

DILEMMAS OF WAR-TO-DEMOCRACY TRANSITIONS¹

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Paper prepared for presentation at the conference State, Conflict and Democracy, 12-13 May 2006 at
Lund University.

Abstract

The combination of a legacy of war, democratization and peace-building, makes war-to-democracy transitions difficult. This paper develops and explores four types of dilemmas that arise when democracy and peace clash, namely the horizontal dilemma (i.e., inclusion versus exclusion), the vertical dilemma (i.e., legitimacy versus efficacy), the systemic dilemma (i.e., local versus international ownership of the processes) and the temporal dilemma (i.e., long-term versus short-term efforts). The failure to deal with such dilemmas can undermine both long-term democratization and peace. A broad conclusion is that when the choice is between securing the peace and promoting democracy, peace should be given priority.

¹ This paper outlines the conceptual framework for the forthcoming volume *War-to-Democracy Transitions: Dilemmas of Democratization and Peace-building in War-Torn Societies* (eds. Anna Jarstad & Timothy D. Sisk). The book also includes thematic chapters by Anna Jarstad, Timothy D. Sisk (Denver University, USA) along with Assistant Prof. Roberto Belloni (Queens University, Northern Ireland), Associate Prof. Page Fortna (Columbia University, USA), Senior Lecturer Benjamin Reilly (Australian National University), Dr. Kristine Höglund, PhD candidate Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, and Prof. Peter Wallensteen (Uppsala University). The contributions of all participants in this project are acknowledged and greatly appreciated. In addition to the participants of this project, I would also like to thank Mats Hammarström, Thomas Ohlson and Cecilia Albin for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

Introduction

During the preparations for the January 2006 elections in Palestine, there were hopes that these elections would not only result in a democratic government, but also move the stalled peace process between Israel and Palestine forward. When Hamas surprisingly gained over 70 percent of the seats, hopes for peace were derailed. The election result was seen as an obstacle to democratization. Hamas, often denounced as a terrorist organization, had now gained democratic legitimacy. Supporters of the defeated Fatah party did not easily accept the loss. In the aftermath of the elections, the Fatah-associated Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigades initiated the violent protests against the caricatures of Mohammed published by a Danish newspaper. Thus, the effort to promote democratization in Palestine triggered events that may have long-lasting negative effects on democratization as well as peace-building.

As this case demonstrates, war-torn societies entering the path towards democracy and peace face the challenge that efforts to achieve one of these desirable goals can have negative effects on the other. This paper puts forward the concept of war-to-democracy transitions to capture the dynamic between the two interacting processes of democratization and peace-building. The focus is on the dilemmas that arise when the two processes have adverse effects on each other. A dilemma is a trade-off situation, where usually the choice is between two bad things. However, here the dilemmas regard two goals widely held to be mutually reinforcing, namely democracy and peace. Such dilemmas for post-war transitions occur when actions taken in the name of democratization have negative effects on the peace process. Dilemmas are also activated when actions taken in the name of peace have negative effects on democratization. In addition, the dilemmas are often interacting: there is seldom one dilemma at a time, and one dilemma may make another dilemma even more critical. Such dilemmas pose severe challenges for both local and international actors engaged in peace-building and democratization.

The paper discusses four types of trade-off situations where the choice is between reforms to promote democracy versus efforts to secure peace. These dilemmas are here referred

to as the horizontal dilemma (i.e., inclusion versus exclusion), the vertical dilemma (i.e., legitimacy versus efficacy), the systemic dilemma (i.e., local versus international ownership of the processes) and the temporal dilemma (i.e., long-term versus short-term efforts). Failure to deal with such dilemmas can result in return to war (e.g. Angola 1992 and Liberia 2000). Alternatively it can result in backsliding to authoritarianism as in for example Haiti 1994–2005 and Ethiopia after the elections in 2005. I claim that a theoretical explanation of why democratization in war-torn societies succeeds or fails needs to include a simultaneous analysis of these four dilemmas.

The overarching purpose of this paper is to enhance our understanding of why efforts to promote democracy and peace do not always go together. I build on research stemming from previously separate discourses on democratization, peace-building and conflict theory to construct a framework for the analysis of simultaneous democratization and peace-building. The concept of war-to-democracy transitions is developed and explored. I discuss why the combination of a legacy of war, reforms to democratize and efforts to build peace often result in dilemmas where peace-building and democratization have adverse effects on each other. The failure to deal with such dilemmas can have devastating effects, thus undermining both long-term democratization and peace. A broad conclusion is that when the choice is between securing the peace and promoting democracy, peace should be given priority.

