmental and consumer protection. Moreover, the proposed creation of private investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) courts has been construed as a threat to the rule of law and as a case of the interests of corporations (and investors) outweighing the interests of citizens. Connected to this, TTIP has also been constructed as a threat to the very notion of popular sovereignty. These aspects have played a prominent role both in social movement framing and in newspaper discourse about the proposed agreements. In journalistic discourse, there is some emphasis on the potential economic benefit of transatlantic trade, but this has by no means been as dominant a theme as the various examples of risk frames (ibid.).

By comparison to the American debate, the debate in Europe has clearly been much more confrontational and politicized. This does not mean that there has necessarily been any uniform understanding of the implications of TTIP/CETA across the EU’s Member States. In addition, the level of politicization of the debate was clearly higher in some Member States than in others, with Germany often mentioned – even in the American material analyzed below – as a country where the debate has been particularly confrontational (e.g. Finkbeiner et al. 2016; Chan and Crawford 2017). The level of contestation about TTIP in Europe has been due in large part to the campaigning efforts of the many organizations involved in the transnational Stop TTIP alliance, which was successful – to borrow Habermasian language – in identifying, staging and amplifying conten-
tious aspects of the two proposed agreements and thereby generating significant communicative power in the European public sphere.

A number of aspects are worth mentioning in this context. On the one hand, Stop TTIP campaigners had long criticized the lack of transparency in the negotiation process. Even members of national parliaments in the EU Member States were only allowed to inspect the negotiation documents under very strict conditions, so that the public was largely in the dark about the demands raised (at least by the US) in the negotiations. This however changed to a significant extent when Greenpeace leaked negotiation documents in May 2016, confirming many of the concerns expressed already before by the Stop TTIP/CETA campaigners about US demands as well as a lack of concessions offered by the US to EU negotiators.

The level of public contestation about TTIP/CETA in Europe is also underlined by numerous demonstrations and “days of action against TTIP”, whether at the global, European or national levels. Hundreds of protests and demonstrations took place during a global day of action in October 2014, followed by a European day of action in April 2015 (Pitlik 2016). As part of the latter, a demonstration in Berlin prompted the participation of 250,000 people, which is said to have been the biggest demonstration in Germany in over ten years (Finkbeiner et al. 2016). In September 2016, seven demonstrations held simultaneously in seven major German cities attracted as many as 320,000 participants. The clearest expression of European opposition to TTIP/CETA was however arguably the over three million signatures collected as part of the (informal and self-proclaimed) European citizens’ initiative; these signatures were symbolically and publicly handed over to the European Commission in Brussels in October 2015 and to Martin Schulz (then President of the European Parliament) in Berlin in November 2015.

In sum, this underlines not only the level of contestation about the TTIP/CETA projects, but also already gives some indication as to the specific areas of the two agreements that are perceived by Europeans as particularly controversial. But what kinds of images of the EU and Europeans does this translate into in US media discourses on TTIP/CETA?
Images of the EU in US newspapers

The articles included in the sample stem from four different newspapers, namely The New York Times, The Boston Globe, The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune, and cover the period between 2014 and 2016. Obviously, the analyzed newspapers have different political orientations and consequently also different perspectives on free trade in general and TTIP in particular. Needless to say, a somewhat diverse image of the EU therefore emerges from the analyzed material. Nonetheless, certain patterns are discernible regarding the perception of the EU in the context of the TTIP negotiations. Before delving into the analysis, however, two points need to be raised.

For one, the debate on TTIP has by no means been as contentious in the US as it has been in the EU, largely due to the absence of a US-equivalent to the European Stop TTIP campaign. Despite the fact that European negotiators clearly also had demands that were perceived as highly controversial by their American counterparts (e.g. regarding European access to public procurement in the US), these were not framed as a fundamental threat to American standards. Consequently, there is much less newspaper coverage of the TTIP negotiations in the US than in European states.

The second point to be made is that the material analyzed here does not always distinguish clearly between the EU as such, the European Commission as the institution negotiating on behalf of the EU, Member State governments and civil society groups campaigning against TTIP. In fact, the EU’s negotiating position – and indeed the position of key governments such as Germany’s and France’s – is often explained by reference to the tide of skepticism towards controversial parts of the agreement that has swept across Europe due to the campaigning efforts of European civil society organizations. The emerging image of the EU is therefore one that tends to conflate the positions of EU institutions, Member State governments and civil society, but nonetheless centers on a few themes that create an overarching image of Europeans as increasingly skeptical towards an agreement that appears to stand in contrast to much more than the “protectionist sacred cows” underpinning European agricultural policy, which The Washington Post identifies as one important reason for European opposition to TTIP (The Washington Post 2014-07-08).
Anti-Americanism, protectionism, populism

