Johannes Lindvall

Johannes Lindvall

Professor

Johannes Lindvall

Crises, investments, and political institutions

Author

  • Per F. Andersson
  • Johannes Lindvall

Summary, in English

On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future policy choices. Second, it shows that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more effective government than power-concentration institutions, in contrast to much of the normative literature in comparative politics, in which power-sharing institutions are often justified on other grounds, such as representativeness, responsiveness, or social cohesion. In a world where crises dominate, power-concentration institutions typically perform better; in a world where investment problems dominate, power-sharing institutions typically perform better.

Avdelning/ar

  • Statsvetenskapliga institutionen

Publiceringsår

2018-08-01

Language

Engelska

Sidor

410-430

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volym

30

Issue

4

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

SAGE Publications

Ämne

  • Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)

Nyckelord

  • Commitment
  • constitutions
  • crises
  • investments

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0951-6298