To date, discourses on democratization and armed conflict have not been integrated, leaving a gap in our understanding of potential trade-offs between peace versus long-term democratization for societies shattered by conflict. Democracy is commonly understood as a system where diverse interests are managed through ongoing negotiations and accommodated by accountable and legitimate institutions. Although conflicts are seldom fully resolved, democracy supposedly manages them by peaceful means (Commission on Global Governance 1995; Przeworski 1991). In this way democracy and peace reinforce each other. Democracy is consolidated when peaceful means of conflict management are accepted as ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, 5). Sustainable peace presupposes a system of governance where

diverse interests and grievances are accommodated by negotiations and compromises (Licklider 2005, 35; Wallensteen 2002, 139-144). For a long time it was also assumed that democratization and peace processes were parallel and mutually beneficial. However, in the early 1990s researchers identified an apparent paradox: while democracy as a political system is associated with peaceful conflict management both within and between states, the road to democracy is often conflict-ridden.²

The conditions typical for war-torn societies, as well as the dynamics of and interplay between the two processes of peace-building and democratization, contribute to this contradiction. While non-violent conflicts are healthy features of any democracy, *violent* conflicts undermine the foundations for a functioning democracy. Electoral violence, political assassinations, violent riots and extreme levels of crime are threats to the new political order and to basic civilian security. Failure to deal with violence can lead to escalation of violence, leading to a vicious circle of retribution and a downward spiral.

After a peace deal is reached, the legacies of war tend to linger. Insecurity and unsolved grievances mean that political elites, as well as civil society, remain polarized and that the basis for inclusive ideologies is weak. In combination with a shattered infrastructure, and an economy structured on the spoils of war, this polarization implies that democratization faces particular challenges in post-war societies. This is why the core elements of democracy, such as popular participation, mobilization of interest groups and open competition between political parties, increase the risk of violent conflict in societies entering a democratization process. In addition, efforts in support of peace deals constrain the process of democratization. For example, the inclusion of former rebels in government for the sake of peace, such as the SPLM in Sudan 2004, may undermine democratic legitimacy and long-term stability. When this is the case, the simultaneous processes of peace-building and democratization have adverse effects on each other.

² See, for example, (Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1996; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Mann 2005; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Maoz and Russett 1993; Snyder 2000).

War-to-Democracy Transitions

Many contemporary democratization processes take place in societies shattered by war. Previous research has often focused either on democratization (often analyzing transitions taking place in societies that have not experienced armed conflict) or peace-building after intrastate armed conflicts without any analysis of democratization. A common assumption is that democracy implies peace and, vice versa, that peace implies democracy. Multidimensional peace operations set out to achieve both peace and democracy. The expectation is that post-war³ transitions result in both peace and democracy. However, the obstacles facing many societies undergoing such transitions, suggest a need to combine the experiences of war-shattered societies with an integrated theoretical framework on the processes of democratization and peace-building.

The transition from relatively stable authoritarianism in Yugoslavia to conflict-ridden democratization in Kosovo and the resumption of war after elections in Angola 1992 give an indication of the broad scope of cases undergoing simultaneous peace-building and democratization. These transitions vary a great deal, for example in terms of starting point (e.g. previous history of governance and type of warfare), conduct of international engagement, and progress towards democracy and peace. The plentitude of cases and efforts intended to promote both democratization and peace-building, gives rise to the need for a comprehensive understanding of post-war transitions where democratization and peace-building are treated as separate phenomena, which might or might not enforce each other. The core question is how a war-to-democracy transition can be achieved peacefully. The challenges of democratization in

³ The phenomenon of war-to-democracy transition takes place in societies shattered by violent conflict. Such societies are often referred to as post-conflict cases. However, the term 'post-conflict' invites the interpretation that 1) there has been a violent conflict and 2) the conflict is now solved and violence has ceased. However, these terms are actually misnomers. By convention, 'post-conflict' usually denote societies affected by armed conflicts, where only parts of the conflicts are solved and where some organized violent behavior still lingers on. Yet, it is problematic to use the term 'post-conflict' when, in fact, non-violent conflicts are part of all societies – also so-called post-conflict societies. Thus, the term 'conflict' fails to distinguish those societies where conflicts are settled by peaceful means from societies where violent relations prevail. The term 'post-war' is used here, for want of a better term, to refer to situations where the major warfare has ceased, but where incompatible issues may remain unsolved.

post-conflict societies can be studied by simultaneously looking at the peace process and the democratization process: how do these processes develop, when do they reinforce each other, and when and why do they clash?