One of these themes in the analyzed material is that the strikingly high level – from an American perspective – of public contestation about TTIP in Europe boils down at least in part to “anti-Americanism”, “protectionism” and/or “populism”. “European opponents to the deals,” The Washington Post writes, “are tapping into anti-Americanism, arguing that the new arrangements will amount to a U.S.-dominated trading system that will weaken Europe’s consumer standards” (The Washington Post 2016-09-22; italics added). The causal connection between anti-American attitudes and the rejection of TTIP is also confirmed in a recent study which shows effect of political elites’ framing TTIP as a basic conflict between American and European values (Jedinger and Schoen 2017). Along similar lines, the Chicago Tribune writes about attempts by European TTIP opponents to “scare people into settling for the status quo”, mentioning different “myths (that are) being perpetuated about free trade with the U.S.”, including that “national health care will be privatized, crops genetically modified, livestock pumped full of hormones and workers stripped of their rights” (Chicago Tribune 2014-10-15). Even the New York Times, which is otherwise fairly sympathetic to concerns about the lack of transparency in the TTIP negotiations, describes the Stop TTIP initiative as “a populist campaign against the trade negotiations underway between the United States and the European Union” (The New York Times 2015-06-09; italics added).

Lack of transparency = lack of public support?

The lack of transparency in the negotiation process that the Greenpeace leaks drew attention to in May 2016 is however addressed in the American debate as a problem, mainly because this lack is seen as a cause of the lack of public support that European leaders have to deal with in order to bring the agreement to a successful conclusion. The New York Times writes of “lessons to be learned for the future”, arguing that “the secretive nature of free-trade talks fuels citizen fears that powerful corporations are plotting behind closed doors against their interests”. Indirectly, the newspaper thereby also blames the US government for the lack of public support for
TTIP, arguing that the US government should have published all its negotiating documents online precisely as the European Commission did (The New York Times 2016-05-02)

This lack of transparency is then also connected to the image that Europeans are concerned about the potential undermining of European standards as a consequence of the TTIP agreement. Most importantly, Europeans are portrayed as skeptical about TTIP’s implications in the fields of environmental and consumer protection, which clearly mirrors the frames employed at the European level by the Stop TTIP campaign. In the context of the Greenpeace leaks in May 2016, The New York Times explains that “TTIP is a hard sell in Europe. Many Europeans fear it will allow powerful corporations to force governments to weaken European food standards, environmental regulations and social welfare programs” (The New York Times 2016-05-02). Consequently, despite what appear to be clear economic advantages (from the perspective of many American commentators), the main problem for the EU is the apparent failure of European leaders – whether at the national or supranational level – to drum up public support for TTIP. Chicago Tribune is particularly emphatic in highlighting the economic benefit (and indeed the economic need) for TTIP from the European perspective, describing the EU as “desperate for good-paying jobs”. The newspaper further claims that due to slow growth and “crushing” youth unemployment, “a deal with the world’s No. 1 economic engine as a means to boost their domestic business climate and create jobs” is virtually indispensable (Chicago Tribune 2014-10-15). Similarly, The Washington Post states that “European and U.S. advocates have been surprised by the increasingly hostile reception (that) is jeopardizing the chances of a deal that proponents say could create millions of new jobs by dramatically boosting U.S.-E.U. trade” (The Washington Post 2014-12-04).

American versus European food standards

While the theme of food safety and consumer protection is highly salient for the European Stop TTIP campaign, it is taken up in the American debate at least in part as a way of portraying Europeans as (unnecessarily) picky about American standards. In Europe, this threat to European stand-
ards is symbolized by allegorical references to the “chlorine chicken” that would not be palatable to European consumers. In *The Washington Post*, this is best exemplified by a French cattle farmer who claims the following:

> “Hormone-boosted beef. Chlorine-washed chicken. Genetically altered vegetables. This is what they want for us (...) In France, food is about pleasure, about taste. But in the United States, they put anything in their mouths. No, this must be stopped” (*The Washington Post* 2014-12-04).

The newspaper highlights the importance of food safety and indeed food culture from the European perspective, noting – not without irony – that allowing for the import of “artificially treated U.S. foods (...) could water down French cuisine even more, leading to *pool-scented chicken chunks* served with *flavorless sides of bionic broccoli* (*The Washington Post* 2014-12-04; italics added).

*The New York Times* picks up this theme as well, yet in a considerably more nuanced and analytical fashion, but also suggesting that European concerns about American beef may indeed be exaggerated: While many Americans share Europeans’ “objections to food containing genetically modified crops”, the newspaper points out that the EU has already “banned beef from cattle that have been fed certain kinds of hormones, despite findings by the World Trade Organization that such beef is safe” (*The New York Times* 2015-06-25).

