The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Using criminal law and sortition against antidemocratic parties

Anthoula Malkopoulou has authored two articles. The first article is titled "Greece: A Procedural Defence of Democracy against the Golden Dawn" and is published in the journal European Constitutional Law Review.

This article explores how democracies that do not ban parties defend themselves. Rather than being too passive and therefore more vulnerable as is often assumed, these non-militant, 'tolerant' democracies often resort to the use of criminal law to punish political violence.

This ‘procedural’ type of democratic defence is illustrated through the Greek state’s response to the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn and especially the 2015-2020 trial of its party members. It concludes that charging the party not as an anti-democratic actor but as a criminal organization put an end to its harmful activities, while preserving a commitment to political pluralism. This key advantage is moderated by certain risks that arise when defending democracy through regular law.

Learn more about the article on Cambridge University Press’ website

A second article, co-authored with Peter Stone (Trinity College Dublin) is titled "Allotted Chambers as Defenders of Democracy" (journal Constellations).

This paper identifies a problem—the problem of which actors should serve as defenders of democracy—and proposes a solution to that problem—the creation of randomly selected citizen bodies, or allotted chambers. 

Existing institutions are often decried as either too legalistic (courts) or too partisan (parliaments). By contrast, randomly-selected assemblies enjoy democratic legitimation, while ensuring impartiality. The paper concludes by imagining three different roles—weak, moderate and strong—that allotted chambers can play in the process of democratic self-defence.

Learn more about the article on Wiley Online Library’s website

Anthoula Malkopoulou’s personal page