The two intertwined processes, from violent conflict to peace on the one hand, and from authoritarian rule to democracy on the other hand, are here labeled a *war-to-democracy transition*. The two processes are treated as separate, but related processes, and the dynamic within and between these processes is in focus. This means that while in practice democratization and peace-building often overlap, they are two analytically different processes. The perception of democratization and peace-building as two logically separate processes, facilitates our understanding of the conditions under which efforts to promote democracy and peace clash. This conceptual framework can be used to analyze the effects of such dilemmas for war-to-democracy transitions and enhance our understanding of how such transformations can be facilitated.

Dilemmas: Horizontal, Vertical, Systemic, and Temporal

Four types of dilemmas may arise when the processes of democratization and peace-building have adverse effects on each other: the horizontal, the vertical, the systemic and the temporal.⁴ The horizontal dilemma concerns the issue of which groups should be represented in the processes of peace and democratization. This decision regards the horizontal relation between the elites of warring parties and of democratic political parties. A selected group of elites may more easily commit to difficult compromises, while comprehensive peace negotiations may result in more lasting agreements by involving all parties with a stake in post-war developments. Broad inclusion is also in line with democratic theory on power sharing, which suggests that the more groups represented in the process, the more democratic it is. Some

⁴ The labeling of these four types of dilemmas is my own, but builds on previous research. Such research identifies obstacles and dilemmas related to democratization in war-torn societies, specifically to what I label the temporal dilemma (see e.g. Cousens 2001a; de Zeeuw 2005); the systemic dilemma (see e.g. Burnell 2005; Chandler 1999; Chandler 2004; Knaus and Martin 2003); the horizontal dilemma (see e.g. Stedman 1997) and what I label as the vertical dilemma (see e.g. Cousens 2001a; Paris 2004).

groups also have legitimate reasons to demand political power after years of oppression and discrimination. Research furthermore suggests that warring parties are more likely to sign a peace deal if they are guaranteed a share in the future government (Lijphart 1977; Walter 2002). However, when broad inclusion is extended to violent parties, it may have negative effects on democratization. Such inclusion can be seen as a reward for violence and thereby contradict the democratic principle of non-violence. This may obstruct disarmament of warring groups and also provide incentives for new groups to use violent tactics to gain influence. Thus, the horizontal dilemma involves a trade-off between inclusion (e.g. for the sake of reaching a peace deal or broad representation) and exclusion (e.g. for the sake reaching a compromise solution and perhaps also for long-term democratization).

An example of the horizontal dilemma is the trade-off involved in the decision about including all warring parties versus excluding potential spoilers. Peace produces both winners and losers. A rebel group that expects to be excluded from future governments and control over part of the territory may find peace too costly. For this reason, a peace deal often stipulates inclusion of the main warring parties in the political process. Peace agreements providing for guaranteed positions in government have been reached in cases such as Burundi 2000, Cambodia 1991, and Democratic Republic of Congo 2002. In some cases, not all rebels are included. For example, the power sharing-agreement for Sudan 2004 did not include the rebels in Darfur and fighting continues. In May 2006 a peace agreement for Darfur between the government of Sudan and the largest rebel group was reached, but two smaller groups demand more concessions before laying down their arms.

However, inclusion of violent parties entails several obstacles for democratization and peace-building. For democracy to take root, actors mobilized for war have to abandon military methods for negotiations and compromises. These leaders also have to convince their followers that they should demobilize and be prepared for concessions. Ideally, they should also abandon excluding ideologies, such as ethnonationalism, and strive for broad-based democratic support. But also parties commonly labeled as terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, can gain

democratic legitimacy via parliamentary elections. Although the hope is that this will lead to a change in Hamas' politics, democratic institutions do not always produce peaceful democrats.

Exclusion of potential spoilers is an alternative strategy for promoting peaceful democratization. It rests on the notion of excluding nationalists and authoritarian actors for the sake of only allowing democratic movements to develop into political parties and compete for power. This strategy more clearly opens up for new actors. However, research has demonstrated that excluded groups to a greater extent return to violent tactics (Gurr 2000; Stedman 1997).