**Conclusions**

One overarching conclusion of this research is that EU negotiators as well as European governments are struggling with a strikingly skeptical public opinion at home. In the US, there is no counterpart to the European Stop TTIP campaign, and the level of public contestation about the project puzzles US observers – all the more so as at least certain commentators point to the instrumental interest that the EU should have in a successful conclusion of the TTIP agreement, most of all because it promises a significant and much-needed boost to the European economy. Against this backdrop, Europeans are perceived in the analyzed material as – possibly
unnecessarily – difficult negotiation partners as far as their reservations about environmental and consumer protection standards are concerned. In particular, the preoccupation of European campaigners with American beef and poultry seems puzzling to American commentators, all the more so because of the agricultural protectionism that one observer believes may very well be what is at the bottom of European reluctance to open markets to American food imports. At least at the discursive level, this finding links back to the point made at the beginning of the chapter on the intimate relationship between the self-perception of leadership and the external perception of the credibility and coherence of self-proclaimed leaders: leaders can only be perceived as such if their actions and proposals are also perceived by prospective followers as credible and coherent with their actions in the past. Here, there is a parallel between the reception of the EU negotiating position (and indeed European attitudes to food safety) and the EU’s role in international trade negotiations: the importance of the EU as an economic actor, but its capacity for a leadership role is undermined by its own protectionism in the field of agricultural trade.

However, much more has obviously been at stake in the debate on the by now abandoned TTIP negotiations. Apart from the distaste for “chlorine chicken” and “hormone-infused beef”, European public opinion has apparently been much more concerned about non-state ISDS courts and their potentially detrimental effects on environmentally ambitious legislators in the EU and its Member States. This could have resulted in serious consequences regarding the concept of popular sovereignty both at the national and at the supranational level. It is not without irony that one can note that the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States ultimately averted such a development. In the words of Chicago Tribune: Free trade needs a champion.
References


**Newspaper articles**


Concluding essay
What is the EU going to be? The issue is constantly debated, as new times provide new conditions for states as well as unions of different kinds (see e.g. Goldmann 2003; Bakardjieva, Michalski and Oxelheim 2017). In connection with the pre-negotiation of the Treaty of Nice in 2000, EU Heads of State and Government decided to set up a future convention to prepare the issue of how the EU should develop in the future. The Convention on the Future of the EU presented its report in 2003, which provided the ground for the Constitutional Treaty. However, as a result of its rejection in the subsequent French and Dutch referenda in 2005, it quickly became obsolete. Instead, in 2007, a treaty with almost the same contents, the Treaty of Lisbon, was signed in full, only without the risk of critical public opinion polling preventing the process. The questions at hand were what the Union’s structures would look like and how the relations and influence of the different Member States would be regulated for the forthcoming enlargement of the Union. The EU’s major Member States and the Commission argued that enlargement required a simplified decision-making process for the Union to function. The Treaty of Nice already meant an increase in supranationality and a reduction in the influence of the smaller Member States, in particular. The Lisbon Treaty strongly accentuated this. Was the EU becoming more federalistic, or did the Member States remain independent states? The Swedish Parliament emphasized that although decision-making powers were
transferred to the EU, cooperation did not change in character but remained “essentially intergovernmental” (my translation, the Riksdag, Minutes and Appendices, 2000/2001: KUU1; Prop. 2007/08: 168).

If the EU had been a static organization, with a general consensus among its members that the EU is good as it is and should not be changed, the question concerning its role in the future would not have to be posed. This is, however, not the case (cf. Persson, Oxelheim and Gustavsson 2009). There is no consensus at all and the EU is also a highly changing organization; in other words, future issues, especially regarding how the EU should evolve, is of constant relevance. Several important recent events have contributed to the actualization of the EU’s future role, such as the EMU-related crises in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland; the Putin regime’s clear demonstration of prioritizing military threats for cooperation with neighboring countries; immigration waves to Europe from the Middle East and Africa; the emergence of immigration- and EU-critical right-wing parties in many EU countries; the advent of several EU countries with governments that openly oppose certain rules of law; the British EU exit and the uncertainty about US positions under the Trump administration. The list could be made longer. After his accession to power in 2017, the French President Emmanuel Macron announced a series of proposals regarding EU integration. Some of them went beyond what the EU treaties allow and thus require new treaty decisions. The proposals are geared towards the fact that, under French-German leadership, the EU will further deepen its integration and without all Member States joining, which would entail the emergence of an EU working at different paces (Jokela 2013).

The European Union claims that its objective, under the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is to promote peace and offer freedom, security and justice, among other things. The organization’s goals are formulated in eight points. Seven of them are about values, but the eighth is of a different nature. Even though it is mentioned as a goal, it still appears to be a means of achieving another, not mentioned, goal. This eighth objective is to “establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro” (Goals and values of the EU).

It is well-known that the hopes for European cooperation have been interpreted very differently, ranging from the construction of a European
federal state, like the United States, into a loose cooperative organization with only intergovernmental decisions. The purpose of this text is to discuss the changing conditions of the EU integration process and the Union’s future development options. Will the Union continue to increasingly centralize decisions and thus become a federation or are there other possibilities?

