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Hanna_foto

Hanna Bäck

Professor

Hanna_foto

Solving the Decider’s Dilemma: Scapegoats, Foreign Affairs, and the Duration of Interstate War

Författare

  • Alejandro Quiroz Flores
  • Hanna Bäck
  • Alexander von Hagen-Jamar
  • Jan Teorell

Summary, in English

The prospects of domestic punishment might compel leaders responsible for the initiation of the war to continue fighting until they achieve favorable war outcomes (Croco 2011, 2015). As applied to war duration, this logic implies that ‘culpable’ leaders do not have incentives to end a war that will bring defeat. This paper argues that leaders can escape this dilemma by blaming and replacing their cabinet ministers for poor war results. Under a framework of war as a bargaining process, and using a database of the tenure of thousands of ministers of foreign affairs, this paper shows that the replacement of these cabinet ministers reduces the duration of interstate wars that end in defeat. These findings suggest that leaders do not necessarily need to continue fighting wars in order to avoid domestic punishment.

Avdelning/ar

  • Statsvetenskapliga institutionen

Publiceringsår

2017-12

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

1-26

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

STANCE Working Papers Series

Volym

2017

Issue

11

Dokumenttyp

Working paper

Ämne

  • Political Science

Nyckelord

  • Ministers of foreign affaires
  • interstate war
  • Cabinet ministers
  • war duration

Status

Published

Projekt

  • State-Making and the Origins of Global Order in the Long Nineteenth Century and Beyond