Civil society is often excluded from power-sharing deals. The exclusion of such segments of society leads to an uneven start for parties in a democratization process. One possibility to overcome this negative effect of power sharing is to include a broad range of actors in the peace negotiations and also in the future government. This was done for example in the Ivory Coast, where the 2003 peace deal also included the main political parties, in addition to the warring parties. The agreement in Liberia 2003 included not only all warring parties to the conflict (the government and the two rebel groups LURD and MODEL), but also representatives from the civil society. Likewise, the 2002 peace accord for the Democratic Republic of Congo included government representatives, rebel groups, militias, opposition parties and different civil society organizations (Nilsson, forthcoming).

Secondly, the vertical dilemma entails the difficult choice between efficacy and legitimacy. It pertains to the relation between elite and mass politics. On the one hand, legitimacy is expected to increase when the people are involved in all phases of the peace process, and also have a chance of influencing the crafting of a new constitution. On the other hand, the elites often have an interest in a non-public process. They want to signal resolve – that they are not prepared to make concessions – in order to get the best deal they can at the negotiation table. After a peace agreement, however, elites are expected to be conciliatory towards former foes and also urge their followers to demobilize and accept concessions. At the same time, some elites use the demands of extremist groups, to push for additional concessions from the other parties to the conflict also after a peace deal.

An alternative approach, or addition to broad inclusion during peace negotiations, is to strive for public support after a peace deal or democratic constitution is drafted. One way is to hold a referendum to try to ensure such legitimacy. The constitution of Iraq was approved despite the vast Sunni boycott of the October 2005 referendum. However, if the new constitution or peace deal does not receive sufficient popular support, the whole process is delayed. This was the case, when the Greek Cypriot majority voted against United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan to unite Cyprus in April 2004. The majority rule typically used in referenda may in divided societies exacerbate polarization. Under such conditions, it might be necessary for new leaders to emerge for negotiations to restart.

Thirdly, the systemic dilemma refers to the issue of ownership, i.e. of international versus local control of the processes of democratization and peace-building. Third party engagement in peace-building might generate a dilemma of peace versus democracy. On the one hand, international involvement may be necessary to end violence and to facilitate negotiations. Support for democratic developments aims to promote stability and institutions for conflict management. But on the other hand, both sustainable peace-building and democratization depend on the commitment of local people and elites. Contemporary peace-building sometimes includes temporary external control over political processes. These structures are not formally accountable to the citizens in these states. In such cases local ownership is weak, thus risking to halt or reverse the process and even to alienate people from democracy as an ideal. For example, when the Office of the High Representative (OHR) stepped in to dismiss elected officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the process of democratization was halted or even reversed. Such international intervention risks increasing support for extremism and ethnochauvinism.

But in a post-war context, moderate political parties tend to be lacking or marginalized. For this reason, international support can be pivotal to strengthen the capacity of local moderate groups and thereby facilitate democratization. Ideally, democracy promotion entails support to a locally driven democratization process. It is often the case that at least some local actors

demand democratization. Today it would be difficult to withhold from people the right to choose a government – even in cases with unclear status of the state, such as Kosovo and Palestine. At the same time, international actors are reluctant to provide funds without conditions. Assistance is often earmarked for specific purposes, which do not always correspond to the most pressing local needs. Also, international engagements are often short-term, thereby prompting donors to try to speed up the process of democratization.

Fourthly, the temporal dilemma regards trade-offs concerning short-term versus long-term effects on democratization and peace-building. Efforts to support democratization may in the short run increase the risk of violence, and thereby in the long run undermine the chances for democracy to take root. Likewise, peacebuilding may involve restrictions on democratic freedoms such as freedom of press and mass demonstrations. In the long run, such constraints may cause unrest and turn into an obstacle for the implementation of the peace agreement.

The timing of elections also activates the temporal dilemma. Democracy means rule by the people, and it is difficult to think of another way to ensure democratic legitimacy than through elections. After a war, a democratic election also serves the purpose of bringing a decisive end to the war and of sealing the peace deal. Consequently, elections have come to be seen as the crowning event of the peace-building phase and an ‘exit strategy’ for organizations engaged in international peace missions.

However, the first post-war election is often riddled with violence and flawed election outcomes. One reason is that some actors expect to lose political power or control over valuable resources as a consequence of the peace and democratization processes. By threats and intimidation, these actors may seek to disrupt the transition, overthrow the election results or prevent election campaigns or voters from going to the polls. In the worst cases, elections trigger violent conflict and the process of democratization is halted or reversed. For this reason, it has been suggested that elections should be postponed until the conditions are stable and democratic institutions are in place (Cousens 2001b; Mansfield and Snyder 2002a; Paris 2004). The sequencing of peace-building has caused dilemmas for Kosovo, for example, where

democratic institutions were introduced before its international status was settled, and before reconciliation between the warring groups and democratic norms have taken root. It remains to be seen whether this method to promote democratization will contribute to a successful war-to-democracy transition.