Ideas about the EU integration process

The EU and its predecessors, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community, have existed since 1952. During this time the world has changed fundamentally. The Cold War and the polarized West-East conflict have declined after decades of terror balance through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries’ democratization. The decommissioning of the European empires in Asia and Africa, as well as the whole problem of North-South, the Middle East conflict, new industrialized countries and economic centers and, in general terms, globalization, are other important factors that undoubtedly have affected developments in the EU and its predecessors.

Both political scientists and historians have for decades formulated theories about Western European integration. Terms such as Federalism, Functionalism, Legal liberalism and Gaullism have been identified as indicators of different approaches to what the EU is and should be. Political scientist Sverker Gustavsson (1996) has formulated a summary structure of different views on European integration. Should supranationality be given its own power base so that citizens get the opportunity to claim political responsibility of the legislators at supranational level, for example, by the European Parliament having sole legislative powers? Should supranationality be taken one step further than today? These are some of the most important issues in this context. Combining them with the answers “yes” and “no”, four fields emerge, as shown in Figure 1.
Legal liberalism means that the market forces are allowed to get maximum impact. Supranationality will be limited to the safeguarding of market rules within the Union. To achieve this, a new constitutional treaty, i.e. supranationality, is needed to ensure a minimum of intervention from both the European and the national levels.

Federalism in this context advocates the introduction of a two-chamber system with a balance between the principles of “one state - one vote” and “one individual - one vote”. Supranationality would be used to pursue projects that are ideologically based to achieve, for example, full employment, regional balance and social citizenship.

Gaullism means a direction that safeguards the formal independence of Member States and accepts only minor transfers of power to the supranational level. Arguments about formal and real power are rejected. The starting point is that the power gathered at the supranational level is simultaneously lost at national level.

Functionalism, in this context, means that the function of the Union is determined, together with what is a practical decision-making process and, above all, what results are achieved. The EU is seen as a purely unique structure, which cannot be assessed on the basis of traditional democracy criteria. The fact that EU institutions can make decisions through supranational authority without having to answer for their exercise of power in general elections means that they can make decisions in the interest of all. The leaders of individual nations do not have to answer directly to their voters, since the decisions made are the results of secret compromises. This method has therefore helped to “save” rather than “undermine” the Member States’ real opportunities for national self-determination. It is assumed that Member States would not otherwise have been able to establish themselves after World War II as successful welfare states and democracies (Miliward 1992). The functionalists do not welcome democratization that would
enforce accountability upon a supranational European government. Functionalism is geared towards getting things done and success is dependent rather on the absence than the presence of a democratic order at the European level.

From the above it is apparent that what is an advantage for a consistent functionalist is a disadvantage for a federalist, namely that if the countries submit to the majority principle at the European level, supranationality arises. Functionalists do not want a federation, since, according to democratic thinking, it requires that the decision-makers can be replaced. Instead, the functionalists want to build on the already existing decision-making process through the greatest possible integration, i.e. maximum supranationality and reduced veto, but without democratization and parliamentarism.

However, for legal liberals and federalists, parliamentarism at the European level is what they strive towards, albeit for quite different reasons. Sverker Gustavsson, however, considers this to be completely unrealistic, as it requires a new constitutional start, that all Member States face a revolutionary situation at the same time and agree to a new joint constitution with this meaning. His conclusion is that increasing supranationality necessitates abstaining from democratic accountability at the national level. Conversely, maintaining democratic accountability implies giving up the pursuit of supranationality (Gustavsson 1996: 38).

Reflection on the ideas

A general objection to many categorizations of actors and ideas about European integration is that they are just becoming too general and insufficiently grounded in the differences that exist between the Member States. The fact that the participating countries have different historical legacies and possess varying degrees of historical awareness is rarely taken into consideration. According to Sverker Gustavsson’s reasoning, this is simply not the intention. His point is precisely, based on normatively established democratic assumptions, that special circumstances or highly valued purposes can never legitimize a consistent and fundamental departure from democratic decision-making principles (Gustavsson 1998: 92-99, see also 2014). The historical differences between the Member States reinforce Gus-
tavsson’s conclusion, as the existence of the democratic deficit is, to a certain extent, important for the political life of the Member States, partly due to differences in political culture and partly due to differences in size. A reflection that can be made is that representations of the various ideas of Legal liberalism, Federalism, Gaullism and Functionalism have a great inner span. They are all represented in the European Parliament and exist on the national level. What is described as “Gaullism” can be a kind of imperialist position, that includes representatives of a national big-brother perspective, but it may also apply to a small state’s striving to mark its independence. The basis for the national perspective varies greatly according to historical and geographical factors. Functionalists can encompass both those who, from the perspective of a larger country, think it is useful to have similar decisions implemented and those employed by the EU institutions. They can therefore have completely different motivations for their common position.

