This article explores how democracies that do not ban parties defend themselves. Rather than being too passive and therefore more vulnerable as is often assumed, these non-militant, 'tolerant' democracies often resort to the use of criminal law to punish political violence.
This ‘procedural’ type of democratic defence is illustrated through the Greek state’s response to the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn and especially the 2015-2020 trial of its party members. It concludes that charging the party not as an anti-democratic actor but as a criminal organization put an end to its harmful activities, while preserving a commitment to political pluralism. This key advantage is moderated by certain risks that arise when defending democracy through regular law.
Learn more about the article on Cambridge University Press’ website
A second article, co-authored with Peter Stone (Trinity College Dublin) is titled "Allotted Chambers as Defenders of Democracy" (journal Constellations).
This paper identifies a problem—the problem of which actors should serve as defenders of democracy—and proposes a solution to that problem—the creation of randomly selected citizen bodies, or allotted chambers.
Existing institutions are often decried as either too legalistic (courts) or too partisan (parliaments). By contrast, randomly-selected assemblies enjoy democratic legitimation, while ensuring impartiality. The paper concludes by imagining three different roles—weak, moderate and strong—that allotted chambers can play in the process of democratic self-defence.
Learn more about the article on Wiley Online Library’s website