Not dealing with these four types of dilemmas can have devastating effects. The Freedom House data is a crude, and some would even say deceptive, indicator of democracy, but nevertheless gives us an idea about which countries are far from democratic, or ‘not free’ as it is termed by this organization. A quick look at the Freedom House ranking 2005 for the 14 conflict locations where major peace-building missions were launched between 1989 and 1999 (Paris 2004), show that very few have achieved what Freedom House calls ‘freedom’. Only Namibia, El Salvador and Croatia are ranked ‘Free’. Angola, Cambodia, Kosovo and Rwanda are ranked ‘Not Free, and the rest ‘Partly Free’.⁵

The lessons learned from missions aiming for democratization and peace-building in for example Liberia and Haiti demonstrate that when there is a choice between promoting democracy and peace, securing the peace is pivotal. To understand why dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions occur, and why they can have such devastating effects, I suggest that theoretical explanations can be found in three areas of research: the efforts to promote peace-building, the conflictual character of democratization processes, and the legacy of war.

Peace-building

The ending of war does not always mean peace. In addition, peace-building can in extreme cases make things worse. Several aspects of peace-building may give rise to dilemmas between efforts to promote peace and support to democratization. This is that case when peace-building includes multiple tasks with competing objectives, when the coordination between a multitude of actors falter, when project-oriented and short-termed mission fail to mitigate negative long-

⁵ See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005>.

term effects, and when international engagement makes the host society dependent on external support. For peace to become viable, not only the conditions that generated the conflict need to be addressed. In addition, peace-building should be designed in such a way that the above mentioned dysfunctions can be avoided. Furthermore, I suggest that peace-building needs to focus on security and the designing of self-sustaining institutions. Otherwise there is a risk that peace-building gives rise to new conflicts or that it undermines democratization.⁶

Since the 1990s, democratization has become an integral part of the conflict-prevention agenda. Multidimensional peace operations have become the model for contemporary peace promotion.⁷ Such missions seek not only to prevent violence, but also to address the root causes of conflict. In *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested that post-war peace-building was a form of conflict prevention via social and political reconstruction. In 1996, the Agenda for Peace was supplemented by the *Agenda for Democratization* and in the *Framework for cooperation in peacebuilding* (2001) UN Secretary General Kofi Annan further developed the notion that democratization is part of peace-building (United Nations 2001, Annex 1:1). In December 2005, the UN General Assembly and the Security Council jointly agreed to set up a Peacebuilding Commission to help countries emerging from conflict manage the transition to stability and development.

⁶ A broad understanding is that peace-building denotes the various efforts in support of political, institutional, and social transformation necessary to bring about lasting peace (Bertram 1995) Besides the commonly used definition of peace-building as defined in the *Agenda for Peace*, there are at least two other interpretations of peacebuilding. Drawing on Johan Galtung, peace-building has been used to refer to non-elite processes, beyond and below the state. Other scholars use the term peace-building broadly to refer to peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict prevention (Call and Cook 2003). Such efforts may involve the local population and local elites as both initiators and recipients of assistance, as well as intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. For my analysis of war-to-democracy transitions, peace-building begins with a peace accord that settles at least one of the incompatibilities at stake in the conflict, such as control over territory or government. Peace agreements do not always put an end to violence. In other cases, the fighting ends but an agreement regulating the incompatibilities is not reached until years later. The focus here is on post-war peace-building, i.e. the prevention of a relapse into conflict. Peace-building is thus defined as efforts to implement and consolidate peace agreements.

⁷ The first generation peacekeeping was mainly a military exercise aimed at upholding ceasefires through the method of separating warring parties and thereby providing opportunities for negotiations. The second generation peacekeeping, also labeled multidimensional peace operations, includes both military and civilian components.

War is costly, but much of the costs of war occur after it is over. Peace implementation requires financial resources, and economic reconstruction is often necessary for sustainable peace (Collier et al. 2003; Paris 2004; Woodward 2002). Efforts to ‘demilitarize politics’ are also important parts of peace-building. This includes disarmament and demobilization of previously warring parties, destruction of weapons, reformation of the security sector, and issues related to democratization, such as the transformation of rebel groups into political parties (Lyons 2005; Spear 2002).