The theories are based on the fact that the western European countries have gradually increased their prosperity and that this has been done peacefully and for the benefit of all the parties involved. All Member States have had something to gain and more and more countries have become members. In the process, however, integration has increased, and therefore nobody knows how a further deepening, including economic policy, will precipitate. A supranational taxation over which the individual Member States have no influence may cause a series of deep conflicts of interest, which in principle can endanger the entire project’s existence. Federalists, however, hope that the EU will become a European equivalent to the United States. But the differences in relation to the United States are so great that this perspective does not seem realistic. It is rather a politically dogmatic mindset. The federalists’ unreserved support for the EMU project should be understood in this context.

The fact that Legal liberals, who wish for more supranationality in some limited areas, supported the emergence of EMU appears less logical. If these areas are limited to ensuring the free market and making political supervision of the economy (including a common tax policy) impossible, it would be logical. However, if, through EMU, in the long term, a supranational economic order is achieved, then EMU will be highly counter-
productive to them. The Gaullists, ultimately, should of course have dis-
tanced themselves from EMU according to the description of their posi-
tions given above but the paradox is that EMU may more or less be con-
sidered enforced for Gaullist reasons. The context is explained below.
EMU can in the long run lead to a centralization that fits very well into
the traditional national policy, but only for some Member States. It could
even be argued that it is especially one member, France, that managed to
execute the project.

EU as the new arena of France

Was the EU originally formed to create peace and prosperity? Perhaps
partly, but a strong contributing factor was undoubtedly the Cold War and
the need to mobilize the Western European countries against the Soviet
threat as a part of the Western containment policy. The European Coal
and Steel Community’s supranational decision-making system was deemed
rational by some countries and aimed at breaking down the distrust from
the war. There were good reasons for all involved to accept this order, as it
was a way of strengthening the economy through cooperation. In addition,
for West Germany and Italy, this was a means of gaining acceptance from
former enemies, as pointed out by numerous researchers (see for example
Milward 1992; af Malmborg and Stråth 2002), in other words a kind of
adaptation by and strengthening of the national state in the current situ-
ation. However, one part is usually ignored in this context: France.

Ever since the creation of the French Empire, there have been repeated
ambitions to extend its borders to the north and east. Louis XIV and Na-
opoleon are the clearest exponents of this policy. The French great power
ambitions provided the country with a giant empire. The loss against Prus-
sia in 1871 was therefore a shock. The hard peace conditions imposed on
Germany after World War I were largely a result of the French desire to
put Germany in place. We know the result of this all too well. Hitler’s
revenge war with the rapid German conquest of France in the spring of
1940, the years of occupation and the Vichy regime punctured the French
self-esteem. The Fourth Republic of France tried to regain its self-esteem
and international status by restoring its empire. This failed in Indochina,
and the African colonies were released when the struggle for Algeria also enforced a French retreat. De Gaulle’s accession to power and the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958 marked a revival of strong French central power. The arena in which French honour and international influence was to be restored became western Europe. As a leading country in the European Economic Community (EEC), France regained an influence that could compensate for the loss of the empire and which concerned the geographical area it traditionally sought to dominate and exercise power over (Larsson 2004).

The French Gaullist dominance over the EEC meant that Britain was twice denied membership. Not until the resignation of de Gaulle was Britain granted entry into the community. Meanwhile, the so-called German wonder took place, signified by West Germany’s remarkable economic growth combined with political democracy and stability. An important reason for the growth of the West German economy was the D-Mark and the Bundesbank, with its low inflation priority. West Germany always maintained a low international profile and developed into becoming the most important net contributor within the customs union. By virtue of its strong economy, West Germany could increase its real influence within the EEC/European Communities (EC). At the same time, the French need for maintained cooperation between the countries increased. Japan’s corresponding economic growth and ascent as an economic superpower changed the conditions for the EC. “Europe” would have to compete with the Americans, Japanese and Russians, economically and partly politically, in order to play a greater role in international contexts. Work on the alignment of the EC economic acquis was initiated in the mid 1980s, while the changes in the Soviet Union were becoming apparent. The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany changed the conditions for the EC. The answer was the Maastricht Treaty with its strengthened emphasis on integration, especially the emergence of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Why was the decision to introduce EMU made? Most researchers point out that there were such thoughts already as early as in the 1950s. However, that is not the reason why the idea was actualized 30 years later (Ljungberg 2004). The cause that became decisive was to be found in the
new situation that occurred with the end of the Cold War, not the resolution of the Soviet Union but the reunification of Germany. Through this, Germany became considerably more populous than France, and could thus refer to the EC’s rules dictating that population determines degree of influence. The democratization of eastern Europe and the possibility of several of its countries becoming new EU members would definitely change the balance of power within the organization to France’s disadvantage. Germany was larger, had a stronger economy and could count on greater economic and political benefits from its eastern neighbors joining the EU than France could reasonably do. For the French president François Mitterrand, who was a nominal socialist but, in fact, the trustee of the traditional national interests of the French national state, the situation became acute in 1990 when the Soviet Union accepted Germany’s reunification. EMU became a way for the French to take part in German economic power. For the German chancellor Helmut Kohl, EMU became a way of getting the rest of the EC to accept German reunification and thus a bigger and stronger Germany in the center of Europe. It was thus the national interests and reciprocal dependence of the dominant EC countries that led to EMU, not a belief that the economy would be improved by it. In this solution, the Bundesbank, which resisted for as long as possible, was forced to obey, but the German condition was that the new central bank would be politically independent and prioritize a low interest rate. The European Central Bank (ECB) also got its location in Germany.