Democratization in war-torn societies also includes support for constitutional and legal reforms, the establishment of election administration, training of election staff and media professionals, political party assistance, international election and human rights monitoring and civil society aid. Experiences from countries such as Cambodia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Guatemala demonstrate that peace-building does not always move societies toward democracy. In these cases, malfunction of institutions is often seen as a key problem. These are largely non-transparent and unaccountable to members or society in general, politically biased, and financially unsustainable. The impact of all international support can be obstructed by interagency rivalries, donor’s priorities to demonstrate short-term results, and also foster a ‘culture of dependence’. This is especially problematic for support for peace-building and democratization, as these processes need to be based on local needs and driven by the people in the recipient society (Chandler 2004; de Zeeuw 2005; Diamond 1999; Paris 2004).

The Conflictual Elements of Democratization

Successful democratization requires a minimum level of security and consensus on which territory and people constitute the state. While this stance was advocated already thirty years ago (Rustow 1970), contemporary democratization is nevertheless promoted where these

conditions are lacking.⁸ I suggest that this old recommendation needs to be taken seriously and that a minimum level of security and agreement on the borders of the nation are necessary prerequisites for peaceful democratization. The necessity of ensuring that these preconditions are in place before embarking on democratization seemed to be forgotten as more and more countries began to hold regular elections. Research commonly assumed that democratic transitions developed gradually, from political liberalization towards a consolidated democracy. Although some violence occurred in earlier democratization waves, it was not seen as a serious threat to peace. On the contrary, the notion of ‘democratic peace’ – that democracies virtually never go to war with each other – prompted both researchers and policy-makers to conclude that the expansion of the democratic zone would reduce the risk of armed conflicts (e.g., Dahl 1971; Diamond 1997; Diamond et al. 1997; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

At the same time, research has shown that democracy as well as democratization both contain conflictual elements (e.g., Hegre et al. 2001; MacMillan 2003; Mann 2005; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Mansfield and Snyder 2002b; Mansfield 2005; Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003; Rosato 2003; Thompson and Richard 1997). Not only may the move towards democracy fail; in addition, democratization can exacerbate violent conflict. I propose that two aspects of democratization can activate dilemmas in war-torn societies: the essence of the stipulated goal of democratization, namely democracy itself; and the shifts involved in the democratic transitions. Firstly, democracy by definition includes conflictual elements that can have severe effects in societies polarized by violence. In line with Robert Dahl's conception of polyarchy, key elements of democracy include contestation (including elections), participation, and basic human rights (Dahl 1971). Although democracy ideally stipulates conflict regulation through norms and institutions, it also induces conflict via increased contestation and polarization. Public contestation provides opportunities for

⁸ This has been noted also by for example Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1992) and Edward D. Mansfield (2005).

replacement of elected officials. As the political candidates compete for votes, they emphasize their differences rather than their common ground. Likewise, during an election campaign the constituencies are mobilized, thus oftentimes enhancing already high levels of polarization. Hence, democracy by definition implies opposition and mobilization along distinctive lines and a certain degree of polarization. This means that democracy provides both opportunities and incentives for conflict. Whereas conflicts are most often managed peacefully in consolidated democracies, this feature can have severe effects in a typical post-war society where weapons abound and people remain polarized.

Secondly, the process of democratization entails particular features which increase the risk of violence (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). The movement towards democracy entails changes and shifts of power. This increases the risk of use of violence by those who lose or fear losing power and by those that feel that they should gain more. In accordance with the definition of democracy above, democratization refers here to *improvements* in contestation (such as more political parties and candidates), participation (broadening of the electorate) and human rights (for example, freedom of speech and freedom to organize demonstrations).

An emerging field of research specifies the conditions and types of political transformations highly correlated with violent conflict.⁹ One factor that contributes to the oftentimes high levels of violence during the beginning of a democratization process is that public expectations tend to be high. People often demand rapid and real improvement in the quality of life. But democracy does not automatically result in other desirable goals such as economic development and equality. Many of the obstacles embedded in the democratization

⁹ Some findings suggest that states that are becoming more democratic reduce the risk of interstate war by half. However, especially rocky and rapid transitions or reversals are associated with an increased risk of war (Ward and Gleditsch 1998). Other scholars suggest that because each move towards democracy or authoritarianism entails a risk of violent conflict, and because democracy is the most stable regime type, rapid democratization is less risky than a gradual process. Furthermore, not only transitions, but also certain phases are associated with conflict. The initial phase of democratization as well as consolidated semi-democracies – cases where no significant political change has occurred for some time – are more war-prone than consolidated democracies and autocracies (Hegre et al. 2001).

process also relate to the fact that the different democratization components cannot be achieved all at once. Initially there are typically great discrepancies between public demands and the institutional capacity to deliver, as well as between public loyalty to the state and the state's capacity to control undemocratic elements and make legitimate political decisions. When the different reforms do not work in concert, the risk of violence increases.

Given the conflictual elements of democratization, basic consensus – concerning the legitimacy of the state, its territory and its citizens – is necessary to prevent democratization from turning violent. However, it is often disagreement on these specific issues which caused violent conflict to erupt in the first place. Unfortunately, democracy does not solve the issue of what constitutes the state; which territory should belong to it and which people should be citizens of the state. Even after a peace deal many actors continue to challenge the state. Also when former warring parties become part of the government, some continue to use violent tactics with the ambition to change the character of the state. In instances where the elites have decided to disarm, people may remain polarized. This means that war-shattered societies are particularly vulnerable to the risks of democratization.

The Legacy of Violent Conflict

After a violent intrastate conflict, conditions conducive to democratization are typically absent and the legacies of conflict tend to linger.¹⁰ Arms are widely available and often used, even after a peace deal has been signed. Due to psychological trauma of violence and fear of renewed violence, mass mobilization along extremist lines remains. Political ideologies are based on exclusive group-based interest rather than on universal, society wide interests. Threats and violence prevent political candidates from running for office and hinder voters from going to the polling stations. Political trust is low, which hinders cooperation across subcultures. Whereas many civil society organizations play a pivotal role in humanitarian assistance and

¹⁰ For a discussion on conditions conducive for democracy and democratization see for example Dahl (1971) and Huntington (1991, 37-38).

reconstruction after war, there are examples where voluntary organizations foment inter-group violence. This was the case during the civil war in Lebanon 1975-89. In the worst case, such activities can even contribute to genocidal violence. In Rwanda, radio broadcasting was used to instigate the genocide of Tutsis in 1994.

During and after ethnic wars, people tend to seek protection in areas where the majority population belong to their own ethnic group and thus become displaced within their own country (Posen 1993). In such contexts, proponents of a moderate ideology face a high risk of becoming targets both of extremist violence by people belonging to the same ethnic kin, and members of other ethnic groups who portray all non-members as enemies. To escape violence, moderates often have to leave for other states and become refugees.

Competition for votes based on increasingly extremist rhetoric, so-called politics of outbidding, can also enhance polarization and foster ethnic tension (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 187). Such outbidding has taken place in, for example, post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, where nationalist parties have cemented their early grip of power in successive elections. Additionally, in many post-war societies the political party organization is absent, weak or fragmented. The 2005 Afghan parliamentary elections demonstrate this point. The over 5,800 candidates that ran for office were formally part of different political parties, but personalistic attributes and clan politics largely substituted the role of ideologies.¹¹

In addition to the initially contested issues, such as control over government or control of territory, new issues emerge during the conflict. At the same time, there are often fewer resources to share or divide after a conflict. Typically, the economy is weak, the level of unemployment high, the infrastructure shattered, and natural resources destroyed or inaccessible, for example, due to land mines. Refugees and internally displaced persons are often prevented from returning to their pre-war homes because of new occupants or destroyed houses, insecurity, and lack of economic resources. Thus, an agreement seldom means that a

¹¹ See Benjamin Reilly's chapter in this volume.

conflict is resolved. Conflicting attitudes, behavior and issues remain to be transformed after the fighting has stopped (Lederach 1997).

Simultaneous Peace-building and Democratization

The cases in focus are war-torn societies that undergo simultaneous peace-building and democratization. For our purposes, it is important to include both cases where a war-to-democracy transition has taken place and cases where such transition is impeded by difficult dilemmas. To recall, peace-building is here seen as the implementation of a peace agreement. This means that all pertinent cases are post-settlement cases. Democratization refers here to *improvements* in contestation, participation and human rights. This minimal definition allows us to analyze also cases where only minor moves towards democracy have occurred.