The compromises are largely found in the Maastricht Treaty, but many practical problems remained when the EC became the EU. EMU convergence rules were put in place, but the political dimension of the project was very strong and the terms of participation were not maintained. In order to praise the political project, all candidate countries except Greece were approved, even though only the smallest country, Luxembourg, clearly met the requirements. The forthcoming eastern enlargement meant that there were shared opinions about how the EU’s money should be used. The net receiving countries, especially the Mediterranean countries and Ireland, were concerned that poorer countries would become members and receive subsidies. The net contributors, especially Germany and Sweden, were not interested in paying more. At the same time no one wanted
to lose influence. The compromise was the Treaty of Nice. A few years after the introduction of the single currency, some effects could be identified: Mediterranean countries initially got a somewhat more disciplined budget and lower inflation, but the requirements for strict budgetary discipline were not taken seriously. They were seen by many southern European politicians as being too rigid, even absurd. The result, some years later, was to become the EMU crisis.

There is reason to question the designation of Gaullists for those who question increased supranationality and guard the right of the national state to decide over its own affairs. By way of its pragmatism – partly through a socialist President and partly through increased supranationality – French Gaullism succeeded in maintaining a disproportionate French influence over the EU. If summoning the situation, after the Nice and Lisbon treaties were adopted, France is actually to be found the biggest winner. After the implementation of the Treaty of Nice, the weighted influence of Member States on the basis of population was largely the same, although Germany was considerably larger than Italy, France and the United Kingdom, respectively. The original structure of a very French-style administration remained, as well as French as one of the EU’s administrative languages, despite the fact that the Union had a wide margin of more German-speaking inhabitants. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which in plain economic order comprises 40 per cent of the common resources, still largely maintains the position of French agriculture. Last but not least: no significant decisions can be taken against France’s will. At the European Council in Greece in 2003, France stopped all hesitation about the change of the CAP and has also stopped all attempts to end the European Parliament’s relegation to Strasbourg. In short, the EU and its predecessors are primarily of French design. This, in addition to official declarations, has the very favored purpose of widening or at least maintaining French influence in the world, especially in Europe. As a consequence, the EMU decision was made in 1992-93 and the difficulty of breaking up compromises means that it is still maintained 25 years later, although economic and political conditions have changed significantly.
From harmonization to causing conflicts

The rapid enlargement of the EU after the end of the Cold War can be attributed to several changed conditions in the European context. For most countries in eastern Europe, the possibility of integration with western Europe was attractive for at least three reasons: a longing for political freedom that had been denied the citizens for so long; a desire to take part in the economic development and prosperity that characterized western Europe and an urge to receive guarantees of military protection against possible future Russian threats (af Malmborg 1995). Since most EU countries were also NATO members, the pursuit of Western accession and integration was given. In some of the eastern European countries there were objections to the supranationality of the EU, as they just shook off an unwelcome foreign influence, but for most, such as the Baltic countries, the prospect of rapid western integration overruled all possible objections. Among EU southern members, countries that were economic net recipients, there was resistance to letting poorer countries into the EU. The Lisbon Treaty, including EMU and Schengen, was the response to objections and the reason why supranationality increased. As early as in 1999, Schengen cooperation with the abolition of internal border controls had become part of the Union treaties. In recent decades, the most important integration projects may have been EMU and Schengen. Behind them were a number of reasons, but particularly the fact that these projects would help tie the EU more closely together, possibly to form a federation. In fact, it is precisely these projects that, more than anything else, have caused distrust within the Union with the EMU crisis and the disagreement concerning refugee reception as their main expressions.

The creation of the EU can be seen as a result of the beginning of the Cold War and the emergence of EMU as a result of the end of the Cold War. The EU has changed, as the world and Europe have changed. For its members, the organization has become an arena for negotiation among actors unequal in prominence (Elgström and Jönsson 2000, 2005). The emergence of EMU meant that a higher degree of centralism and supranationality was established. The outcomes of such changes are completely different in terms of influence. If all members renounce the same type of
decision-making, it means, in practice, that the small ones lose and the bigger win. Denmark, Sweden and other small Member States cannot on their own realistically count on anything else than submission to the decisions taken by larger countries. For the larger countries supranationality appears to be less dramatic because they can regain and even expand their power through their influence over the common decision-making process.