Below is a list of 43 conflict locations where a peace agreement has been signed during the post-Cold War era. The conflict location for civil armed conflicts, and the latest peace accord for each conflict are listed. In most of these cases, there have also been improvements in contestation and human rights after the conflict was formally ended. Where this is the case, a war-to-democracy transition can be considered underway.¹²

¹² These are the 43 cases that fulfill the following criteria: they are 1) coded as peace agreements by UCDP by April 2006; 2) intrastate peace agreements (inter-state peace agreements are excluded); 3) a peace agreement was signed during the period 1989-April 2006 4) only the latest peace agreement is included (this means that the given peace accord may be non-substantial, e.g., procedural or only regulating a minor issue, while the main peace accord was signed earlier or is planned for the future). Cases exclude from the list, according to the criteria above, include Iraq and South Africa (no peace deal), East Timor/Indonesia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia and Cyprus. Although they do not fulfill the criteria above, it can nevertheless be valuable to analyze these cases to deepen our understanding of war-to-democracy transitions. For UCDP data, refer to <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/index.htm>.

Cases of peace-building and democratization after civil war, 1989–2005

Conflict Location	Name and Year of Latest Peace Accord
Afghanistan	Mahipar Agreement 1996
Angola	The Lusaka Protocol 1994
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hills Tracts Peace Accord 1997
Bosnia and Herzegovina	The Dayton Accords 1995
Burundi	Global Ceasefire Agreement 2003
Cambodia	The Paris Agreement 1991
Chad	Yebibou Agreement 2005
Colombia	Los Pozos Accord 2002
Comoros	Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros 2003
Congo	Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités 1999
Croatia	The Erdut Agreement 1995
DRC	Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations – The Final Act 2003
Djibouti	Accord de reforme et concorde civile 2001
El Salvador	Chapultepec Peace Agreement 1992
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Declaration on measures for a political settlement 1994
Guatemala	Agreement for a firm and lasting peace 1996
Guinea Bissau	Abuja Peace Agreement 1998
Haiti	Governor's Island Agreement 1998
India (Bodoland)	Bodoland Autonomous Council Act 1993
India (Tripura)	Memorandum of Settlement 1993
Indonesia (Aceh)	Memorandum of understanding between Indonesia and GAM 2005
Israel (Palestine)	The Sharm-el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II 1999
Ivory Coast	Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire 2005
Liberia	Accra Peace Agreement 2003
Liberia	The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003
Macedonia	The Ohrid Agreement 2001
Mali	Pacte National 1992
Mexico	San Andrés Accord 1996
Moldova (Dniestr)	Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations 1997
Mozambique	Acordo General de Paz 1992
Niger (Air and Azawad)	Agreement on Lasting Peace Settlement (Niger – ORA) 1995
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	The Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001
Philippines (Mindanao)	Mindanao Final Agreement 1996
Rwanda	The Arusha Accords 1993
Senegal (Casamance)	General Accord between Senegal and MFDC 2004
Sierra Leone	Abuja Ceasefire Agreement 2000
Somalia	The Cairo Declaration on Somalia 1997
Sudan	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005
Tajikistan	The Moscow Declaration 1997
Uganda	The Yumbe Agreement 2002
UK (Northern Ireland)	The Good Friday Agreement 1998
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	Kosovo Peace Agreement I 1999
Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	Brioni Agreement 1991

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A brief look at the list gives us an idea of the many war-torn societies where challenges face the people that live in these locations, and the international community organization which aim to support the processes of democratization and peace-building. There is no easy way to simultaneously achieve peace and democracy after civil war. Not only are the conditions for the initiation of a democratization process unfavorable after intrastate conflict, in addition, the opening up of political space aggravates these conditions. The two processes of democratization and peace-building may clash, thus leading to negative effects on each other. Such potential

quandaries reflect the inherent conflictual nature of democracy and democratization as well as the difficult process towards peace. Appreciation of the particular dilemmas that arise in each post-war situation is necessary for the design of proper means to advance synchronized democratization and peace-building. Ideally, such analysis makes it possible to avoid several of the dilemmas and to properly design means to simultaneously support peace and democracy. However, sometimes there is an inevitable choice between democracy and peace. Without peace it is impossible to achieve free political contestation, popular participation and human rights. This is why, it is here argued, democratization should not be promoted too early. Whereas the process of democratization is very vulnerable to a breach of peace, peace-building often progresses despite setbacks in democratization. When dilemmas between democracy and peace cannot be avoided, peace must be prioritized. Securing a minimal level of peace is a first necessary step for successful war-to-democracy transitions.

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