The EU has also repeatedly violated its own rules when referendums have led to unwanted results for the central decision makers. Had all the rules been the same for all EU Member States, the Maastricht Treaty would not have been approved, since Denmark voted no. The same is true of the Treaty of Nice, to which Ireland voted no. The handling of the so-called constitution rejected in French and Dutch referenda, but then implemented under the name of the Treaty of Lisbon, constitutes another flagrant violation of the acquis. The EU is a political project in which the decision-making process is based on the fact that larger countries have a greater influence than smaller ones and the treaties are interpreted accordingly. By acting this way, the EU itself has caused widespread skepticism towards the validity of its basic treaties with all that this implies for domestic mistrust against the EU establishment and, for example, the Putin regime’s ability to split the Member States.

In 2015, the so-called Visegrád countries, i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, announced a strong opposition to a system whereby the EU would fix quotas for Member States’ refugee reception. The disagreement about immigration was not new (Hansen 2008; Hansen and Hager 2012). Later on it became an open conflict between the Visegrád countries and the EU institutions and most other members. In the Visegrád countries there are also strong political forces that believe that the political majority is entitled to restrict both the freedom of the media and the independence of the courts. Since 2015, there has been a conflict between the government parties in Hungary and Poland vis-à-vis the central EU bodies and the majority of the Member States.

The British decision to leave the EU may be considered the biggest contradiction of the Union. Although there are a variety of causes for the referendum in 2016, the most important reason might have been that a majority of the British perceived the EU central institutions’ control as too
far-reaching. Indeed, the British had already refrained from participating in both Schengen and EMU, but the criticism against the EU’s ongoing centralization of decisions eventually led to the ruling. How the EU manages the emerging situation can be the decisive for the EU’s future development. What route should be chosen?

**Alternative routes for the EU**

Should the EU continue to increasingly centralize its decisions and thus become a federation or are there alternative options? Increasing supranationality has repeatedly been motivated by the fact that the EU is a peace project, why it is often argued that peace is strengthened if the decision-making becomes more centralized. War has certainly not broken out between Member States and they have all been transformed into social welfare democracies since the early 1950s, albeit with significant national features. Does this mean that the EU has succeeded in securing peace in Europe? The Commission itself claims that “the most striking success of European construction is that it has created an area of peace and prosperity” (The Inter-Governmental Conference, IGC, 1996: Commission Opinion, p. 23). This statement is common in the research community too, but it is impossible to lead in evidence since it is incorrect. The Nordic countries that do not constitute a union are an example of the opposite, namely that supranationality is not needed at all to create peace and prosperity. However, democracy seems to be a prerequisite. The EU, on the other hand, has created a functioning common market, which also maintains the conditions of free competition, something that is not as clear today in the United States.

The ambition to change the EU into a federation lurks below the surface and is sometimes very visible within the Commission, the European Parliament and some national political parties. The French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal from 2017 is indeed aimed at increased supranationality but not directly towards federalism. The French position has never been that supranationality should limit French national independence, rather the opposite. For this reason, the French position can be seen as a combination of Functionalism and Gaullism. In order for France to
benefit, the French can live with certain decisions becoming supranational, but through cooperation with Germany they hope to maintain the same influence as before.

For Germany, the problem is reversed. The German Social Democrats want to increase federalism within the EU and see the German constitution as a good norm for how influence is to be balanced. The Christian Democrats have, since the elections in 2017, been forced to re-prioritize in order to maintain power. This means restrictions on immigration, since Germany’s new problem is that the open borders undermined the popular support for the policy pursued. Immigration has changed Germany’s political map, but the same also goes for other countries. The Visegrád countries, which so far have experienced insignificant immigration, protest that the EU decides against their will. Macron believes that they should adapt or else not receive any contributions from the EU, which risks widening the gap. The German attitude is ambivalent but can be categorized as almost federalistic, according to the ideas of the German constitution.

The Legal liberal attitude seems to have lost its significance, but the three other options remain: Federalism, Functionalism and Gaullism. The latter term also appears to lack actuality, unlike its fundamental idea, i.e. to create cooperation between the European countries without federalism. Functionalism, finally, is integrated in both the other ideas, as a pragmatic form of decision-making through compromises.

The enlarged Union is facing two options: to tie itself to an ever-closer and centralized structure, where the periphery has less influence and the conflicts of interests become deeper, or to develop a pluralistic and decentralized structure that enables different Member States to cooperate on different issues and in different ways. A free market continually needs to be monitored so that large companies cannot override market rules. In a globalized era, this is one of the most important reasons for the EU. A future scenario for the EU could be to guarantee Member States’ democratic decision-making power over themselves and enable those who wish to deepen integration in certain areas to do so. However, this cannot be based on Emmanuel Macron’s proposal for an EU at different paces, as it is based on preserving a disproportionate French influence. On the other hand, a pluralistic variant, which allows for the return of power to the
Member States, could be a viable way. If this already would have happened it is unlikely that Britain would have decided to leave the union. For example, those who wish could continue to run the EMU project while others may refrain. Countries with common cultural ties and geographical proximity to each other could form specific areas of cooperation. Such regions could be the Nordic countries, the Balkans, Central Europe, etc., depending on the desired area of collaboration. A pluralistic, decentralized and regionalized EU could then be an important instrument for integrating other European countries, in particular Ukraine and the Western Balkans, in a trustworthy and non-aligned cooperation. In the long run, it could also open up to Belarus, Russia and Turkey, if and when these countries embark on a clear process towards becoming democracies and civil rights states governed by law. An EU approaching the future with that kind of ambition will always be able to adapt to changing circumstances and could develop into a truly pan-European peace project.

References
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Notes on contributors

**Lisbeth Aggestam** is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Research Fellow at the Centre for European Research (CER-GU), University of Gothenburg. She works in the field of comparative foreign policy and writes on role theory, political leadership and the European Union as a global actor.

**Anders Ahnlid** is at present Sweden’s Ambassador in Finland. He served as Permanent Representative of Sweden to the European Union in Brussels 2013-2016. Ahnlid has also held positions as Ambassador to the OECD and UNESCO in Paris 2011-2013 and Director General for Trade in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm 2005-2011. He has spent most of his career in various trade policy functions.

**Rikard Bengtsson** is Associate Professor of Political Science at Lund University. His main research interests include global order, global political economy, European security and EU external relations.

**Natalia Chaban** is Professor and Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies and Deputy Director of the National Center for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. She has published on image and political communication studies within international relations contexts involving the EU in numerous journals and books.

**Maximilian Conrad** is Professor and Head of the Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland. His main research interests include European integration and political theory, in particular issues connected to democracy, communication, civil society and the public sphere. Recent
and ongoing research includes work on the European Citizens’ Initiative, images of refugees in mass media discourse as well as on Eurosceptic mobilization after the global financial crisis.

**Lars Danielsson** is Ambassador and serves since 2016 as Permanent Representative of Sweden to the European Union. He has previously inter alia served as Ambassador in Seoul (2011-2015) and Berlin (2015-2016) and as State Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, Stockholm (1999-2006).

**Sarah Delputte** is a Postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for EU Studies, and a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science at Ghent University, Belgium. Her primary research focus is on the EU’s development policy and EU-ACP cooperation.

**Björn Fägersten** is Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Europe Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. He conducts research on European integration, security policy, intelligence, international institutions and political risk.

**Markus Johansson** is a Postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for European Research (CERGU) and the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. His primary research interest is cooperation and negotiations in the EU Council of Ministers, but he has also done work on the issue of leadership in EU foreign policy.

**Christer Jönsson** is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Lund University and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Diplomacy, international organization, negotiation and transnational relations are among his research interests. He has published several books and a large number of articles in leading academic journals.

**Knud Erik Jørgensen** is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Aarhus University. He is co-editor of *Global Affairs* and three book series with Palgrave Macmillan. He has published extensively on EU in international relations, European foreign policy, and international relations theory.
Serena Kelly is a Lecturer with the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), based at University of Canterbury, New Zealand and also Chair of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Christchurch branch. Her research interests include European diplomacy, international political communication, public opinion and the EU as an international actor.

Hans Albin Larsson is Professor of History and Educational Science at Jönköping University. His main research efforts and publications are within the areas of Swedish and European modern history, history of education and history didactics.

Sonia Lucarelli is Associate Professor of International Relations and Pan-European Security at the University of Bologna, Italy and Resident Member of the Institute for Advanced Studies of the University of Bologna. Her research areas of interest include; EU foreign policy and external image; European security; identity and foreign policy; and migration and global justice.

Jan Orbie is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for EU Studies at Ghent University, Belgium. His main research interests concern the EU’s external relations and its normative dimensions, with a specific focus on European external trade, development, democracy promotion, human rights and humanitarian aid policies.

Anders Persson is a Postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for European Politics at University of Copenhagen/Lund University, where he is conducting a research project funded by the Swedish Research Council on the EU’s normative power in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He has published three books and several articles in peer-reviewed journals about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Malena Rosén Sundström is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Lund University. Her research interests include political parties, EU studies, negotiations and Sweden’s feminist foreign policy.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Antoine Rayroux is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. His research deals with comparative foreign and security policies of European states, multilateral peacekeeping policies and transatlantic diplomatic practices.

Michael Smith is Professor in European Politics at the University of Warwick and Emeritus Professor of European Politics at Loughborough University. His research interests lie in EU external action, EU negotiation and diplomacy, EU-US relations and EU-Asia relations.

Lies Steurs is a PhD fellow at the Centre for EU Studies at Ghent University, Belgium. Her main research focus concerns EU development policy in the health sector. For her PhD project in particular, she has concentrated on European aid and health system strengthening in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Joren Verschaeve is a Post-doctoral researcher at the Centre for EU Studies, and a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science at Ghent University, Belgium. His primary research focus is on the EU’s international relations, focusing in particular on development policy and the relationship between the EU and international organizations.
### Lund Political Studies


